Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-95-044 *7 March 1995*

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Speculations on Berisha-Selami Conflict

95P20573A Tirana REPUBLIKA in Albanian 16 Feb 95 pp 1, 4

[Article by G. Levonja: "Reconciliation or a Bigger Split"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The "Selami phenomenon" was one of the latest links in a chain of events that followed the [defeated] 6 November 1994 referendum [on a new constitution]. Therefore, like the results of the referendum, the "Selami case" has served as a catalyzer in the fermentation of several processes, which have been inactive up to now, both within the Democratic Party [PD] and outside it.

Recently, the media—especially the left-wing media and the media close to it—have been devoting a lot of space to the latest disagreements within the PD; between Selami and his supporters, on the one side, and the other wing, which is said to be under the influence of President Berisha. The developments at issue are even treated as a duel between Berisha and Selami. If you follow carefully everything that is happening in the PD, any hypothesis concerning the "rebellion" of the chairman of the ruling party against the party line is possible—which is somewhat absurd!

Considering the moment at which the "Selami phenomenon" appeared, the version that he is trying to get more power in his party by reducing the power of the head of state is a credible one. Indeed, the discussions in the PD parliamentary group in connection with government personnel changes, in the "Ruli-Uka" case; the attacks of the opposition against Zhulali, Arbnori and Meksi; the way in which the "Brozi" case concluded, resulting in the release of the five ethnic Greeks—all these occurrences, since they were directed against Berisha, created a favorable terrain for Selami to become an uncontested leader of the party. In such a situation, Berisha, caught between a rock and a hard place, would be wise to give approval to the aspirations of his dauphin. This would preserve the unity of the party, and Berisha would have his hands free to maneuver in these difficult situations and would not be the only target of the attacks of the opposition.

However, we cannot rule out the possibility that Selami—realizing that his party has no future because of the ineffective governing of the PD, which has caused it to lose popularity—is trying to distance himself from the party leaders by creating a "casus belli," by fighting with the rest of the party leadership; and to leave the post of party chairman. If one considers the way in which the crisis that this has caused in the PD is being treated, the second possibility becomes more credible.

While not underestimating the aforementioned versions, which place Selami himself in the role of the generator, one cannot ignore the thesis that the "Selami phenomenon" might have been devised by the PD leadership, as a maneuvering tactic to confront concerns about the future.

First: The scenario of a conflict within the party, which would target its key figures, would temporarily divert the attention of public opinion and the voters from the many problems that have not been resolved due to the ineffectiveness of the PD government—as a result of which the PD has been bombarded with accusations and a campaign by the opposition to expose corruption and violations of the law by government officials. In this regard, it can be said that, so far, the "Selami case" has achieved its aim.

Second: A conflict of massive proportions within the PD might result in its abandonment by Berisha, who (although it is late) might prefer the comfort of a supra-party position, which the position of head of state assures him.

Third: The PD—especially after the referendum, after the hostility with a part of the strata who ascended to the throne on 22 March [1992], after the divorce from the partners of the formal coalition—is following its own road and is more and more isolated. In such a situation, the formation of alliances with different parties is regarded as essential for the future of the PD. However, its unfriendly attitude toward the right wing—especially against the former political persecutees and the legal owners—and the propaganda against the socialists; the Democratic Alliance Party [PAD]; and, lately, the Social-Democratic Party [PSD], considerably reduce its opportunities for entering into alliances in its two wings.

To break through the "armored coating" created in the two wings by the PD, the party would be divided into factions, following the example of the Christian Democrats in Italy, who remained in different governments for four decades thanks to the factions in their party. Thus, the PAD would be happy to agree to a coalition with a PD faction that would not include the "supporters" of Berisha who made [PAD chairman] Ceka and the "motionists" [parliamentary group that founded the Democratic Alliance] leave the party—while the PD "radicals" hope to be accepted as allies by the Albanian Right-Wing Alliance [LDSh] regardless of this group's contempt of any overtures made to them.

The PD and other political forces are aware that none of them can get the percentage of support necessary for a single-color government. For this reason, Selami's "rebellion" is hailed by the forces grouped politically with the PD.

The PAD members that split off from the PD under the label of "leftists," "agents and missionaries of Ramiz Alia," etc. would be committing suicide if they were to accept an alliance with the Socialist Party [PS]. This is why the PAD leaders talk about a program alliance. On the other hand, the PAD has still not found the keys to open the doors of the right wing, and the creation of the LDSh dashed their hopes for such a thing. Therefore, the creation of a PD faction without "Berishans" would be an oxygen tank for the PAD's aspirations to create a competitive "liberal-democratic" center.

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However, the statement of PS deputy chairman S. Pellumbi, who does not rule out an alliance with "the uncompromised part of the PD," could be considered to be the biggest surprise in the events following the "Selami phenomenon." Mr. Pellumbi's statement and the support and approval shown in the PS press for Selami and his recent attitudes are an indication that the PS, which considers the contributions of the PAD and the PSD to be insufficient, intends to fish among the PD's electorate. On the other hand, the fact that these things happened immediately after the creation of the LDSh makes one think that the PS intends to create a left-wing pole that would counterbalance the forces of the right-wing pole to avoid any dangers which might result....

However, any alliance between the PS and any part of the PD would run into great difficulty because of the fact that the leader of the PS, [Fatos] Nano, is in prison because of the contribution of what can be called the "uncompromised part of the PD." It must not be forgotten that it was Selami who issued the first call to put Nano into prison, at PD meetings. For this reason, an alliance would not be easily accepted by the rank and file members of the PS, who are greatly upset by the imprisoning of their party's leader.

On the other hand, the support expressed by the PS leaders and press could be turned into a weapon against Selami and be used as an argument to justify calling him the "Iago of democracy."

In any event, tomorrow's meeting of the National Council of the PD, at which the process of approving the constitution will probably be discussed, will be more a clash of groups than a meeting.

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SDS Leadership in Blagoevgrad Splits in Two

AU0603171695 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 2-3 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by Nikola Stoyanov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Blagoevgrad—The Coordinating Council of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] in Blagoevgrad on 1 March finally split in two. The local SDS organization thus now has a new leadership and new chairman.

Ivan Kostov, chairman of the SDS National Coordinating Council, had promised that he would guarantee that both of the warring camps in the local SDS coalition in Blagoevgrad would be able to attend a general assembly to elect a legitimate leadership, but last night some of the SDS party leaders in the city were refused admittance to the meeting.

Kostov did not attend the meeting, but SDS Chief Secretary Khristo Biserov and Filip Dimitrov, the top name on the SDS election list for Blagoevgrad, were present as substitutes. The leaders of seven of the 11 parties in the local SDS coalition—including the Radical Democratic Party, Ecoglasnost Independent Association, Christian Democratic Union, and the Democratic Party-1896—did not receive official invitations and were barred from entering the hall by the bodyguards of an unknown security company.

Former DS Official Discusses 6th Directorate

95BA0088A Sofia 168 CHASA in Bulgarian 19 Dec 94 p 15

[Interview with multigroup official and author Dimitur Ivanov by Mariana Svetoslavova; place and date not given: "'I Was on Both Sides of the Barricade at the Same Time'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *To a certain extent State Security was more modern in its way of thinking compared to the Communist Party, he claims. Former DS [State Security] employees remain on top because they are officers—disciplined and purposeful—was his explanation.*

[Svetoslavova] Mr. Ivanov, in your new book titled *Confrontation*, you speak of the opposition to the Todor Zhivkov regime from 1956 to 1989. I assume that you were quite familiar with the participants in these informal movements.

[Ivanov] Yes, I knew some of them. Others I observed—the people related to the party and coming from the party. Some of them were also leaders, creators of such informal group organizations. I have included in my book the so far only existing and fullest possible list of members of informal organizations. The book even includes the following dedication: Occasionally, the following happens in human life: to be on both sides of the barricade, simultaneously. Or else to try to interpret both viewpoints and be torn between two extremes. In the final account, if you are not sensible, try and stop the pendulum of social development. However, this is nearly impossible. The dedication is to Petko Simeonov and others like him.

[Svetoslavova] Why Petko Simeonov?

[Ivanov] Because as a result of a conversation with him about a month ago I developed this idea. There is something else as well. Petko is one of the people most worthy of respect who were opponents of the regime, as were Dr. Zhelev, Blaga [Dimitrova], Koprinka Chervenkova, Vagenshtayn, and Georgi Mishev. These are people who, regardless of the consequences, held their views motivated by purely ideological considerations, marching toward a single objective that, to a large extent, was a lost cause for they lacked international, foreign political conditions. That is what both then and now made me respect them even further.

[Svetoslavova] What would you say about the widespread view that in Bulgaria the opposition was created by State Security?

[Ivanov] I will say that this is not true. It was not State Security that created the opposition in Bulgaria. It is even less true that it was created by the Communist Party. Personally, I would say that if there were a few more intelligent people or else younger people, more modern people in the leadership of the Communist Party and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, they would have most likely created it. To a large extent, however, what prevailed was dogmatism, sectarianism, and narrowness of views. Unfortunately, to a certain extent State Security was a more modern organization in its way of thinking compared to the Communist Party. In the sense that, in addition to the bad, we were also aware of the good....

[Svetoslavova] What good?

[Ivanov] The fact that our treatment of people must proceed not only from the bad but from the good as well, unlike the Communist Party. The reason was that, especially concerning their own cadres, they were terribly merciless and cruel. The moment they expelled someone from the party they forgot him. They made him lose his job. The biography of his children stated that they are the children of an opponent of the regime. This took place over many years. We dealt with all these people, naturally, as instructed by the party.

[Svetoslavova] As an officer of State Security what was your attitude toward the participants in informal movements?

[Ivanov] The work of State Security personnel makes it possible to study the target on a much more comprehensive basis compared to anyone else. Unfortunately, it makes it possible to be familiar with the person's private life. At that point one can see best who is moral and who is not. It is possible to assess most accurately the purity

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of the motivations of an individual, for I must tell you that in the entire so-called opposition self-seeking was frequently present.

[Svetoslavova] Even then?

[Ivanov] Even then. Self-seeking, careerism....

[Svetoslavova] What kind of careerism? At that point they were risking their freedom....

[Ivanov] Not all that much, as you may see. Unlike the characters in the first chapter of my book—1,200 people were subject to repression. They were jailed, interned, expelled from the party, dismissed from their jobs, and deprived of their pensions and officer rank. In this case, we are dealing with some seven people who were expelled from the party.

[Svetoslavova] Are you trying to say that the participants in the informal movements were aware of the fact that they were not threatened by anything substantial?

[Ivanov] In reality they were not threatened by anything serious. In 1988-89, in the center of Europe, nothing could happen other than for someone to be expelled from the party or toss Deyan Kyuranov into the police van and take him to the 5th Precinct. He was slapped across the face and, I think, Sasho Karakachanov received some scratches on his back. On the other side, Lieutenant Colonel Bonev committed suicide after that, if you remember the case. At this point I would raise the question of morality, of civic morality. And of individual responsibility.

[Svetoslavova] For quite some time, the greatest insult was for someone to be accused of being an agent of the 6th Directorate.

[Ivanov] That applies to those who spoke unprepared. Is it possible to think of a political police, of the 6th Directorate, the 6th Department, without knowing them, without being familiar with the legal documents and the law—what type of person that individual was when he committed his activities. What was the bylaw of the Communist Party—what it allowed and what it forbid to its members. It is entirely natural, when you violate democratic centralism, to be expelled from the party without this to be considered a repressive measure. You violate democratic centralism so the party leadership violates your comfort by expelling you from the party. Second, how could one speak of operative agent activities without being familiar with the legal base? There were laws and instructions, and all activities of State Security were based on legal documents.

[Svetoslavova] Everything was according to the law, but nonetheless....

[Ivanov] Do you know what happened then? All of a sudden it turned out that the former State Security personnel were once again playing a certain role in social, political, and economic life. The reason was not because they had agents in such places or because they had stolen money from the people or were laundering money; simply because, first of all, they were officers, and they were exceptionally disciplined and purposeful. Second, because they always had a serious attitude toward their work. Between 1984 and 1989, I and my colleagues did not have a single day of rest. We were always in the streets and in the country. There were bombs, there was a process of revival [measures against ethnic Turks], there were antiparty elements, ecological meetings, and who knows what else. We worked 16, 18, 20 hours a day. That was for 500 leva wages. Now, when it is possible, with the same amount of labor and the same stress with which we had become accustomed and which was within us (all of us are workaholics) to live and earn 10 times, a hundred times more, so why not do it? Such is the explanation and not because someone gave you money for nothing or else because Andrey Lukanov had helped me.... I personally was fired by Andrey Lukanov.

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Overview of Major 1994 Developments, Trends

95CH0129A Kosice DOMINO EFEKT in Czech 6-12 Jan 95 p 5

[Article by Martin Schmarcz: "The Czech Republic in 1994: Without Shocks and Dramatic Reversals"]

[FBIS Translated Text] To the extent to which we look back on the last 12 months, we find that the year 1994 lacked any kind of centrally great idea or signified any dramatic changes in direction in the Czech Republic. But, at the same time, this is the greatest positive factor of the past period. If we were to characterize last year at all, then it would be as a time of political stability and moderate economic prosperity. Despite the fact that the coalition was virtually pushing a few political evergreens before it constantly, despite the fact that the domestic scene was, for the first time, expressly shaken by corruption scandals, and in spite of the fact that the Czech Republic continues to specifically lag behind the more developed portion of Europe in terms of national economic indicators, this is not exactly a small accomplishment among the postcommunist countries.

In the Czech Republic, politics is finally beginning to be what it is supposed to be in an organized country: a profession for a very narrow stratum of people and a very boring matter for the overwhelming majority of the rest. The coalition is holding together despite continuing tension. In parliament and in the government, the cards have been thus dealt. Domestic and foreign policy are basically consistent and predictable and the opposition has very few chances to exert any kind of more specific influence upon this development before the elections. Moreover, natural Czech conservatism, which manifests itself in the belief in proven authority, contributes to maintaining the status quo: As long as emphasis on expertise occupies first place among citizen preferences with respect to government, the left does not have too many chances.

Throughout the year, there was a moderate redistribution of voter favor. Of course, despite the fact that the ODS [Civic Democratic Party] dropped by five points and the Social Democrats saw their advantage decline to a mere 8 percent according to the December public opinion poll conducted by the STEM [expansion not given], the coalition as a whole is nevertheless able to preserve its comfortable absolute majority (more than 50 percent). In actual fact, this means a still more express leadership—under the present situation, a mere five parties would be seated in parliament. In addition to the ODS, the ODA [Civic Democratic Alliance], and the KDU-CSL [Christian and Democratic Union-Czech People's Party], only the Social Democrats and the Communists would be eligible. In view of the fact that halfway through the election period voter faith in government policy normally always reaches its minimum, this is not a bad result for the Czech right. The year 1994, which also resulted in a more specific crystallization of the political and voter spectrum following the dramatic events of prior years, thus indicated that, provided there are no unexpectedly dramatic turnarounds, the changing of the government team will likely be a matter having a long-term horizon.

The degree of political stability in the Czech Republic in 1994 was directly proportional to the degree to which the existing coalition was cohesive. Domestic policy pursued by the four-party government already managed to find its own modus vivendi vacancies in the senate, incomplete restitutions or disputes regarding territorial-administrative reform are chronic and occasional neurotic bottlenecks in intracoalition cooperation, but, in principle, the transformation locomotive continues to be able to move.

But in 1994 a specific example showed, for the first time, that differing party interests are capable of not only tightening the string of intracoalition patience, but of threatening the substance of the reform itself. This was done by the People's Party. Of all of the government parties, this party has the oldest voter base, which leads them to now torpedo the proposals for conceptual changes in the area of social security, particularly raising the retirement age and lowering the share of state-guaranteed pensions in favor of individual coinsurance. This is truly a serious problem because the reform, which will strengthen the responsibility of individuals for their own old age, is essential. And when should these changes be implemented if not now that the willingness of the citizenry to bear the costs of the transformation is still advantageously high? Social reform will thus be a government topic in the year 1995—something that even Prime Minister Klaus openly admitted in his New Year's television address.

The most important moments in economic development during 1994 were the actual conclusion of privatization and the attainment of the long-anticipated approximately 3-percent growth in the gross domestic product.

The second round of coupon privatization culminated in a fundamental systems change in ownership relationships. Thanks to it, the Czech Republic, with its 80-percent private sector share, is ranked among the leading capitalist countries. This situation will not be changed even by the scandal surrounding the chief of the Center for Coupon Privatization, Lizner, who was accused of accepting bribes, or by several other corruption scandals and not even by generally realistically anticipated new revelations.

The speed with which this goal was reached is decisive. This is confirmed by the tremendous problems being experienced in those postcommunist countries in which privatization was slowed for a number of reasons, or even totally halted. This is not merely a question of lagging behind economically, which is an inevitable consequence of the persistence of a state controlled economy. Political disputes and an atmosphere of combativeness and mutual accusation result in a vicious circle of problems which could not even arise at all in a standard market society. As

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far as corruption is concerned, it fares somewhat better given the rapid pace of privatization, but its consequences are only short-term in nature, in contrast to the situation in which property remains under the administration of state officials. The extent of corruption is directly proportional to the influence the state administration has in the economy: In the phase of privatization, corruption tends to grow, but thanks to privatization it comes to an end once and for all.

Encouraging news for the government and another blow to the opposition, which has had to bitterly admit earlier that it is not likely to see a drastic growth in unemployment and a crippling decline in the standard of living, is represented by the growth of the gross domestic product. Following four years of decline and stagnation, there are signs of small, but hopeful recovery. The Czech economy has obviously definitively come to terms with the shocks resulting first from transformation and then from the partition of the state, but also those resulting from the introduction of a new taxation system or the disintegration of Eastern markets. And what is of the essence is that foreign experts are, in fact, predicting a growth rate for 1995 which is higher than the additional 3-percent growth rate promised by the government.

The year 1994 saw a definite end in the Czech Republic to the great transformation period. This means that, in future, the role of government, which has already now lost much of its influence in the economic sphere, will shrink greatly. However, the state's share in privatized enterprises continues to be preserved at unhealthily high levels, something which needs to be changed in the plans for a liberal economic doctrine. Also, the extent of state paternalism is overly broad. In addition to the social reform mentioned by Klaus, there is a need to fundamentally relax the regulation of the housing market and to reduce the share that public budgets occupy in the gross domestic product. But here the Klaus cabinet will not be able to find any direct line and clear solutions, as was the case with the economic transformation. Nevertheless, there is but a single path toward the future: It involves additional limitation of government jurisdictions in favor of freedom of action and decisionmaking on the part of individuals.

Few Applicants Receive Citizenship, Passport

95CH0134A Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 16 Jan 95 p 3

[Article by Oldrich Bilovsky: "The Plight of People Without CR Citizenship"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Only about 20 percent of the 75,000 applicants for Czech Republic [CR] citizenship have secured a Slovak passport. According to Jan Horvath, a publicist who concerns himself with this problem and who is a member of the Museum of Gypsy Culture in Brno, the remaining ones find themselves in a sorry plight. He told ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY that after 1 July of last year they lost their jobs, and social and other forms of benefits were taken away from them. They live in CR illegally, so to speak, without proper documents.

"They have begun to sell or pawn their equipment and personal effects on a large scale, they live with relatives or in temporary dormitories. In some cases they have received meal vouchers from authorities in the value of about 500 Czech korunas per person per month," said Horvath. He specified that an overwhelming number of these people are Gypsies. According to him, their families live in overcrowded apartments, as many as 18 to 20 people in three rooms. But only three or four people are registered for permanent residency, because that is the number that corresponds to the size of the apartment. As a result, a considerable number of Gypsies cannot prove permanent residence and obtain CR citizenship. "The situation is complicated by the efforts of the building owners to get rid of inconvenient tenants and rent the apartments on better terms," said Horvath.

He emphasized that there are cases on record of families being harassed, when their apartments were attacked by skinheads. According to him, families in Northern Bohemia especially, but also in Brno, have been ousted from their appartments in this way, and thus they lost a legal proof of permanent residence. He stated that those affected immediately also lost their jobs, because only citizens of Slovak Republic [SR] with a permanent residence in CR can obtain work. Horvath characterized as insolvable the situation of people who are in the process of serving sentences. According to him, at least 5,000 prisoners, formally SR citizens, cannot obtain a passport of that country because they have no possibility of having their pictures taken. "In this respect there are negotiations in progress with the prison administration to grant them an exception; nevertheless, they can obtain only a Slovak passport, not CR citizenship," Horvath continued. He noted, that they do not meet other condition—a clean record, and in most cases a permanent residence.

National Police Target Street Crime, Illegals

95CH0143B Prague PRAGUE POST in English 1-7 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Jan Stojaspal: "Police To Continue Street Sweeps"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Czech national police's recently stepped-up efforts to fight street crime and illegal immigration will continue.

Massive police sweeps—identification checks and widespread traffic checks—ended January 24. But police officials have said similar actions will be taken on a regular, daily basis in the future, if on a smaller scale.

"It's not going to be police in groups of 10, but five or so," said Radislav Charvat, deputy director with the national police. "It will depend on how many people are available."

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The recent operation involved close to 1,400 police officers, including an anti-terrorist police squad called in for reinforcements.

Even though the sweep cost an estimated 2 million Kc ($74,000), Miroslav Vavra, chief superintendent of the police's criminal service, argued that it paid off in a decrease in crime. According to Vavra, the number of car thefts per week was down by 60 and burglaries declined by 10. The incidence of traffic accidents was also lower, Vavra said.

During eight days of the sweep, 12,498 people were checked for identification and 1,675 people—440 of them foreigners—were brought in for further questioning, according to police records.

A total of 123 foreigners, mainly from former East bloc countries and Asia, were denied visas, and up to 13 foreigners will be deported.

"I can believe that foreigners (who are tourists) were surprised. But then they also complain when they're pickpocketed. They have to choose: either police or pickpockets," said police director Miroslav Bornik.

The number of pickpocketings in downtown Prague reportedly declined from an average 75 per week to 30.

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Velayati Arrives in Bratislava, Meets Press

LD0603184295 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovakia welcomed an important foreign guest today. 'Ali Akbar Velayati, minister of foreign affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has arrived in Slovakia. Following a meeting with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, there was an improvised news conference. Jan Baranek represented Radiozurnal:

[Baranek] After Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati had expressed thanks to Prime Minister Meciar for receiving him, he met a small group of journalists at the government office and said:

[Begin Velayati recording, in English with superimposed Slovak translation] During our talks we have covered bilateral, regional, and international issues. We have come to know each other ever since the birth of your country. We have exchanged delegations, we have visited each other. Naturally, this is the first meeting on this level. We would like to create joint working groups in the near future. We would also like to sign an agreement doing away with visas for diplomats. We would also like to cooperate in the sphere of science and technology, and in the private sector. The chairman or a member of our trade commission will visit your country in the near future.

We have also had consultations about regional problems, in your country, in the Balkans, as well as in the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and Central Asia. In the end we have agreed on the need to continue the dialogue and the exchange of delegations of the two countries. [end recording]

[Baranek] 'Ali Akbar Velayati will continue his visit to Slovakia tomorrow. Tomorrow morning he will be received by Ivan Gasparovic, chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic.. He will be received by Slovak President Michal Kovac tomorrow afternoon.

Meciar Meeting With Czech Counterpart Delayed

LD0303213695 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 2030 GMT 3 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar welcomed today a Czech proposal to hold an unofficial meeting with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus in Prague on 20 March, but, unfortunatelly, he had to turn it down. This date clashes with his visit to Paris to attend the Conference on Stability Pact and with his visit to Germany.

Speaking at a news conference in Vienna, Vladimir Meciar stressed he was interested in meeting his Czech counterpart and in intensively preparing the meeting that should lead to concluding new agreements because the existing model of cooperation no longer corresponds to developments.

Meciar Determined To Finish Mochovce Plant

LD0303154295 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1400 GMT 3 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] I regard my talks with Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky as very useful and fruitful. Both parties realize the necessity of good relations and mutual cooperation, which became particularly important after Austria joined the EU, Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar said at a news conference in Vienna after talks with his Austrian counterpart.

Meciar went on to say that the joint interest in developing mutual relations should not be impaired by public opinion on the completion of the Mochovce nuclear plant. According to Meciar, the Slovak Government fully understands the civic movements in Austria whose target is a nuclear-free Europe. The Slovak prime minister added that Slovakia is prepared to discuss alternative decisions with the Austrian Government. Should they turn out to be unacceptable, Slovakia is determined to complete the Mochovce nuclear plant, he said.

Aspects of Meciar's Personal Life Revealed on TV

AU0403144695 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 1 Mar 95 p 10

[Article by Karol Wolf: "Vladimir Meciar Loves Full Moons and Likes To Watch Wrestling"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, appearing on the new Slovak Television current affairs program "Without a Tailcoat" yesterday evening, declared his love for the full moon and admiration for the strong men on display in the wrestling ring.

"I am a little romantic when the moon is full; I always wander alone through the city or woods. At that time, everything is completely different; for example, despite the cold, skiing or roaming through the woods is wonderful," said Meciar.

At the same time, however, he admitted that he mainly watches the strong-man show—wrestling—on the Eurosport television channel. "I always pick one wrestler, support him, and experience it with him. I stay up until two or three o'clock in the morning and then I go to bed absolutely exhausted and all in a sweat," said the Slovak prime minister.

In the almost hour-long program, which has a considerably propagandistic undertone and which is characterized by questions evidently prepared and discussed in advance, Slovaks had an opportunity to see their prime minister cut timber and lift dumbbells.

"A man must recharge his batteries somehow. I decided that this would not be by coffee, cigarettes, and alcohol but by iron and timber," said Meciar, commenting on his feats in front of the camera and, at the same time, declaring that

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"a man who has never worked in the woods with an axe and timber is, perhaps, not a real man."

In literature, the Slovak prime minister admires the novels of Alexandre Dumas, in which the knightly honor delights him, and the poetry of the Sturites.

"It is great philosophy and a wonderful expression of Slovaks' bygone desire for freedom," he said. Of the composers, he likes Tchaikovsky most and is fascinated, first and foremost, by his life as an "unrecognized genius."

Vladimir Meciar likes to go often to the Bratislava Opera, but he avoids the performances at the National Theater. "A lot of the actors there do not like me; this was apparent during the election campaign and I do not want to foist myself on them," said Meciar.

Vladimir Meciar would not want to change anything in his past life; and, as far as he himself is concerned, he has achieved—in his own words—everything he wanted. "However, I still have obligations toward our homeland. I promised that Slovakia would be a rich country and I want to achieve this too," said the Slovak prime minister. At the same time, he admitted that his biggest nightmare is his fear that he could fail personally in fulfilling this promise.

Meciar commented on the statement "a lie as a method of work," which is used among journalists in connection with him, as follows: "No one has ever proved that I have lied. I am not accusing anyone, although I know who is lying and when. I possess a greater sense of the truth than all of the other Slovak politicians."

Meciar Empowered To Appoint SIS Director

LD0603134795 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The third session of the National Council of the Slovak Republic has opened in Bratislava.

In an open ballot, deputies approved an amendment of the law on the Slovak Intelligence Service [SIS]. The amendment means that the SIS director will not be appointed and dismissed by the president. This will be done at the prime minister's suggestion by the Government of the Slovak Republic.

Of the 79 deputies present, 75 voted in favor of the amendment and four abstained.

HZDS Deputy Poses Questions on SIS Affair

AU0603212595 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 27 Feb 95 pp 1, 4

[Article by Roman Hofbauer: "The 'Spies' Have Left Their Posts and Everything Else Associated With This Issue"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The request from Slovak Information Service [SIS] Director General Mitro to be relieved of his post and similar requests from Igor Cibula, director of the SIS 1st Section (intelligence-espionage), and Stefan Straka, director of the SIS 2d Section (counterintelligence), submitted on 13 February 1995, obviously came as a surprise to most of the public. Readers were justified in asking what is going on in the Slovak Information Service, why these unexpected resignations have taken place.

The debate in the National Council of the Slovak Republic in January 1995 concerning the issue of the decidedly untraditional correspondence between a certain William Orme Jr., chairman of a certain Committee for the Protection of Journalists in New York, and President Michal Kovac cleared the way for a substantially wider range of questions concerning far more than just the issue of this puzzling correspondence. Former Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik in his statement, unwillingly and decidedly unwittingly, unveiled a range of issues associated with his access to StB [State Security] archives in connection with his pre-November initiatives in the onetime Leninist Spark [a club affiliating pro-reform communists].

What Jozef Moravcik began to uncover by means of his reluctant and prevaricating formulations had—and has—great information value. The stances of President Michal Kovac, the now former leadership of the Slovak Information Service, and former Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik have an equally great information value.

A Couple of Questions

I set out some of these facts in an article called "An Intelligence Maneuver," carried in SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA on 4 February 1995. I formulated a great deal of information and also ambiguities into a few sets of questions:

1. Why was there any correspondence at all between W. Orme and President M. Kovac? At whose suggestion and to what end did it take place? Who is its real author? What is its real purpose?

2. Why did SIS Director V. Mitro demonstrate the political integrity of former Prime Minister J. Moravcik on the basis of StB documents, and why is it that Mr. Moravcik is nonchalantly informing the public about these classified StB archive documents?

3. For what qualities did the president, on the eve of the resignation of the Moravcik government, promote SIS Director V. Mitro to the rank of general? Why, for what purpose, and at whose instigation did the President Kovac-Prime Minister Moravcik-SIS Director Mitro hotchpotch evolve?

A Terrifying Glimmer

The questions in the article "An Intelligence Maneuver" on 4 February 1995 forced the uninformed reader to

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think about a series of phenomena that were seemingly unconnected, but overall provided a terrifying glimmer of intelligence games before future "Marches" in the struggle with the "internal enemy." Who is actually struggling here, with whom, against whom, and, mainly, for what? It may be obvious enough to the better informed and more attentive reader that the majority of the asked and unasked questions end not with a question mark but with an exclamation point!

With the passing of time, the number of questions associated with this nebulous (or, rather, foggy) scene is not diminishing; on the contrary, it is increasing in a geometric sequence. When, on 16 January 1995, the daily SME published a transcript of a recording of a meeting of the Meciar government, something extremely admonitory happened. That is, this involved a transcript of the government meeting on 7 December 1993, which was strictly confidential. At this meeting—and, therefore, also on the tape recording, part of whose transcript SME published—extremely discreet information, from the state's point of view, was discussed, information that concerned not only the delimitation of federal materials from the former Federal Interior Ministry and later the Federal Security and Information Service, but also the structure, number of personnel, and financial coverage of the Slovak Information Service. I know this, because I took part in the government meeting. Information of this nature is neither sold on the flea market nor does it just appear on a desk, as some journalists often explain.

"Ours" and Foreign

This foreign newspaper (the owner of SME is a foreign entity) was given a recording of a government meeting that was so strictly confidential that not even staff from the Government Office took part in it; only a very restricted group of people was present. Undoubtedly, among those who may bear the responsibility for handing over recordings of the government meeting are the former spokesman of the former prime minister, Lintner, the former head of the Government Office, Filko, former Deputy Prime Minister Roman Kovac, and, especially, former Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik. Questions, questions, questions....

How did it happen that such trafficking in information came about, that a foreign entity has such information at its disposal, and that matter-of-fact, organizational, and personnel information about our security service is divulged so nonchalantly? How can the absolute inactivity of the then leading representatives of the SIS—Messrs. Mitro and Cibula—be explained? Why did they not immediately pursue this more than hot lead? How is it that they acted like dead beetles? How is it that this information was "presented" to journalists about whose alleged umbilical cord stretching across the Atlantic the sparrows on Slovak roofs are also chirping? The current events surrounding this issue, which is not, incidentally, clustered around March 1994, are opening up another range of questions.

What Igor Cibula Claims

Why, according to the reports in NARODNA OBRODA of 23 February 1995, did SIS 1st Section Director Igor Cibula give information on the resignations in the SIS leadership to...the Czech Press Agency, NARODNA OBRODA, and, in third place, TA SR!? Why is Igor Cibula providing information in the press on the steps of Vladimir Mitro, the SIS director, and Stefan Straka, the director of the 2d Section? Since when does a subordinate inform the public about the steps of his superior? So, who is in charge of whom here, Mitro of Cibula or Cibula of Mitro? Why is Mr. Igor Cibula informing the public in NARODNA OBRODA of the decisions in the matter of President Michal Kovac's conduct? Has the president, perhaps, entrusted the director of the SIS 1st Section with this? What is the hierarchical arrangement here? Who, in fact, is in charge of whom, and who answers to whom? Does the SIS management answer to the president—or the president to the SIS management?

The Broader Contexts

How is it possible to explain the fact that, on the eve of March 1994, in the second half of February 1994, when Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar along with a number of cabinet colleagues was on an official visit to China, the interior minister and head of the secret service of a certain state visited Slovakia in the utmost secrecy and held talks with President Kovac and the SIS management without the participation of the Slovak interior minister? The report on this in the press was so inconspicuous that hardly anyone noticed it. Do we also notice that the director of the Foreign Affairs Department in the Office of the President and one of the executive directors of the Institute for East-West Studies, Mr. Demes, goes off for consultations every time it seems to someone that developments in Slovakia are not proceeding correctly and that he goes there like a schoolboy to his piano lessons?

Opposition Fears Expressed

AU0403144795 Bratislava SME in Slovak 2 Mar 95 pp 1-2

[Article by "ll, bog, TASR": "According to Spejl, It Is Necessary To Attentively Monitor Steps Aimed at Controlling the Slovak Information Service"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—As was confirmed to us by Democratic Union [DU] Deputy Vladimir Bajan yesterday, a deputy-sponsored draft amendment to the Law on the Slovak Information Service (SIS) was submitted to the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] Budget, Currency, and Finance Committee yesterday. The author of the draft is Dusan Macuska, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] deputy. Although Macuska's draft amendment does not feature in the preliminary agenda of the NRSR meeting that opens on 6 March, its discussion in the NRSR committee indicates, according to Bajan, that the government coalition will add it to the agenda. Dusan Macuska

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proposes that the SIS director not be appointed by the president on the basis of a government proposal, as is the case now, but by the prime minister.

Christian Democratic Movement Deputy Chairman Ivan Simko said in this context that the draft amendment to the law on the SIS proposed by Dusan Macuska "only confirms the concept of concentration of power in HZDS hands." Party of the Democratic Left Chairman Peter Weiss said that the secret service must serve the state as such, and not the government, and that it must be thoroughly controlled, in view of the possibility of being misused. According to Weiss, Macuska's proposal upsets the fragile balance of power within the state and the system of safeguards against abuse of power.

DU Press Secretary G. Nemkyova said that, if Macuska's proposal is accepted, "nothing will stand in the way of the SIS serving the party interests of the HZDS or its coalition partners. This could be the beginning of a very dangerous stage of political persecution of the opposition." She said that the sole body authorized to control the activity of the SIS, the special parliamentary commission [for supervising the SIS], currently comprises exclusively deputies from the HZDS and its coalition partners. The special NRSR commission for supervising the SIS is chaired by HZDS Deputy Ivan Lexa, whom Slovak President Michal Kovac refused to appoint as SIS director.

According to M. Spejl, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia, following its painful experience with the operation of the secret service under the former regime, the Slovak public should "very attentively monitor, and sensitively perceive, any steps aimed at bringing it under complete control." He added that the SIS was not so much in need of the prime minister's confidence as of citizens' confidence. "When the HZDS refuses to respect the principles of a state based on the rule of law and interprets laws as it suits it, there is a danger of the SIS's being misused to eliminate the pluralistic social system," National Democratic Party Deputy Chairman Anton Hrnko said. The Hungarian Civic Party views Macuska's proposal as an attempt to adapt legislation to the personal interests of the HZDS. The aim of the amendment is to place at the head of the SIS a person whot is unacceptable to the president and the opposition.

[On the same day, on page 2, Bratislava SME in Slovak carries a 600-word interview with former Interior Minister Ladislav Pittner by Peter Toth entitled "Ivan Gasparovic Asked the SIS for Information." In the interview, the place and date of which are not given, Pittner qualifies Macuska's proposal as "dangerous because it places the SIS at the disposal of the prime minister or, respectively, the ruling party of the moment, which opens scope for the misuse of the SIS." Asked who he believed would become next SIS director, Pittner says: "If the draft amendment to the law on the SIS is passed it will not be a matter of appointing an expert but someone capable of doing anything. In spite of that, they will try to appoint someone without a battered past. Therefore, I do not think Messrs. Lexa or Svechota will be appointed. That would be very risky, particularly for Prime Minister Meciar."]

FM Kovac Calls Budget Cuts Drastic, Paralyzing

AU0403145695 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 2 Mar 95 pp 1, 3

[Article by "ml": "'President Is Head of the State, Not of the Opposition or Coalition'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpts] Bratislava—An international news conference was held in the Forum Hotel in Bratislava yesterday to mark the second anniversary of the inauguration of the Slovak president. [passage omitted]

The president assumed a stand on some current domestic political issues. The situation around the Slovak Information Service [SIS] need not be dramatized, in his opinion, because in other countries, too, changes in the secret service occur when the government changes. As long as the president has the power to appoint the SIS director, he will appoint only someone whom he is convinced will perform his duties in accordance with the law and the Constitution.

The cut in the budget of the Office of the President was characterized by the president as drastic and as paralyzing its activity. He does not consider the efforts to limit the activities of the presidential office and the president to a minimum reasonable because they do not serve the interests of Slovakia. In this context, Michal Kovac said that "the president is head of the state, not of the opposition or coalition."

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Agreements Signed During Horn's Moscow Visit

LD0603160195 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1500 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Agreements on investment protection and the maintenance of war graves were signed today in Moscow, where Prime Minister Gyula Horn arrived this morning accompanied by several of his ministers. Our correspondent Janos Molnar reports from the Russian capital:

[Molnar] There are no political differences of view in Hungarian-Russian relations. The main task is to deepen the friendly relations and to expand cooperation, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said after the discussions with the Hungarian delegation headed by Prime Minister Gyula Horn, which lasted about 90 minutes.

Following the discussions, the leaders of the two delegations signed an agreement on investment protection and exchanged the ratification documents of the Hungarian-Russian basic treaty.

Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs and his Russian counterpart, Andrey Kozyrev, signed an agreement on the mutual care of war graves, and they initialed the so-called inventory agreement reviewing the validity of the Soviet-Hungarian agreements.

After the signing ceremony Prime Minister Horn said that with the agreements it has been possible to further strengthen the system of relations between the two countries, and he noted that at the discussions, specific questions on promoting cooperation came to the fore.

Government spokesman Elemer Csak told members of the press that at the discussions the Hungarian side came out, first and foremost, in favor of clearing the one-time Soviet debt, balancing out the Hungarian negative balance in [bilateral] foreign trade, which is by now becoming chronic, and for livening up goods deliveries—proposals which the Russian side received with understanding and referred to the specialist ministries for further elaboration.

The matter of Hungarian nuclear waste came up at the discussions. The Russians proposed, in the interest of ensuring the continuity of removal transportations, that, in the future, the two countries' experts work out an agreement. No objection in principle was raised.

In the matter of Hungarian art treasures [taken out of the country during the Russian occupation], the reviewing of tasks also awaits the experts.

In the matter of settling the debt, there has already been concrete progress.

Horn, Chernomyrdin Discuss NATO Expansion

LD0603224395 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin held talks tete-a-tete on foreign policy matters—among them the expansion of NATO—in Moscow this evening. Janos Molnar reports from Moscow.

[Molnar] By concluding the Russian-Hungarian Basic Treaty we have left bad memories behind and established the basis for new agreements, said Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in his toast at the gala dinner held in honor of the Hungarian prime minister tonight. Chernomyrdin was of the view that Hungary is one of the most stable and most respected states of Europe. He also said that Hungary—currently holding the position of current chairman of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—proved to be a proper and reliable partner during the discussion of matters related to the Chechen crisis.

Chernomyrdin also mentioned that Hungary is one of the very few states with which Russia has managed to increase its trade over the past few years. He referred to the fact that there are more than 600 Russian-Hungarian joint ventures at the moment.

The Russian prime minister reiterated the invitation to his Hungarian counterpart and expressed his hope that, along with President Arpad Goncz, Horn too will also be able to take part in the Moscow celebrations to be organized for the 50th anniversary of the victory of World War II.

In his response, the Hungarian prime minister expressed his satisfaction over the fact that the Russian side received the Hungarian proposals raised in today's talks in a constructive way. Horn expressed the view that the direction of further relations has already been determined; now only the concrete tasks remain to be carried out.

Prime Minister Horn said that regional and world problems cannot be solved without Russia. He expressed the hope that Moscow will use its international reputation for the establishment of peace in Europe.

After dinner the two prime ministers withdrew from the table and in accordance with Chernomyrdin's earlier request, held discussions tete-a-tete on foreign policy matters, primarily on Hungary's membership in NATO. According to reliable Hungarian Radio sources, Horn called the attention of his negotiating partner to the fact that Hungary's NATO membership will not threaten Russia's security. He argued that NATO has defensive aims and, since its establishment, has not ever threatened the independence of any country. Hungary's membership will, at the same time, serve Russia's interests as well, because one of the conditions of admission is that the country to be admitted settle its foreign relations and establish stable contacts with its neighbors—not to mention the possibility that the expansion of NATO will make possible a more effective handling of regional crises.

According to the Hungarian position, Russian security interests must be respected in the course of the expansion of NATO, and it has to be made possible for, under certain conditions, after a while, Russia too to be able to join NATO.

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The two prime ministers' talks lasted late into the night. Thus, for the time being, it has nott been possible to find out how Chernomyrdin reacted to the Hungarian prime minister's arguments.

Forum Protests Culture Ministry's Activities

AU0703120995 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 6 Mar 95 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed report: "Anxious Cry for Culture—Opposition Public Forum"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Concerned over the state of Hungarian education, press, and culture, district organizations of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] and the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] and various social organizations held a public meeting entitled "Cry" [Kialtas] in the crowded MOM [Hungarian Optical Works] House of Culture on 4 March. Opposition politicians and public figures spoke up in the interest of Hungarian culture and education, sharply criticizing the measures and plans of the Ministry of Culture and Education, the minister himself, and the policy of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ].

Andras Sugar [television personality] criticized the one-sidedness of the press. He characterized as a purge the fact that at least 400 members of the staff of Hungarian Television have been "erased" from the screen because they do not belong to the SZDSZ's hard core or its group of close associates. Criticizing the government, Sugar said: "Uneducated, immature, and dilettante characters with dubious pasts, impudent social parasites, and political peddlers are snatching the country's governing rod from one another's quivering hands." According to Sugar, there is a need to warn people against anti-national cases. He cited the plans to turn over national television to concessions as an example. He predicted a national government by 1998, adding that victory can only be hoped for from a united opposition list, and in this case, radio and television personnel belonging to the SZDSZ's group of associates will have something to worry about....

Rather than a concept, it is a daydream—said Zoltan Pokorni, deputy chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ], about the government's flawed education policy plans. He said he considers it essential for the government to submit the national core syllabus and the development strategy of public education to the parliament, because these issues cannot be an internal matter for a ministry or a narrow expert group.

MDF deputy Gyorgy Fekete sharply criticized the harmful activities of the Education Ministry in 13 particulars—including the purge in the ministry, issues of the Art Gallery and the National Theater, and the 30-million-forint ministerial residence. In his view, rather than a lack of concept, improvisations, or amateurishness, it is the strategy formed by the SZDSZ that is behind this. In Fekete's view, the goal of "Cry" is to forestall this cultural strategy. He indicated that the SZDSZ would always pull out the "anti-Semitic trump card" when it needed to cover up its own crimes.

Tamas Deutsch (FIDESZ) stated that Hungarian culture is in crisis. According to him, there is a structural crisis and its roots have to be sought in the Kulturkampf. This can only be ended if the political forces and elites that are in power distance themselves from the extremists among them. Deutsch said that "cultural struggle and the free competition of cultural values have as much in common as horse-racing and cock-fighting." He recommended agreement between moderate left-wing and right-wing forces.

In his speech, Istvan Benedek called upon the audience to take a brave stand and warned that all party views have to be laid aside—because, he said, only one of the six parliamentary parties is anti-Hungarian. It is this party that should be afraid, Benedek said, adding: Either they win and we become annihilated, or we win and they become annihilated.

Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] deputy Matyas Szuros also participated in the meeting as a private individual. He told journalists: "The Ministry of Education and Culture is not proceeding in the right way if it questions the existence of national institutions. On media issues, the MSZP's position is gradually moving closer to that of the opposition parties than to that of the SZDSZ."

A manifesto was accepted at the forum. According to this manifesto, Fodor's ministry does not adequately take care of the protection, maintenance, and development of national institutions. Fodor interferes and supports others' interference in the internal life of cultural and art institutions. The forum's participants protest against the ministry's ignoring the rights of professional and social organizations that are laid down by law, and against replacing leaders of certain institutions for no good reason.

'Strict' Law Against 'Racist' Activities

95CH0119B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 11 Jan 95 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed article: "Strict Law Against Racist Activities Planned"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An amendment to the Code of Penal Law initiated by the president regarding crimes against national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups will be submitted to the National Assembly in March.

The justice ministry has completed the draft of the regulations regarding crimes against ethnic and racial groups. The original version was prepared by the staff of the president's office at the initiative of President Arpad Goncz. In September, the president sent this proposal, together with detailed background materials, to Prime Minister Gyula Horn, who tasked the justice minister with preparing the final bill.

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According to Karoly Bard, assistant state secretary of justice, there are two major reasons for the new regulations: First, in crimes defined in Article 156 of the Penal Code, problems of interpretation have arisen, in implementing the law. The deputy state secretary noted that an increase in antisocial utterances on the part of certain extremist political groups, and in open attacks against certain groups of the population, could be perceived recently. However, when charges are brought because of crimes defined in Article No. 156 of the Penal Code (crimes against national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups), the courts rule only in crimes of assault. Therefore, contradictions in legal practice will be solved by an amendment to the law.

On the other hand, several international treaties signed by Hungary (such as the Genocide Treaty, and the Apartheid and Discrimination Treaty) prescribe stopping and consistently punishing every form of racial discrimination.

Within the Penal Code, the planned regulation places crimes against members of ethnic and racial groups—supplemented by two completely new facts—among crimes against freedom and human dignity.

According to the planned amendment, the crime called "demonstration based on national, ethnic, racial, or religious discrimination" punishes participating in, or organizing, programs liable to embarrass, humiliate, or intimidate the target group or its members. They also intend to punish individuals who provide financial support for such activities.

The other new fact intends to punish organizing activities for the purpose of discrimination. This new fact includes joining an organization or participating in its activities, if the purpose, activity and endeavors of the organization are directed at instigating hate or discrimination against ethnic, racial, or religious groups.

In this area as well, they intend to punish individuals who provide financial support. In both crimes, perpetrators can expect imprisonment of up to five years in a basic case and of up to eight years in aggravated cases (i.e., involving weapons).

Prison Conditions, Data on Prisoners Detailed

95CH0119A Budapest MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 16 Dec 94 p 11

[Article by Szilvia Zimber: "On Both Sides of the Bars; Prison Improvement Unavoidable—Not for the Prisoners"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is difficult to get in, not only to get out. At least if one approaches the gate on one's own and not under "escort." The uniformed guard at the gate, a handsome young man, says this is a job like any other; one colleague is like this, the other is like that. The money is meager, but he likes the schedule, 24 hours of rest after 12 hours of duty—and at least this is secure employment. His family and friends accept that he works in a prison, and he tells strangers he works for the ministry of justice.

My escort arrives, the electronic lock opens, and I enter the Budapest Prison and Penitentiary. Nearly 1,800 people are held here, 600 of them in pre-trial detention. The interior is the classic image of a prison, familiar from movies: hallways, iron doors, bars. The tenant of the one-person cell is at work. He has put everything in exemplary order. The many flowers, photos, and the television make a homey impression.

A one-person cell is still a rarity in Hungarian prisons, but there is no overpopulation. More than 13,000 people are imprisoned in Hungary, of which nearly 4,000 are awaiting sentencing. There are 680 women, 710 minors, and 451 foreigners in the jails. In 32 institutions, 6,790 employees of the interior ministry take care of them. The rights and circumstances of the imprisoned are regulated by laws; according to the experts, in a modern way, comparable to European norms.

Those who follow the rules will succeed behind bars, says the swindler with the engaging face and graying hair who has enjoyed the hospitality of the Penal Authority several times but vows never again. In his opinion, the law should define even more exactly what they are entitled to and when, because many privileges can only be awarded, and nothing is worse than waiting anxiously all week long to see whether one will be awarded the privilege or not.

According to the prison guard, on the other hand, they have hardly any means of discipline in their hands. In a bar, he would easily slap someone in the face for speaking to him the way some prisoners do—but here, corporal punishment is forbidden. If someone lifts his hand to a prisoner anyway, a tremendous hassle can be the result, and the person can easily be fired. Four or five disciplinary procedures are started on these grounds each year. The prisoners, however, take out all their imagined or real grievances on the guards. Still, the relationship between prisoners and guards is not nearly as contrary as the outsider might imagine. Most prisoners honor compassionate guards. In Sopron, the prisoners sent a wreath to the funeral of a warrant officer who died of heart failure; and a prisoner wrote a letter to the prison authorities urging them to raise the salaries of prison guards because they earn a shamefully small amount.

The Penal Authority has a very large number of young employees. Many of them retire with serious illnesses, and the organization frequently buries its members before their time. In the Budapest Prison and Penitentiary, people in their twenties make 25,000-27,000 forints [Ft] before taxes, and in their thirties, Ft27,000-28,000. Never have they been so understaffed. After the 12-hour shift they can frequently take off only 12 hours, instead of 24, and then they have to be on duty again. Many of them cannot even go on vacation. There are applicants for the vacant positions, but no more than one or two out of 100 are suitable.

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The health and psychological requirements are high. Aggressive, intolerant people without an adequate level of intelligence cannot be hired. People with university degrees are not standing in line for the job of prison counselors. Although the planned budget for next year foresees a Ft2,000 per month increase for those who deal directly with prisoners, over and above a 10-percent increase in the wages of the Armed Forces, and Ft80 million has been planned for housing subsidies, this will not compensate for the neglect of several years, and means only temporary relief.

For years there was hardly any money for prisons. The renovation of the Budapest Prison and Penitentiary had to be stopped, even though the stucco is crumbling. Whatever could be fixed today with Ft10 million, will cost Ft150 million in three years, says Csaba Konkoly, justice ministry deputy state secretary, who seems to be deeply concerned about the troubles of the Penal Authority. As a prosecutor, he visited a large number of institutions, and today he visits the prisons for more than ceremonial reasons. He finds not only the money wanting, but also legal regulations. Laws were passed regarding the Police and the Army, and it is time for the service conditions of security personnel such as prison guards to be regulated by law, and for the work—which involves armed service, readiness, and exposure to hazards—its due.

According to the deputy state secretary, the current system of prisons does not fulfill the needs. It is too centralized. The majority of buildings were built at the turn of the century in the heart of the cities and not in the areas from which most of the prisoners come. According to the European agreements, people should be imprisoned close to their place of residence, and if possible in a one-person cell.

Some people wish they were inside. They do not consider freedom to be too high a price to pay for the security of room and board. It happened in the practice of one district judge that a regular "client" came back every autumn. When the cold weather came, he "set up shop," ate and drank, and if he did not succeed in making himself noticed, he grabbed a cop and made a confession. "Give me only as long as it takes to make it till spring," the bum asked the judge—and he was usually obliged.

According to Csaba Konkoly it would not be proper to compare the situation of people on one side of the bars to that of those on the other. Humanitarian care—which, incidentally, can play a role in crime prevention—is a different story from the detention of prisoners. If we do not succeed in stopping the turnover of employees at the Penal Authority, for instance by raising salaries; and if the circumstances of prisoners are not adequate and they cannot be occupied with work or study, unusual events can easily occur, and that will be much more expensive.

Regarding occupation, there are enough problems. The prison companies had to form corporations; thus, they entered the free market. While they perform a task assigned by the state—they employ largely uneducated prisoners—they are expected to produce a profit and to adapt themselves to the volatile market. One-third of the costs of the 12 limited-liability companies is due to the fact that it employs prisoners—4,300 of them, to be exact. Hungary currently occupies a good position worldwide: of the 9,600 prisoners who can be made to work, 6,721 work, some in the corporations and some in service occupations within the prisons. The average salary is Ft5,500, Ft47 of which is deducted for room and board. This, too, is very good in international comparison.

However, it is doubtful how long it can stay that way. Although the yearly product of the limited-liability companies is above Ft3.1 billion, and several of their products can compete on the market, they will be unable to continue without regular state subsidies. At the same time, they are not allowed to stop their operations. There is no law or regulation yet to solve the contradiction and to provide automatic subsidies to the economic corporations of the Penal Authority. The experts of the finance ministry want to know when the investment will pay for itself if they spend money on the corporations. Never—or at least not in the way an economic expert expects it to happen.

Dr. Katalin Borka, department head of the economic corporations of the National Penal Authority, says that there is no single solution, no single idea, no single medicine to take care of the problem. Still, if the solution were sought at a level from which things can be seen in their context—for instance, at the government level—many problems could be solved by a few well-thought-out measures. For instance, it is customary abroad—where the profit of occupying prisoners is not measured in money, either—to give preference to prisons in orders by the state, and state institutions can buy from others only what the prisons cannot produce.

Ferenc Tari, national commander of the Penal Authority, considers it a great achievement that in recent years there were no large prison riots or unusual events despite the adverse circumstances. In his opinion, however, one must not play with fire. We are faced with new challenges, and we must prepare for them. To the west of us, 60-80 percent of prisoners are drug users, and as Hungary is on the way of becoming a target country rather than a transit country, one must expect drugs to appear in Hungarian prisons as well. Therefore, they are already training their employees in the recognition of various drugs and drug addicts, and they are tightening controls. Geza Beck, commanding officer of the Budapest Prison and Penitentiary, has a stamp collection in his drawer: the photos of stamps saturated with LSD used in international transit.

One must be prepared to detain hardened criminals: terrorists, drug traffickers, members of the international mafia. Moreover, one must be able not only to make sure they cannot escape but also to guarantee their protection. Unfortunately, crime is on the rise worldwide, and we can hardly expect to be spared. New prisons are being built and old ones are being renovated in every part of the world—not to make the life of the bandit gentlemen more comfortable but to protect society.

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Walesa Appoints Jozef Oleksy Prime Minister

LD0603175595 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1737 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 6 Mar—On Monday evening President Lech Walesa formally appointed Jozef Oleksy to the post of prime minister. The members of the new Cabinet also received nomination acts to the posts of deputy prime ministers and ministers.

The president's decree on the appointment of the new government was read out. The prime minister and all the cabinet members received nomination acts from the president.

The prime minister and ministers took oaths that they will abide by the Constitution, serve the good of the homeland, and regard the well-being of the citizens as their highest command.

Four government members—namely, Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, minister of foreign affairs; Jacek Buchacz, minister for foreign economic cooperation; Zbigniew Zdzislaw Okonski, minister of national defense; and Miroslaw Pietrewicz, head of the Central Planning Office in the rank of minister—took advantage of the constitutional provision and included in their oaths the words: "So help me God."

Voices Hopes for New Government

LD0603185895 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1800 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] After the ceremony of swearing in the new government, President Lech Walesa said that Poland needed a government which would indeed govern and not pretend that it was attempting to introduce reforms.

[begin Walesa recording] Poland needs a government which will govern and not pretend that they are attempting reforms. There are many very important decisions which have been postponed and which can wait no longer. Poland is wasting precious time. There is an enormous amount of work awaiting you, ladies and gentlemen, so that you can prove to society that this cabinet really is politically qualitatively new, that it will conduct the affairs of the country better than its predecessor, that the Polish state and Poles can link their hopes for a better future with it, that the decision not to dissolve the Sejm was a correct one.

Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy announced in the Sejm that his government would carry out reprivatization and speed up privatization. He also promised the continuation of the local government reform and decentralization of state administration. He reassured us that we can expect a general reform of the social welfare system. He gave the assurance that Poland will not transform itself into a Polish People's Republic Mark II. [end recording]

Oleksy Regards Walesa Speech as Positive

LD0603195395 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1830 GMT 6 Mar 95

[Relayed via TV Polonia Network]

[Studio interview with Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy by correspondent Iwona Maruszak; from the "Wiadomosci" program—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Maruszak] Prime Minister, this government has been created. We now know that it exists, and it inter alia arose thanks to a far-going compromise with the president. The point is that all the so-called presidential ministers are, in fact, appointed according to the wishes of the president. Does this mean a more far-going compromise with the president, or is this is a cease-fire, or is this now the end of the conflict with the president altogether?

[Oleksy] We all know that from the start I was against the conflicts and wars at the top, feeling that Poland needs calm and the resolution of the problems that trouble people, not politicians. Meanwhile, it has been the case for some time that it was the problems of politicians that were presented to people as the problems of Poland as a whole. I am pleased at the fact that this Council of Ministers is already functioning. A compromise, you said, visible, deep, and far-going—it is not the case that matters stopped with what the president was demanding. The compromise is based upon the fact that it ended with a mutual decision and the selection of those candidates, from among many, for we considered the selection from among a wider range of candidates—it ended with those who both the president and myself acknowledged as being capable of fulfilling the tasks in these ministries. Whether this compromise will be maintained, and whether there will be calm and agreement among the highest authorities? There are no threats on my part. The speech by the president today is one that I receive positively as a declaration of the will to cooperate, for the resolution of issues, so that this government will be able to show that it cares for the issues of people in Poland. There are many of them. The issues of the security of citizens are the most urgent ones. Already tomorrow, the Council of Ministers will be looking at these issues. I wish to appoint a special group, from among the highest-ranking personalities who are required for the resolution of these issues, so that from tomorrow matters of security and the real investigation of criminals, thieves, and hooligans be perceptible and felt. This is one of the first matters. With this aim, I will quickly appoint a main commandant of police. I am also pleased at the fact that the president has taken into account my arguments and has decided to withdraw from the Constitutional Tribunal tomorrow the accusations against the budget laid there and, as he assured me, he will sign this budget without delay. This is a piece of good news—for the stabilization of the situation in Poland and the conditions of work of the government.

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[Maruszak] Prime minister, the issue of the police is above all an issue of money. [Minister of Internal Affairs] Andrzej Milczanowski, at the sittings of the commission hearings of candidates for ministers, said that, in fact, he could paper the walls with his ideas but that on the other hand the greatest problem is the fact that, quite simply, there is absolutely no money for anything at all.

[Oleksy] This is too drastic a way of putting the matter. Money is very important here and, indeed, the police are short of money. On the other hand, I look at this issue more widely, and Minister Milczanowski will tomorrow, precisely, give a presentation to the Council of Ministers on the entirety of these problems. One thing is outside discussion. We must strike the world of crime hard, and all those who are tempted by crime at the cost of harm to other citizens, so that most citizens have a feeling of security in the street, at home, in their cellar, with their family, at school, and on vacation.

Prime Minister Oleksy on Policy, Criticism

WS0603121595 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 6 Mar 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy by Ewa Rosolak and Dariusz Szymczycha; place and date not given: "A Government for the People"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [TRYBUNA] Mr. Prime Minister, what type of politics do you prefer? Politics of compromise?

[Oleksy] No. The policy of the government will be implemented according to the program that has been announced. Compromise is not an objective, it is only a means that is needed at certain stages of policy implementation. Compromise creates conditions for the implementation of objectives. At a later stage, politics must be clear, simple, legible, and compliant with program targets.

[TRYBUNA] Does that account for your approval of the president's three ministerial candidates?

[Oleksy] It is not that I approved the presidential candidates. They were chosen in the course of consultations I held both with the president and with the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]-Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] coalition.

[TRYBUNA] How would you thus comment on the absence of Zbigniew Okonski, candidate for minister of national defense, at the Sejm debate, during which the composition of the government was voted on...

[Oleksy] I will not comment. Mr. Okonski had asked me for permission to leave so he could attend to personal matters once the hearing at the Sejm commission was over. The swiftness and compromises reached in appointing the new government were, after all, surprising to many. Mr. Bartoszewski also had my permission to leave for Vienna.

[TRYBUNA] The previous government was said to be excessively peasant-leftist. What will your cabinet be? Leftist-peasant?

[Oleksy] This will be a government of the Republic of Poland, serving the interests of the Republic and all its citizens. Poland needs reforms, but more citizens have to benefit from them. Social policy needs constant reform; its motto should be: "More justice, not more thrift." The state and the government should serve the needs of everyone, not just those of the ones currently in power. Thus the character and features of the coalition's political coloring are not paramount, although they are not unimportant.

[TRYBUNA] What is paramount?

[Oleksy] The executive potency of this government, which I will earnestly pursue.

[TRYBUNA] You are to present a calendar for your cabinet's activities in one month. How long a period will it cover?

[Oleksy] For all of this year, which is a natural caesura. The end of the calendar year also marks the end of the fiscal year. Then, providing for the new budget, we will adopt a new calendar of activities. These should, after all, be yearly calendars.

[TRYBUNA] Deputy Stefaniuk, speaking on behalf of PSL, criticized the "rural part" of your Sejm report. Is this a foreboding of new tensions within the coalition?

[Oleksy] I am not a small-minded man and I do not react to criticism emotionally. There must have been some reason for pointing that out in the PSL presentation. I am aware more people may feel dissatisfied with the report. It is impossible to say everything in one speech given the time limitations. I and my government will try to dispel such doubts in the course of our day-to-day activities, including those raised by Deputy Stefaniuk on rural issues.

Besides, in my report I did not speak of many other issues I consider obvious, as they are provided for in the coalition agreement.

[TRYBUNA] The opposition raises charges that the new government of the PSL-SLD coalition uses key phrases which sound good from the point of view of propaganda, but do not relate to the work of government. What is your understanding of one such key phrase: "Maintaining economic growth?"

[Oleksy] Simple and unbiased. Last year, the Polish economy recorded 5-percent growth. This is the success of our society and all the governments of the past five years, including Waldemar Pawlak's cabinet. We have not attained economic growth once and for good. To maintain it, we have to fight inflation, observe fiscal discipline, and seek a growth in investment—both foreign and domestic.

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[TRYBUNA] When the opposition warns against the second People's Republic, it also casts a shadow of doubt on the orientation of Polish foreign policy under the PSL-SLD government.

[Oleksy] The international strategy of this government is clear and irrevocable: YES to Poland's membership in European structures. We are aware, however, that our presence in the EU and NATO must be preceded by adequate processes of adjustment.

I wish to tell Eurosceptics, who see European integration as a threat to Poland's national identity, that my government will carry out firm negotiations with all partners. Poland, however, belongs not only on the map of Europe, in terms of European culture and history, but it also belongs in European structures.

[TRYBUNA] Tadeusz Mazowiecki warned that your government will be run by a two-party political bureau, a so-called directorate, made up of PSL and SLD leaders. How will you shape relations between the government and the parties which constitute its political backdrop?

[Oleksy] In my report, I clearly stated that I myself intend to lead this government. There will not be two governments—coalition and presidential—in my cabinet.

Therefore, for me the coalition backdrop will be a forum for the program, analyses, opinions, and consultations. But no one will run the government for me in day-to-day practice.

[TRYBUNA] What about staffing?

[Oleksy] I cannot imagine the prime minister and government leaders being deprived of the liberty to select their associates.

[TRYBUNA] Are you not sorry to be leaving the Sejm?

[Oleksy] Of course I am, yet I still remain an SLD deputy from Siedlce Voivodship.

[TRYBUNA] Mr. Prime Minister, what was the first decision you made?

[Oleksy] I have not yet made any decision in my capacity as prime minister. I am waiting to be sworn in.

[TRYBUNA] When can we expect your government to be sworn in?

[Oleksy] Monday, I assume. There are no reasons to postpone it any longer. Still, this is up to the president.

[TRYBUNA] Mr. Prime Minister, we wish you and TRYBUNA readers that this government meets the huge expectations with which society has endowed it. Thank you for the interview.

Oleksy Views Debate on Government Program

LD0403204395 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1249 GMT 4 Mar 95

[Speech by Polish Prime Minister Josef Oleksy to the Sejm in Warsaw—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mr. Speaker, may it please the House. I have listened with attention to all the speeches in the debate on my outline. Thank you for all the statements. Thank you for the suggestions, which—while sounding critical—have become a source of reflection for me at the same time. Not about what the program is lacking—as many issues were missing, and I am going to explain why in a moment—but for the critical suggestions that lead me to the conclusion that some issues will have to be put differently and presented more extensively, showing the various aspects of these matters.

To begin with, I want to express my particular thanks to the speakers on behalf of the main opposition parties. They presented sometimes unfair but quite balanced criticism, from which I am going to draw conclusions in defining more precisely the program of actions outlined only briefly in my statement. I also want to say that the Strategy for Poland program exists, and I would like to refer all deputies who pointed to the lack of explanation on such matters like agriculture, for example, to that program. There is a program of agricultural development approved by the House.

I would like to remind those of you who pointed out that very important ecological issues were not mentioned, that the House recently adopted the ecological program and the resolution on balanced development. Deputy Stefaniuk raised the question of the development of exports and export policy not being mentioned in the statement. This is also a considerable part of the Strategy for Poland, in a chapter dealing with the need to increase the competitiveness of Polish goods.

Thanking you for all the critical remarks, I want to confirm that it was not my intention to create a new program. I want to repeat that the program prepared by the coalition a year and a half ago—which requires amendments, a different way of implementation, a new dynamics in some points, a step forward on those points where the progress has been too slow—is still the program inscribed in the nature of the Polish transformation. This is the program derived from the public discussions that have been going on for five years on changes, reforms, and transformations. Remembering all the shortcomings that have prompted the criticism of the implementation so far, let me remind you that this criticism concerns not only the setbacks of the last year and a half, but of the whole five years, during which some issues closely linked to the dynamics of transformation were not undertaken or were not implemented sufficiently and quickly enough because they were not easy or there was not enough time.

I want to share the view that the time for words is coming to an end. I am aware of this. I confirm the announcement of deeds so much in demand during today's debate. I share the view that a timetable for changes is needed. I want to say that my intention is that, within a month, this government will make public such a timetable, so that from then on everyone can watch its implementation. I have already said that I better see the tasks ahead

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following this discussion. I understand those who said and explained why they could not and were not ready to support my government. I stress once again that I do not consider this government to be the government that is to execute tasks set out by the coalition. I spoke clearly about this yesterday. This is the government that is to implement tasks for Poland and the whole society.

What gives me hope is an offer of cooperation undertaken by everyone and the understanding that my declaration is not an empty declaration, although it may sound vain today. I want to underscore that what was said yesterday will remain in force, that the government will not oppose any constructive proposal.

I would also like to talk about some other issues that seemed problematic. First is the matter of identifying a political configuration that is the basis for this government. I would like to say clearly that, in my opinion, the only method to determine this identity in a democratic system is and should be the result of elections. So let us not waste energy quoting the numbers of some or other support. In democracy, elections verify who does what during the term in government.

Second, there is a matter of understanding a compromise and the question of whether this is going to be a real government. My position is clear here. I understand a compromise as a condition and not an aim in itself. I see clearly the limits of a compromise. These are: the Constitution, Poland's welfare, and an opportunity to make progress. In my opinion, I did not cross the limits of such a compromise when I was forming this government. I stress again that this government will be real, and there is no need to worry about a politburo that is supposed to work and make a decision behind the scenes.

When I was forming this government and during the coalition discussions, we also talked about this problem. I agreed to head an independent government. I am saying this today to stay loyal to future government members. I would not like government members not to understand the essence of the forthcoming reform of the economic center, which was mentioned and which I cannot comprehend. This matter has already been decided in my policy and in my vision of the government's work. Those who do not understand what the point of implementing this government's program is will not be forced to participate in its work.

Third, I want to get back to the basic thesis of my program, the one in which I declare and say unequivocally that we must carry out the reforms with the people, and for the people, and in an honest and fair way. That is why there is no reason for returning to the noose of a false alternative—equality or freedom. There is only one choice: equality of opportunity and conditions with simultaneous state guarantees for a social and cultural minimum. My government will immediately undertake the already advanced work on finalizing the social guarantees pact that is so eagerly awaited by different participants in social life.

Fourth, the matter was raised here concerning compensation for the wrongdoing of the past. I do not escape the issue. What is more, I have linked it with the honest privatization, including mass privatization. We are going to look for possibilities for compensation in accordance with the rulings by the Constitutional Tribunal. Reprivatization will be carried out; the basic rules are another matter.

Fifth, the government will undertake the task of promoting Poland and Polish goods. I do not understand it as isolation. I understand it as an announcement of actions allowing what is Polish to defend itself, not because there is such a regulation or order, but because of its quality and good organizational and personal preparations for facing competition in the contemporary world, a world in which we want to be permanently present. That is why all concern about the role of foreign capital in Poland and its possible threat to some economic entities that are not able to face the competition are not and cannot be the main thread of our debate within the government.

We must look after the development of the market and the protection of the market and domestic goods, but we have to do it through raising the competitiveness of Polish goods and creating such systemic solutions that consolidate this competitiveness and allow it to meet the unavoidable challenge.

Sixth, the individual who wants to ascribe to us the robbing of the funds of the poorest and the neediest as our understanding of social and health insurance reform is making a mistake. May it please the House. On the contrary, we want to give necessary guarantees for pensions and annuities to retain their purchasing power, to ensure fairness, and to establish a list of needs guaranteed by the state that cannot rely on a material standard. At the same time, however, we want the wealthy, the people with money, not to find signs in state economic policy that may restrain them from investments, economic risk, and economic activity. This is my understanding of what was rightly expressed in the statement.

Seventh, different opinions were voiced here with regard to decentralization and the administrative reform. The direction of these activities should raise no doubts. This has not been the idea of this government or the previous one. This is a general and fundamental premise in the reforming of Poland. The details of instruments, but not the goals themselves, may yet be decided. The main criterion remains. This must be the decentralization of the state, which will improve the function of the state as a service to man. First, I understand this decentralization and the civil society as an expansion of public authorities outside the government and at the cost of the government, as a situation in which a citizen elects the authorities closest to him at the parish and most distant from him at the Sejm. This is also a transfer of jurisdictions, tasks, and financial resources to self-government cells—above all, to local self-governments.

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Second is respect for and the practical implementation of the principle of the subsidiarity of the state within the framework of decentralization. All that can be undertaken and arranged by the parish, voivodship, or by other local government entities in the future ought to be found within the prerogatives of these entities. I treat this as something that is obvious. Third is a deep reform of the administrative center. The point is not the reorganization of the ministries or the search for new names for them. I wish it to be clear that the point is the reduction of their prerogatives, the simplification of decisionmaking procedures, and their liberation from thousands of decisions on individual matters. I know that this is not straightforward. This will, for instance, require changes in the Administrative Procedure Code, the reconstruction of the administrative judicial system, and so on. These are transformations that may not be finished within just one term of office. The esteemed chamber surely is very well aware of this. I still cannot say today through what methods and with which instruments I will be capable of implementing this policy through to completion. I do not even, esteemed chamber, know how much time will be given to me for the implementation of all the points of the government program. I assuredly will implement it, however, and I think that perhaps I will do so more consistently than has hitherto been the case.

Eighth, finally, there was talk about what I said yesterday in my statement about Poland, about the state being provided for citizens and not citizens for the state. This thesis in my statement yesterday doubtless did not sound particularly eloquent. I wish to repeat it. Poland is and must be the homeland of all its citizens. Nationality, gender, and place of residence cannot be the cause of any limitations or differences here. Everything that is valuable must be promoted within our state. It will my task, and that of the government, to better coordinate at the central level issues with regard to the satisfaction of needs—including in this the needs of the national minorities. I apologize that, indeed, I did not express my will on this with even a single sentence in the statement yesterday.

A number of matters were also taken up in the context of the need to indicate details. Indeed, I once more return to this thesis. Everyone in the chamber knows what the nature of a formal statement is—especially a formal statement on the occasion of a change of government by the same coalition—with, after all, in many areas a clear continuation of that coalition's program. Indeed, however, on a number of issues, certainly, the provisions of details would be.... [pauses] would enrich this program. This relates to important issues such as farming or ecology.

I will not now be tempted, however—and here I address, in particular, the deputies from the coalition's Polish Peasant Party [PSL] grouping—I will not now be tempted to cite all my intentions, thoughts, and also firm manifestations of will with regard to Polish agriculture and our obvious convergence of views with the PSL parliamentary floor group on many matters relating to the conditions for transformations in Polish agriculture. This includes the conditions for its modern activity and the obvious negation of the thesis on the (?transfer) of people from the countryside to the towns and on what kind of farming, profitability conditions, and standards will bring us closer to European agriculture. This is too important a branch of the economy.

Esteemed chamber, let this be enough by way of explanation of the details that are assuredly necessary for our colleagues. There was, after all, time enough for this during the discussion before I commenced my formal statement. Let the fact be enough that the agriculture minister will be the deputy prime minister in this government, someone from the PSL. I am only worried that one of the members of the PSL floor group questioned this candidacy, here in this chamber. I think that this is some sort of mistake.

Tenth, please allow me a moment to pause. I was surprised when Deputy Stefaniuk took up the thesis of Deputy Bugaj, known to me from the mass media, that this means nothing—the exchange of a man of few words for a chatterbox. This is not nice, Mr. Deputy, but I will say to Mr. Bugaj and to Deputy Stefaniuk, esteemed chamber, that in a government in which there are to be found Professor Bartoszewski, Jerzy Jaskiernia, and Grzegorz Kolodko, can the prime minister really be a chatterbox? [loud laughter and applause]

Tenth, may it please the House! I fully share the view—and this is, of course, something obvious—that people decide about how even the best intentions of a government may be effectively implemented. Yes, but the point was one aspect raised by Deputy Ziolkowska. Yes, I wish to say that all the candidates for the government were requested by me to make written statements that they are not aware of any procedure—legal or penal—or of any events in their lives that could be the source of public accusations against them after they have taken up posts in the government.

I know that within the future government there are people who are adult and responsible. In signing—and everyone signed these statements—they will know what it will mean if these statements were to turn out to be untruthful.

May it please the House! I also wish to say that that which was put forward by.... [pauses] Please forgive me if I, by virtue of the hour, will not be tempted to give replies to each of the deputies who spoke. That was 28 people in all, and each of the speakers raised something that drew my attention and that I would like to address. So, in order to achieve more understanding in this final part regarding that with which I am concerned and regarding my intentions when I undertook this mission—and for the final time before the vote, esteemed chamber—I will repeat that I did not undertake this

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mission because of desires hidden within me to experience still, in my lifetime, those alleged pleasures that come for some from filling the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers. I will repeat for one last time—and I will not return to this—I have really undertaken this mission with a feeling of responsibility and as a test, which has been laid upon my shoulders. It is a test to prevent, for a while, that which was shaping up, the consequences of which could have been bad for the overall arrangement of Polish democracy and parliamentarism.

Forgoing that which I would like to say to each of those who spoke, I will allow myself to reply to certain of you, to the questions you posed, in writing later, if there is an interest in this. I wish to state, on the other hand, both that the theses stated by Deputy Mazowiecki remain in my memory. I will address them because they were a wise and calm analysis of that which is lacking and that which must apply to all of us. Also, with regard to that which was raised by Deputy Ziolkowska regarding income differentials and an incomes policy that must address this, I just recall that I have not forgotten about the agreement dated December of last year between the Union of Labor and the coalition and the SLD regarding the lowest taxation thresholds. All the remarks together, esteemed chamber, with those regarding the criteria of social respect and acknowledgement that were cited by Deputy Moczulski—and which I feel to be a register of objective criteria of social trust in every power—all these and other remarks I note as the achievement of this discussion. It is one that will fit within the calendar of specific actions of this government, if it is created. In conclusion, esteemed chamber, I can only give assurances that since my intention is to try to move forward in our Polish democracy, so that the PRL [Polish People's Republic] concept, or else the PRL Mark II, will never again return here. I, in contrast to Deputy Moczulski, am not capable of saying whether Prime Minister Pinkowski was after Babiuch or before Babiuch. [laughter]

I really do not know. I simply do not remember. [laughter and applause]

Deputy Potocki does remember, even though he is younger than I am. This also a sign of the times, esteemed chamber.

In giving assurances of my intention to serve Poland, Polish democracy, I wish to say that I would wish that the esteemed chamber—especially the opposition, whose birthright this more or less is—be certain that criticism from the opposition is not a discomfort to me when critically looking at the activities of this government. This must be a pressure that is tangible for every minister, every state administrative official, and every head of a central, state, or voivodship level entity. For then, if we will treat the roles allocated us in democracy—of the government and coalition authorities, of the opposition's criticism—as serving more important and general aims, then we will better fulfill our functions. I desire this in undertaking this role. Thank you very much.

Oleksy Against Divisions, To Report on Reform

LD0503142595 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 5 Mar 95

[Interview with Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy by correspondent Stanislawa Stec; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent Stanislawa Stec] Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy delivered his expose and our listeners are familiar with the content of his speech and main political principles under which the government is going to act.

Prime minister, I would like to ask you about two things. First, how do you understand your statement that this is not going to be a PRL-Bis [Polish People's Republic], as I think this requires an explanation, and second, on what conditions did you accept the president's proposals on appointments at the presidential ministries?

[Oleksy] This was not a question of conditions by the president, this was the discussion about the president's opinion on various candidates. We considered many candidatures and nobody attempted to set conditions. Simply, after discussions during several good meetings we have arrived at the arrangement that I proposed, and I th nk this can prove to be the best arrangement.

As far as the PRL-Bis is concerned, this is a conventional statement and it does not contain any deeper allegory in itself. I mentioned this intentionally as a response to these people who reject in advance the new government as a whole, who croak that this is recommunization, that this is the PRL, meaning the worst period, and they drew this conclusion from the biography of Prime Minister Oleksy.

[Stec] Television already reminded you of this in detail, using archive material.

[Oleksy] They did not have to remind me of anything as I do not hide my biography. So many years have passed, this is the sixth year of building democracy. I have been active since the beginning of parliament in 1989. So, should I now, after becoming prime minister, begin to explain everything all over again, that I was in the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party], that I was active in the party, that I was [PZPR provincial committee first secretary] in Biala Podlaska, and so on. This is not serious. Where does it lead to? It leads, and this is very sinister, to somehow digging a trench again within Polish society and to divide people in Poland again into post-PRL and postcommunists, and post-Solidarity. Who is tending toward this is choosing a very sinister line. I think that this historic division should be buried. Not artificially, not by blurring the accounts of history, but

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remembering them, but not by making them a criterion for dividing people and a criterion prompting activities.

[Stec] I think that the public is not going to blame you or to bring you to account for what you were doing in the past, but it certainly is going to closely watch how you are keeping your promises included in the expose. Do you set yourself a date when you will report on what you have managed to do and what you have not?

[Oleksy] I would like, for example after a year, to report to the public. Not everything can be accounted in detail, as I mentioned different time perspectives in my expose. Some of the things, such as legislative drafts necessary for the reforms, I will strive to submit to the Sejm very quickly, and that would mean keeping the promise. Others will be introduced gradually—a social security system for example, and the reform of this system. This is the reform for several years.

[Stec] But you are going to begin this reform.

[Oleksy] I most certainly am. This was announced by me and I want to report on the progress of this reform. So, after a year I am going to report on what and how I began. I would like work on the budget for 1996 to begin by the end of March, that there will be time for public consultations and discussions. Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko is ready. I am going to urge him, but he is hard-working and there will be no need for that. There are many issues in the expose, there are different dates for their execution, and there are various methods for reporting progress. But I am going to do it.

Bartoszewski Takes Up Duties as Foreign Minister

LD0703091895 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0824 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 7 Mar—Professor Wladyslaw Bartoszewski today took up his duties as foreign minister. This morning, Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy introduced the new minister to his office. After a brief conversation, the prime minister and the minister met the ministry's top officials.

Jozef Oleksy expressed the conviction that, with Prof. Bartoszewski at the helm of the Foreign Ministry [MSZ], "the Polish state imperative will be represented even better," and that "all bad things between the government and the MSZ will be quickly removed." He stressed his and the minister's joint conviction that there will be concerted action by both sides.

The prime minister stressed that the MSZ is in charge of Polish foreign policy and this applies to all offices in the state. The role of the MSZ in coordinating this policy is beyond discussion, he added.

"I will hold the prime minister to his every word," Bartoszewski said with a smile.

The meeting was attended by Under Secretaries of State Robert Mroziewicz and Andrzej Towpik. Former Minister Andrzej Olechowski was absent inasmuch as he was reportedly staying outside Warsaw.

Biographic Data on Bartoszewski

WS0303140895 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 3 Mar 95 p 3

[Biographical information on Wladyslaw Bartoszewski by "knysz": "Historian and History Maker"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Professor Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, Polish ambassador to Austria since August 1990, is a historian. He specializes in contemporary history and Polish-Jewish and Polish-German relations. He is one of the most renowned experts on [Nazi] occupied Warsaw.

He was a prisoner at Auschwitz (number 4427). Within the Polish Catholic Liberation Front he took part in relief operations for Jews persecuted by the occupying forces. In the fall of 1942, he joined the Home Army [AK]. He established an underground magazine for young Catholics called PRAWDA MLODYCH. He took part in the Warsaw Uprising.

In the years 1946-48 and 1949-54, he was imprisoned by the Polish People's Republic authorities on charges of espionage.

He cooperated with the Catholic weekly TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY. He was active on the Committee for Investigating Nazi Crimes in Poland. He was then secretary of the PEN-Club (1972-82) and taught history at Lublin Catholic University.

He was interned immediately after Martial Law was introduced. He celebrated his 60th birthday at a camp in Jaworz, located on the testing ground in Drawsko, in the company of, among others, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Bronislaw Geremek, Andrzej Szczypiorski [novelist], and Wiktor Woroszylski [poet].

His fellow internees elected him as elderman of the camp. Today they remember that Bartoszewski, with the longest prison "record," impressed them with his experience and repose.

The Jerusalem-based Holocaust Memorial Institute gave him the "Just Among the Nations of the World" award.

He has received many other awards: the Cross of Courage [Krzyz Walecznych] and the Silver Cross of Merit with Swords [Srebrny Krzyz Zaslugi z Mieczami] (from AK), the Commandor's Cross with the Star of the Polish Resurrection Order [Krzyz Komandorski z Gwiazda Orderu Odrodzenia Polski] (from Edward Raczynski, Polish president in exile in London), the Large Cross of Merit of the Order of the Federal Republic of Germany [Wielki Krzyz Zaslugi Orderu Republiki Federalnej Niemiec] (from President Richard von Weizsaecker).

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He was a member of the Honorary Memorial Committee, which organized celebrations commemorating the 50th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz. He delivered the Auschwitz appeal during the ceremony. He is 73.

Bartoszewski Wants Good Relations With West, East

LD0703122195 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1100 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The new foreign minister, Professor Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, has said that the appointment of the Polish ambassador to the Vatican will be his first decision. He also announced that he will attach equal importance to relations with both West and East.

[Reporter Monika Sieradzka—identified by screen caption] A former inmate of Auschwitz, an activist in the anticommunist opposition, and recently Poland's ambassador to Austria, Prof. Bartoszewski does not see any inconsistency between good relations with Russia and cooperation with the West. If the Russians oppose our entry into the European Union and NATO, the new minister will try to convince them that they can only benefit from this.

The first decision by the new minister will be the appointment of the new ambassador to the Vatican, the absence of which for over a year he described as embarrassing.

Bartoszewski announced that he will resign if he is unable to implement a pro-European foreign policy or if he loses the president's support. He will also be loyal to the government, and he will not take the past nor party affiliation into account in new appointments.

New Police Chief To Be Appointed in '2 Days'

LD0603163595 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1347 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 6 Mar (PAP)—Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy announced today on Radio Three that he would set up a committee for combating organized crime as soon as possible, and appoint a new head of police within two days.

Oleksy said that he himself would probably chair the committee, which is to include a small but responsible decisionmaking group. Apart from the prime minister the committee is to include interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski; Gromoslaw Czempinski, head of the State Protection Office; Justice Minister Jerzy Jaskiernia; and Police Chief Jerzy Stanczyk.

The committee is to start its work on 7 March "to review the situation and make possible but urgent decisions, so that people will at least feel that there is a serious approach to the issue and that actions are to be tough and resolute," the prime minister added.

Oleksy said that the appointment of Stanczyk to the post of the chief of police would be among of his first decisions. "General Stanczyk has already gone through the entire procedure and I see no reason for not finalizing it. I shall appoint the chief commandant of police tonight or tomorrow, and he will immediately join the government team for the fight against thieves, hooligans, muggers, and other criminals," he said.

Defense Head: Integration Into NATO Priority

LD0703104595 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1010 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 7 Mar—Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy today introduced Zbigniew Wojciech Okonski to his post as the new national defense minister. In the presence of the ministry's leadership, the chief of general staff of the Polish Army, and heads of departments in the Ministry of National Defense [MON], the minister expressed the conviction that cooperation between civil and military sections would proceed well. "We have one common goal and we will be able to reach a common view," he said.

Okonski announced that he is not going to tolerate "servility, lies, and a lack of loyalty from his associates." He will expect from himself and his subordinates "resoluteness, courage, and a striving to achieve solutions without force."

The minister listed among the most important issues the modernization of the armed forces, integration with western security structures, expansion of cooperation with NATO, and Poland's quickest possible entry to the North Atlantic Alliance.

The prime minister expressed the hope that with Okonski at the helm of the ministry the situation at the MON, which "has been rather complicated for some time, will become settled." The prime minister would like the new minister and the MON to cooperate well with the Polish Army General Staff and with military districts. Oleksy is also seeking that "army matters not necessarily become public topics and most certainly not controversial issues."

The prime minister said that the government considers Poland's entry to NATO as its strategic goal. "Civilian supervision of the army is beyond discussion. This has been inscribed in the nature of democracy," he stressed. "This is a principle accepted by all countries with which we want to have very close relations," Oleksy added.

The prime minister declared that he will "strive with persistence" for a growth in defense spending.

National Security Office Chief on NATO, Russia

WS0603143095 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 4-5 Mar 95 p 26

[Interview with Henryk Goryszewski, head of the National Security Office of the Chancellery of the President of the Polish Republic, by Jan Skorzynski; place and date not given: "Poland and NATO: We Have No Alternative"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] *During consultations held by the president and the prime minister-designate on the composition of the government, Henryk Goryszewski was listed as Lech Walesa's candidate for the position of national defense minister. However, the head of the National Security Office [BBN] refused to accept the offer because, as reported by PAP, he would not enter a government which includes communists. Asked by RZECZPOSPOLITA to give more details of his conversation with Lech Walesa on this subject, and to provide an explanation of the stance that he had taken, he refused to answer.*

[Skorzynski] Do you think that the Polish political elite has taken a uniform position on the issue of Poland's integration with NATO?

[Goryszewski] First and foremost, there are quite a lot of people in Poland who have taken a uniform stand on this issue. Results of a recent study show that over 80 percent of Poles are in favor of Poland's joining NATO. Any political force must reckon with such a choice made by the electorate. Among the political elite, the loudest voices of opposition can be heard not only in post-communist circles, but, quite surprisingly, also in some rightist groupings. Even in my grouping—the Christian-National Union [ZChN]—you can find people who are quite reserved vis-a-vis the prospect of Poland's integration into NATO. However, these are politicians who are unable to exert any great influence, and their participation in the molding of public opinion is insignificant.

ZChN, as a whole, as well as other major political forces, has presented its opinions on this issue on numerous occasions. Even the outgoing government declared in Prime Minister Pawlak's Sejm speech and during the 19 January Sejm debate on defense that Poland is invariably striving to join NATO and that it is the basis for the country's defense policy.

[Skorzynski] Nonetheless, some politicians of the Democratic Left Alliance or the Polish Peasant Party place the stress somewhat differently: They say that this is the right direction, but this plan should not be implemented so rapidly, that we must not irritate Russia...

[Goryszewski] Indeed, the different stands on Russia's reaction to Poland's NATO aspirations are quite noticeable. Some politicians believe that we should join the organization as soon as possible, regardless of how this is perceived in Moscow. Others say that the most important thing is to see to it that our integration with NATO is not detrimental to our good relations with Russia. This is from where the different stands of Polish politicians on NATO stem.

[Skorzynski] In which group would you include yourself?

[Goryszewski] On this issue I do not have even the slightest doubt. We are sentenced to determine Poland's defense policy on participation in the structures of NATO. The current situation is very dangerous. For the first time since 1918 we are not a member of any defense system. In this respect, we are an isolated country; neither Visegrad [Group] nor any bilateral agreement is a defense accord. An isolated country is always exposed to external pressure and attempts at subordination. This is beyond many politicians, who have not acquired any experience in government and thus fail to interpret the situation properly. Opinions on a country's chances and possibilities are formed a little differently if one has access to information and is given an opportunity to talk with people who make actual decisions.

[Skorzynski] What are the alternatives to NATO? Neutrality? An alliance with Russia?

[Goryszewski] An alliance with Russia is out of the question. First, there is no social consent for that. Second, the disproportion between the two countries is so great that such an alliance would inevitably lead us to the position of a vassal-status state. As for neutrality, we have also had a rather unpleasant historical experience with that. Incidentally, it is not enough to declare neutrality—this must be accompanied by the assent of superpowers, as well as by favorable geopolitical conditions. In the 18th century the Polish Republic was neutral during the Seven-Year War and in the Northern War [wojna polnocna], but alien armies ravaged the entire country—we lost our sovereignty long before the partitions took place.

[Skorzynski] Agreed. There is no alternative to our membership in NATO. However, how are we going to overcome Russia's resistance?

[Goryszewski] It is a mistake to argue in talks on this subject that Poland is endangered and that this is why it wants to join NATO as soon as possible. By doing so we may be accused of suffering from an anti-Russian complex and of wanting to bring this complex to NATO. When he was in Warsaw, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Krylov asked me why exactly we so persistently want to join NATO. Today a discussion on the shape of an integrated Europe of the 21st century is under way, I replied. Unless we take part in those discussions, and then in the decisionmaking process, our interests will not be taken into account. Now, Russia's stance cannot be ignored due to its potential...

[Skorzynski] ...Despite the fact that it will stay outside the structures of the Community.

[Goryszewski] Yes, despite that. If Poland remains far removed from what is going on, Europe will take a new shape without paying much attention to our needs. Who knows, perhaps this argument should be submitted before all others. Krylov was quite interested and asked whether I would agree that Russia also join NATO right now. I answered that this problem is, for now at least, the subject of analyses. Russia should be first to initiate such analyses.

[Skorzynski] Russia's negative position on expansion of NATO will not change soon, will it?

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[Goryszewski] I do not think it will. During his extremely difficult meeting with President Lech Walesa, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin said the following: "If Poland joins NATO, there will naturally be U.S. and German troops, as well as nuclear weaponry on its soil. This will be a threat to Russian interests."

[Skorzynski] NATO member states are now only discussing the possibility of extending the organization eastward; the final decisions are not to be expected by the end of the year. Still, can you tell us where we are right now? Which views are prevailing?

[Goryszewski] The United States has taken a different stand on this issue than their West European allies. The Europeans are hoping—more than the Americans are—for a democratic evolution of Russia, which would sooner or later turn Moscow into a nonaggressive democracy, consistent with European standards. They say that things should be done to accelerate these processes in Russia. Thus, the feeling of threat on the part of the West should not be stimulated because it is may benefit the aggressive Russian nationalism. Therefore, it would be best if the process of admitting Poland into NATO were accompanied by approval from Russia.

[Skorzynski] U.S. diplomats are also making efforts to persuade Russia that NATO expansion is not directed against it.

[Goryszewski] As a global superpower, the United States has its own special strategic goals. The primary one of them is to remove and liquidate the nuclear menace posed by Russia. Where conventional forces are concerned, the West has an overwhelming advantage [as published]: according to estimates, in the European portion of their country the Russians have the equivalent of 10 efficient divisions at their disposal. However, in the event of a global conflict, Russia has a sufficient number of nuclear weapons. Thus, Washington is trying to develop the relations with Moscow in such a way as to remove the specter of a potential confrontation.

Another strategic goal of the United States, I believe, is determined by possible competition with China, in which Russia may become a valuable partner—just as was the case in the 1970's. China became Washington's partner in the competition against Russia. I believe, however, that the United States would not be against shifting the western borders of the security structures to the east.

[Skorzynski] What internal obstacles does Poland have to surmount on its road to NATO?

[Goryszewski] There are several obstacles which defer possible admission of our country into NATO. First, civilian control over the Army. My interlocutors at NATO Headquarters, as well as U.S. Ambassador to Poland Nicholas Rey, have clearly given me the understanding that unless Poland builds a system of such control, this may impede our integration with the organization.

[Skorzynski] How are we evaluated in this respect today?

[Goryszewski] Current Polish solutions do not meet the standards accepted in NATO. This is a constitutional issue. What we should do first is answer the following question: Are we heading for a presidential system or a cabinet-parliamentary one? The troubles that we have now result from the fact that the Constitution contains elements of a presidential system (president exercises general supervision over the Armed Forces), but there is no mechanism that would subordinate the minister to the head of state. This must be resolved in the new constitution. Until the model of the country's political system is clearly determined, we will be skating on thin ice.

Another issue is the improper personnel structure in the Army. We have a reversed pyramid of officers' ranks—there are too many people in high ranks. This is the legacy of communist times, when the military bureaucracy became overgrown; this was a time when we had more majors and colonels than we needed.

The third problem is the technological backwardness of our Army, especially in the sphere of communication and command means [srodki dowodzenia]. This directly restricts our ability to act jointly with NATO Armies. However, until last year these elements of military equipment were under an embargo. Thus, it is difficult to criticize us for this. In fact, only after the adoption of the so-called Brown Amendment was the blockade on delivery of such equipment removed.

[Skorzynski] Since we can already import equipment from the West, why do we need a contract on arm deliveries from Russia, which was to be signed during Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's visit to Warsaw?

[Goryszewski] As for the value of the contract itself, I find it hard to express my opinion. However, the fears concerning reactions to it in the West were really justified. Incidentally, I do not rule out the possibility that the intention of the Russians was to demonstrate that such ties with Poland are still being maintained. Perhaps the purpose of it all was to make it possible for opponents of Poland's integration with NATO to use this fact as an argument that we have not made the decision ourselves and that we are still at a crossroads.

Another aspect of the problem is the issue of our arms industry—its conversion to civilian production is time- and capital-intensive. Arms industry plants cooperated with the Soviet Union. Perhaps it is not a good idea to break these ties completely; maybe we should think about joint exports. The tanks that we have been manufacturing in our factories so far are based not on the technology and standards of the Leopard, but on the T-72 tank. Until, in cooperation with the West, we begin manufacturing another model, we are—to some degree—sentenced to cooperate with Russia. Moreover, the new contract was more advantageous than the ones we signed earlier, in which the Russians had the right to

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give or not to give its consent each time any equipment manufactured jointly by them was to be exported. It is not difficult to imagine how this made things easier for them—it eliminated our products from the international arms market.

New Agriculture Minister Interviewed on Policy

WS0603153395 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 6 Mar 95 p 16

[Interview with Polish Minister of Agriculture Roman Jagielinski by Monika Dzierzynska-Nowak; place and date not given: "The Minister of Agriculture: The Gate Is Open for Colleague Soska"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Dzierzynska-Nowak] What do you intend to do once you are sitting at the agriculture minister's desk for the first time?

[Jagielinski] The first thing I have to do, of course, is talk with my associates. I do not intend to dart into the ministry with a "broom" and start making new staffing decisions.

Secondly, I shall ask the president of the Agency for Restructuring and Modernizing of Agriculture to submit a report on opening a credit line for land purchases.

[Dzierzynska-Nowak] What about the Agency for Agricultural Marketing [ARR]?

[Jagielinski] I evaluate its recent operations as positive, but there are certain shortcomings. In my opinion, ARR should be more careful in selecting those with which it cooperates, namely those commissioned to carry out purchases on its behalf. So far, they have been, for the most part, rather untrustworthy.

I thus intend to look at ARR closely and perhaps inspire it.

[Dzierzynska-Nowak] What about reform of the Food Industry Bank [BGZ]?

[Jagielinski] It must be completed as soon as possible. Only then will adequate balances have to be processed.

[Dzierzynska-Nowak] And subsidies granted?

[Jagielinski] If need be—yes. But only as a last resort, since any attempts at capitalizing BGZ will be a source of potential conflicts, and such action would be looked upon with scorn by the opposition and Polish society.

The problem of BGZ and, at the same time, ARR could be solved if the latter issued bonds. They could be taken over by BGZ on account of debts. The debt of ARR would also diminish considerably.

[Dzierzynska-Nowak] Will you counteract the growing food prices and implement provisions of the anti-inflation package?

[Jagielinski] It is my duty. Besides, high prices have an unfavorable impact on farmers. Price increases cause rapid growth of demand, followed by crisis.

Another top priority is the establishment of a real market in Poland, made up of exchanges and wholesale trade. A lack of an intermediary link between producer and consumer causes food prices to run excessively high.

As far as operations within the anti-inflation package are concerned, I consider imports of feed grain indispensable. Likewise with sugar. Still, I do claim that if we eliminated profiteering, even the small output of 1994/1995 would satisfy domestic needs.

[Dzierzynska-Nowak] Do you intend to do anything about compensatory fees?

[Jagielinski] I do not see any need to widen their scope. Should it be limited? That depends on market conditions. After all, we have to be flexible.

[Dzierzynska-Nowak] During the hearing at the Sejm agriculture commission you said you wanted to cooperate with Deputy Jacek Soska. Why so, considering you have completely different opinions on a vast majority of issues?

[Jagielinski] My colleague Jacek Soska claims he has a program to cure Polish agriculture. I want to give him an opportunity to implement it with me. If he accepts an offer to become undersecretary of state, the gate is open.

* * *

Jacek Soska, asked if he would accept the offer, told us: "I have to ask my wife first."

Spokesman Says Walesa To Sign Budget Law 7 Mar

LD0603190795 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1830 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Lech Walesa has decided to sign the budget law, which he previously passed on to the Constitutional Tribunal for examination, Presidential Spokesman Leszek Spalinski says.

[Begin Spalinski recording] President Lech Walesa has decided to withdraw from the Constitutional Tribunal his motion requesting that the budget bill be examined with regard to whether it is compatible with the Constitution. The president has also decided to sign the budget law tomorrow, 7 March.

Of course, the reasons for his complaint have not been removed but, because of the appointment of the new Cabinet, the president in a way is meeting the new government halfway. [end recording]

Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy has said that the president's decision is a manifestation of goodwill. The new prime minster met correspondents half an hour ago.

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More on Walesa Refusal To Sign Constitution Law

LD0603194895 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1830 GMT 6 Mar 95

[Relayed Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Lech Walesa has refused to sign the changes in the Small Constitution adopted by the parliament one month ago. In Walesa's view, the adoption of the principle that a dissolved Sejm deliberates until the first meeting of the chamber of the next term, threatens to turn paraliament into a place of electoral struggle.

[Correspondent] The parliament introduced these changes in the Small Constitution one month ago, when there was talk in the lobbies of the possibility of the dissolution of parliament by the president. Upon the basis of the vetoed change, a dissolved parliament will have no right to change constitutional laws, the electoral law, the budget, and also such laws that will have financial consequences for the state. A dissolved parliament could, on the other hand, deliberate. And Sejm deliberations are broadcast on television. Some deputies suggest that it is precisely this that the president fears. Deputies will need a two-thirds [majority] vote to overthrow the presidential veto. Since, however, the vetoed change was adoped by the Sejm by a crushing majority of votes, it is probable that the veto will be overthrown.

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Defense Minister Tinca on NATO, Integration

AU0703100695 Bucharest VOCEA ROMANIEI in Romanian 1 Mar 95 pp 1, 3

[Part I of interview with National Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca by Mircea Bunea; place and date not given: "Almost Everything About the Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Bunea] Mr. Minister, let us begin our conversation by your confirming or rebuffing two pieces of news published a few days ago by a daily that quite often mixes lies with the truth. Thus, is it or is it not true that we are to buy combat aircraft from the Americans and manufacture air-to-air missiles in cooperation with the French?

[Tinca] Your question refers to the future and therefore I cannot venture to give you a straight yes or no answer. As far as the present is concerned, it is clear that we do not have the necessary money to buy the F-16 fighter jets. I know nothing else about any other talks with respect to the purchase of such aircraft. I believe it is quite likely that such speculations began to appear following our efforts to find ways for our industry to cooperate in certain respects with prestigious firms in the aircraft-manufacturing business.

Recently I went to Craiova with Mr. Dassault, where we visited the airplane plant. An expert from DASA [Deutsche Aerospace], which is the twin brother of the French Aerospatiale, has also visited that factory, and I also received promises that the representatives of another, U.S., company would come to Bucharest as well. We would like the fighter planes for ground targets that we currently manufacture to be modernized in cooperation with a serious firm. On the basis of our efforts in this area, the news appeared that the U.S. Administration has lifted the embargo on the transfer of lethal combat equipment to the East European countries. It was such a combination of events that probably led to speculations on our purchasing F-type jets.

As for the missiles, I can confirm that we are holding talks with two major high-performance French companies in the field. They concern antitank missiles as well as air-to-air missiles, with which airplanes are equipped.

[Bunea] Do the operations in question have anything to do with our wish to be accepted into NATO?

[Tinca] Yes and no. No, because regardless of our joining NATO and regardless of the Partnership [for Peace] or other such things in the European context, the Romanian Army needs to be modernized. It needed modernization before 1989 too—that is: This need did not emerge only after the [1989 December] revolution. And yes, because our integration within Euro-Atlantic security structures, as well as the active role we play within the Partnership for Peace call for the modernization of the Romanian Army. Moreover, the integration process allows for easier access to both equipment and modern conceptions of organizing and utilizing resources.

[Bunea] By the way, since you mentioned the [North-Atlantic] Alliance: During a conversation I had at the White House with Mr. Richard Shifter, he assessed that (I quote) "admittance depends to a great extent on the activity of the defense minister." That is: on your activity. Then he quickly added, so that all the members of the Romanian press delegation gathered in his office could clearly hear, that you personally had made a very good impression in Washington. This on the one hand. On the other hand, U.S. Congressman Frank Wolf, whom we also contacted during our stay there, asserted—also referring to our admittance to NATO—that "nothing will count apart from the progress individually made by each country." Would you comment on these views?

[Tinca] Let me begin with the assessment that concerns myself. If there is such a positive opinion, publicly expressed, as you claim, about what I did in Washington, I am pleased. This is so because everything I said and did there stemmed from a, let us say, sincere and honest impulse. That is how our dialogue was, there. It had its source in my conception of our national interests. There was nothing halfhearted about it. It was a very direct and very frank dialogue. If that appreciation is true, I am delighted, because this means that the U.S. side appreciates approaches of this kind.

[Bunea] I repeat: He said it so that our 16, plus two of their journalists—altogether 18 journalists--could hear it.

[Tinca] I know from my previous experience, when I used to negotiate in diplomacy, that honesty, realism, and the clarity of one's stance are of great importance in placing the dialogue on a foundation of trust. I also know that our interests are mutual. No free lunch [last two words in English] there. And therefore the parties appreciate the truth and dignified stances. They can live with anything except for situations in which they would feel cheated.

As to the second part of your question, you see, currently the East European countries seem to be divided into the Visegrad countries [reference to the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary] and the others, those that are to be left out.... It is true, there is a draft bill in the U.S. Congress addressing the issue in this way, although lately it has lost some clout. But I would like to tell you that at the level of the U.S. Administration—by this I mean the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon, and other institutions—the perception that we tried to present to the U.S. side, but also to the European side as well, is getting stronger: namely, that the security of East Europe is indivisible, and the approach favoring a step-by-step admittance, according to the salami-slicing theory, could only result in the worsening of the security climate in our region. It would do no good to the countries that are admitted first either. Let alone the fact that the step-by-step approach could also undermine the democratic evolution and the economic reforms in the countries that are left out. I could feel that the U.S. side

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admits that our considerations are valid—at least logically. Of course, this process is much more complex, and we will have to continue voicing our arguments. On the other hand, no one should believe that the indivisibility of the security context is tantamount to a blank check. That is, that the East European countries will be admitted as a lump regardless of the way they evolve in the future. Each of them will have to try to meet the established criteria, and this depends on their individual efforts. Those criteria have to be applied in a nondiscriminatory way.

As a matter of fact I would not like to be in the shoes of any country that is unable to fully exercise its attributes as a member of the alliance. That is why I assess positively the U.S. congressman's opinion.

Besides all this, in connection with NATO one could say that sometimes they look at the alliance in an oversimplified way. Residues of the old idea of the East-West rift and confrontation are still present. NATO is still regarded—how should I put it?—as something opposed to something else. But there is no such thing any more. Furthermore, NATO does not have the same relevance it used to have. Some of us grew up with the image of NATO as a military bloc, while others with that of the Warsaw Treaty. In the end it turned out that it was not the military factor that made them viable. NATO has survived the Cold War, the crumbling of the Berlin wall, the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty, and the dismembering of the Soviet Union not because it emerged a victor on the battlefield. I believe that the viability of NATO should be sought in the political field. It has survived because it represented an association, the solidarity of certain free states around a set of political, economic, social, cultural, and other values. These same values are asserting themselves in East Europe as well, and the societies in this region are consolidating on the basis of those values.

Our integration into the alliance would be beneficial because it would broaden solidarity around those same values, which are ours as well: namely, those of democratic societies. We would feel more stable and more secure, without which there can be no democracy or prosperity. Whoever thinks that after joining the alliance under the NATO umbrella one can afford to engage in any kind of military adventures is wrong. No. Joining NATO presupposes a great deal of political responsibility, a much more responsible behavior. Adventures are senseless. If that were all, I believe we would be admitted very soon, because we do not conduct an adventure-seeking policy. We have never done so. It would be like a passport to NATO. However, the situation is much more complicated.

[Bunea] We are still in the "to-be-or-not-to-be" zone of NATO. At the same time, signals from the East prove that a possible expansion of NATO is not exactly regarded favorably. I read about such things. What do you think, should we feel concern about this?

[Tinca] One should always feel concern when perceptions do not correspond to reality.

I have been saying this for a while—and so far no one has said that I am wrong: that, actually, this is not an expansion of the alliance. No one from NATO will come knocking on our door and telling us "we wish to expand" while we ask them questions such as why, when, and how, or tell them that we would need more time for that. Reality is the reverse of this. It is the East European countries that wish to integrate with NATO. What is more, they are ready to make certain efforts to be able to join NATO, and to make certain pledges. Thus, we are dealing with the political will of those countries to integrate with the alliance, rather than their surrender to certain trends or pressure.

NATO is not like a carpet rolling all over Europe until it reaches certain borders, with the respective states moaning underneath. Of course, we are dealing with the expansion of the alliance, after all—but the nuance I propose is important, because we wish to join NATO as the result of manifesting our sovereign will to do so. I believe that this small detail is important. Besides, only the ones who wish to integrate do so. Those who hesitate are not being put under pressure by anyone. However, for the convenience of our discussion let us continue to use the term expansion.

Now, judging logically: If all the assertions and the official parameters we have been operating with are valid, I do not see any reason why the expansion of NATO should be perceived as something hostile by the Russian Federation. Declarations have been issued by the United States, NATO, and the Russian federation that might not be declarations of love, but still: They admit that they have ceased to be enemies. Therefore I do not see how the integration of the East European countries that wish to do so could again turn NATO into an enemy of the Russian Federation. I do not see how Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, and Czechia, once they joined NATO, could begin to conduct hostile policies against the Russian Federation—or, even worse, to influence NATO by reintroducing its hostility against the Russian Federation.

Let us take our own case. We have always wished to have good relations, and in no way hostile ones, with Russia in its various stances through history. The fact that we participated in World War II [against the Soviet Union] is an entirely different matter. Here we should note that certain territories had been taken from us, and this made us go to war. Had Ribbentrop and Molotov not signed the pact [granting Bessarabia and Bucovina to the Soviet Union], Romania's option would probably have been different. As it happened, Romania was compelled from every point of view to go to war. I assert that we have never conducted, nor do we now conduct, a hostile policy against Russia, and it will never lie in our interest to do so. I would even say: It is perhaps one of those rare occasions in our history when our fundamental interests

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in our relations with Russia coincide with the Western countries' stance with respect to that superpower. This is a chance that should not be missed by those who are genuinely interested in the peace of our continent—which could happen if their calculations are dominated by suspicion stemming from a none-too-happy past.

[Bunea] But what if we are seen by Moscow with different eyes? You have clearly demonstrated this: We have no such interest. We never have and probably never will.

[Tinca] I do not see any reasons for our being perceived in a different way. There might still be mistrust. I cannot accept that official declarations claiming that their perceptions of each other [NATO and Russia] have been altered or renewed, do not correspond to the truth. I would not risk having such doubts.

[Bunea] Neither would I.

[Tinca] We take such declarations as genuine because they are made in public. What I would like to stress is the deficient logic in certain aspects of certain states of affairs. What we wish to achieve by joining NATO is to give this region a status and to stabilize it, to create a climate that favors economic development and to strengthen the democratic organizing of our countries—all of which, allow me to remark, is in Russia's interest. Thus Russia would be able to deal with a stable partner able to positively influence the Russian democratization process.

On the economic plane we are eager to reestablish the ties of cooperation we used to have. And they did not begin with CEMA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance], but long before that. We are living in an adjacent region, and in a way we are fated to cooperate with them. I can understand that Russia is interested in having partners among countries that are undergoing a specific economic development, which to a certain extent could also stimulate Russia. Think of the economies of the East European countries. If they were to enter an upward trend, beginning to produce a lot, commerce would flourish with them, because they would need Russia's resources.

Let us go further. I believe that the stability of the region and the clarification of problems would be—how should I put it?—an act of limiting the maneuverability of those forces that oppose democratic developments in Russia and oppose placing its foreign policy on new, genuinely European bases. Therefore, one can say that the integration of East European countries into NATO would be in the interest of positive evolutions in Russia.

Let us move even further. We admit that there should be certain relations at a strategic level between Russia, the United States, and NATO. These are objective relations that exist whether we want them or not. Just think of nuclear weapons. It is in the interest of mankind for there to be relations between nuclear powers. Those weapons must be controlled, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction should still be controlled. What we are asking is that these special relations that we acknowledge be transparent. They should not be at variance with the interests, or with the assertion of the interests, of other countries. Hence, there are guarantees to satisfy—or at least not to ignore—Russia's interests.

Somebody might say: Fine, but if NATO expands, then this means that we would cut Europe into two parts. An answer to this issue should take account of the following: Russia is the only country that can ensure its security with its own forces. Thus, while other countries, to feel secure, need association, Russia can allow itself the luxury of taking care of its own security. Russia is a nuclear superpower. What it needs is not to be isolated. And we do not want it to be isolated. We are even taking steps so that it does not become isolated.

[Bunea] Mr. Minister, let us talk about another issue. A few days ago, Senator Adrian Paunescu captured the attention of the members of Parliament with a very serious affirmation. I quote: By reducing the number of high-ranking officers, the country's stability is affected. End quote. And now, I would be interested in the following: I have no knowledge of any reaction whatsoever to this from the National Defense Ministry, either in the press, or radio, or television...No one in your ministry has said anything. This might be perceived as a sort of admission of the fact that, on that occasion, the truth was uttered.

[Tinca] The lack of reaction is not necessarily an admission. In fact, it was correct not to react because I provided some indirect explanations—indirect reaction because I have respect and admiration for Mr. Adrian Paunescu. I am not aware of details of his activity as senator, because I am not fully aware of parliamentary politics. However, I know his poems and there are some that always bring tears to my eyes whenever I hear or read them.

It is true that a number of officers complained to him in Ineu (eastern Romania]. I think that it would have been much better if he had asked us what the situation is, in case he was convinced that "the Army is disintegrating." He could even have spoken to us on behalf of those officers, if that were the case. I think that he rushed to some conclusion. Certainly the Army, the fate fate of officers, is a very sensitive issue. It arouses feelings, and maybe his reaction in the Parliament is understandable. However, I have to thank him for bringing up the issue. He brought up the issue, one might say; and I can come up with the necessary clarifications.

The statute through which the situation of those officers was settled arrived on a Monday. The case raised by the senator occurred on the weekend. Those people saw that they are not dismissed, and each of them has his own place and a salary that he deserves. In a way this was comforting for me because I stated, am stating, and

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hopefully will continue to state that there will not be unemployed officers. Here lies the greatest difficulty: We carry out reform and restructuring in the Army without dismissing anybody or creating unemployment among the military cadres. The officers of whom the senator spoke will not become unemployed. And now a logical question arises: All very well, but if you have to reduce personnel by about 16,000 people, how is it that you are not producing unemployment?

First of all, not all schemes are complete. And this offers us the possibility of reducing posts without dismissing people, because those posts have not been filled. Apart from this, although the average age of our people in our Army is 35-37, there are a great many military cadres who have retired or are about to retire, and some have greatly exceeded retirement age. Who could be against the act of giving young officers a chance so that they too can assume responsibilities, to fulfill their military career that they have been trained for? This is natural, honest, and a positive thing for the country.

The reform is a new thing, and it does not mean only restructuring or rearranging posts. There are certain ideas behind it, and the older you get—I tell you this from my own experience—the more difficult it is to adapt to them. How can you ask a person who is about to retire—not an unemployed person, just somebody who is about to retire—and let us not forget that the Army pension is quite good, so, how can you ask such a person, in his last year or last months of service before retirement, to see things differently from the way he was used to seeing them throughout his entire life? If we do not carry out the reform as a creed, believing in its necessity; and if we do not understand its ideas and the goals on which it is based, then we struggle in vain.

Another way of reducing personnel is by increasing Army discipline. And one point should be clear to everybody: namely, that no longer will there be concessions or compromises. Except for... whatever is humanly possible. We no longer tolerate violations of military discipline or military honor. The Army is not a shelter where you can hide quietly and busy yourself with other things, having solved the problem that something might happen but because you are in the Army and have a stable career, that ensures your security until old age. If some people wish to enter lucrative activities that are specific to a market economy, they have all my admiration. They are to be commended that they have an enterprising spirit, but in this case they should deal only in business. If they wish to work for the Army, then they have to serve it not only in words but deeds as well. In that case, they can rest assured that they will have a career and a honorable profession. Therefore, the senator should really feel assured that there will not be unemployed officers.

And I can offer him another guarantee: If there is any injustice, or a case that must be solved humanely, or if these reductions of personnel create a tragedy, we will have sufficient understanding for those cases, and we are human. I hope that officers will not be afraid of modernization. They should fear only immobility. And they should also fear that if the current situation stays the way it is now, it will not be in their interest. We must strive to create a flux of opinion, through which officers and other military personnel should show interest in reform and understand that this is the only way toward improving their condition.

Armed Forces Maneuver in Ethnic Hungarian Areas

AU0703093395 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 3 Mar 95 p 3

[Article by Laszlo Botos: "Low Flying in Szeklerland—Show of Force Before 15 March"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Romanian Army helicopters and combat jets have been carrying out consistent and repeated training flights above towns in the Szeklerland, especially in Harghita and Covasna counties. The low-flying aircraft were creating a tremendous noise last weekend and similar maneuvers could also be observed on 1 March.

The Szeklerland press has reported various kinds of military exercises. The daily HAROMSZEK published in Sepsiszentgyorgy [Sfantu Gheorge] reported aerial as well as land maneuvers. An exercise was reported in the vicinity of the county's settlements inhabited solely by Hungarians, and soldiers and their officers in combat fatigues were also observed assessing the capacity of an old Hungarian manor house and asking about its owner.

In Harghita county, the aerial military exercise above Csikszereda [Miercurea Ciuc] will be remembered for the deafening noise, loud explosions, and the frightening low flying. The daily HARGITA NEPE published a sarcastic commentary on this.

According to reports in the Szeklerland press, aerial military exercises performed over densely populated areas—one of these noisy maneuvers could also be heard in Csikszereda's central housing estate at the time of writing this article—can also be attributed to a show of force before the 15 March Hungarian National Day.

This phenomenon is especially surprising because during his visit to Csikszereda last year, Romanian National Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca personally promised, in the presence of Gyorgy Keleti and a Hungarian military delegation, that such aerial military exercises would not take place in the immediate airspace of Szeklerland towns....

Anti-Hungarian Demonstrations Slated for 15 Mar

LD0603144595 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Experts concerned with drafting the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty are continuing

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their discussions in Bucharest today, while anti-Hungarian actions are being prepared and conducted in Romania. Tibor Bogdan reports from Bucharest:

[Begin Bogdan recording] Throughout Transylvania, Romanian nationalist forces are preparing for counter-demonstrations on 15 March [Hungarian national day]. (Bebe Ivanovic), one of the influential politicians of the Social Democracy Party of Romania, the main government party, has said (?he) is preparing a large-scale anti-Hungarian demonstration in County Mures in order to prevent what (?he) calls the celebrations saluting Greater Hungary.

Gheorghe Funar, chairman of the Romanian National Unity Party, the other group within the government coalition, has also called on the Vatra Romaneasca association and patriotic parties to organize all-day events. According to his argument, since the law does not allow simultaneous street events, the relevant mayors' offices can legally ban the Hungarians' ceremonies.

Funar said: Banning the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania by judicial means would be a very lengthy process; therefore, they will use quicker methods.

Intimidation of the Hungarian population has already begun in the Szeklerland. The Romanian Army's Puma helicopters and MiG fighter units carry out low-level flights for several hours every day over several areas in County Covasna, including the county seat of Sfintu Gheorghe, Reci, Baraolt, and Tirgu Secuiesc. According to information from Army circles, there is no question of intimidating the population. This is merely the carrying out of actions serving integration into NATO. [end recording]

New Chief of Anticorruption Corps Appointed

AU0603181495 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 2 Mar 95 p 1

[Article by Rodica Ciobanu: "Dismissals at the Interior Ministry"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Major General Nicolae Neagu became the new chief of the Interior Ministry's Control and Anticorruption Corps yesterday. He had previously been the Brasov Police inspector. General Neagu will replace Colonel Moise George, who was released from duty and forced to retire by Interior Minister Doru Ioan Taracila for not having carried out "precisely and on time" the measures ordered by the ministry collegium. The Interior Ministry Control and Anticorruption Corps exerts control over command activity, watches over the legality of the commands, and supervises the similar activity carried out by the Police General Inspectorate. During 1994 they placed in reserve 75 Interior Ministry officers, 425 noncommissioned officers, and 10 civilian employees, all of whom had committed various abuses.

Halanga Heavy Water Plant Operations Viewed

AU0703092595 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 2 Mar 95 p 16

[Report by Ion Marcovici: "A 500-Billion Lei Investment: 1,003 Metric Tons of Heavy Water by the Year 1996"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At Halanga [Mehedinti County] there is an absolutely necessary energy tandem: the thermal power station and the heavy water-producing plant. The first has been completely overhauled and modernized (15 billion lei), the modernization process being scheduled to continue over the next two years (further investments worth 20-25 billion lei). As the heavy water-producing plant, the latter principal energy unit is supplied by the thermal power station. As a result of these strictly necessary investments the town of Drobeta Turnu Severin has ceased to suffer from a lack of heating and hot, running water. It is only now, after the modernization of the thermal power plant, that maximum safety can be guaranteed in the running of the heavy water plant. (The steam boilers of the thermal plant operate on the worst quality coal in all of Europe, having just 1,300 kCal [kilocalories] per kilogram, which is identical to that of locust trees), while the residues eliminated after the process amount to 45 percent of the original coal mass.)

The heavy water plant at Halanga caused the so-called Drobeta syndrome to spread throughout the town. This is a mass psychosis phenomenon due to the fact that the heavy water plant is situated near the town. [passage omitted]

One equipment group is currently operating (90 metric tons per year,) but beginning with September, a second group will begin production, the total amount of heavy water produced per year by the two groups being expected to amount to 180 metric tons. This investment was assessed to amount to 500 billion lei, while all the already achieved constructions intended for the second phase have been preserved owing to lack of funds.

Let us mention a positive fact: the purity degree of that "nuclear subproduct" is the highest possible, namely 99.98 percent, which exceeds that of the heavy water produced by countries with greater nuclear potential and tradition, although ours is more expensive.

PNTCD Thinks Government Needs To Be Replaced

AU0603135695 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] During the weekly news conference of the National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party [PNTCD] today, PNTCD First Deputy Chairman Ion Diaconescu referred to the current situation within the Democratic Convention, assessing that this is a provisional moment waiting for the final decisions to be made by the Civic Alliance Party and the Liberal Party

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'93 [as to whether to sign the 17 February protocol of the convention and thus remain members of the opposition alliance].

Following the UDMR's [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] withdrawal from the Convention, we will be witnessing the UDMR's orientation toward the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania], since the representatives of the ethnic Hungarians will not be able to obtain rights from anyone else, except for the government, stated PNTCD spokesman Radu Vasile.

They also made appraisals regarding the [economic] restructuring process under the pressure exerted by international bodies on the current government to speed up the privatization process. The conclusion of the PNTCD is that, caught between external and internal demands, the government has lost its ability to solve current problems and therefore has to be replaced—reports informs our correspondent Maria Cristea.

Memoirs Expected To Cause 'Political Earthquake'

AU0603142595 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 2 Mar 95 p 8

[MEDIAFAX report: "General Cristea's Memoirs Will Have the Effect of an Earthquake on our Political Life"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Over the past months Dumitru Cristea, former major general of the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] and [SRI Director] Virgil Magureanu's deputy, has been working on his memoirs, which will reveal interesting scenes from the SRI backstage. His book will cause a political earthquake, as Cristea wishes to reveal important things about several political leaders and high-ranking SRI officers.

General Cristea has already been contacted by two publishing houses that wish to publish his memoirs for a considerable amount of money. However, in an exclusive statement to MEDIAFAX, Cristea said he has declined both offers and that his book is to be published in 1996.

Until summer 1994, Cristea was a deputy of the SRI director's, as well as the rector of the Superior Intelligence Institute. Although the principal charge against him was merely his suspected liaison with a former student, Magureanu approved his dismissal without disclosing the real reasons behind General Cristea's removal.

Political Elements Seen in Romanian-Roma Clashes

95P20569A

[FBIS Media Note] "Once again, Gypsies' homes have been set on fire. Once again, this unstable sector of society has become the epicenter of a bloody conflict," stated the Bucharest daily ROMANIA LIBERA in its 11 January 1995 issue. According to the paper, the most recent conflict between Romanians and Gypsies, or Roma, took place in the village of Bacu in Giurgiu County, about 25 kilometers from Bucharest, where the 1 January rape of a Gypsy woman by her godfather triggered brawls between Roma from Bacu and other areas, the burning of Gypsies' homes by Romanians, and general terror. The paper reported that Romanians said that they were afraid to set foot outside their houses because they were "threatened by the 'ninja' swords of the Gypsy billionaires." ROMANIA LIBERA noted that 8 to 10 policemen had guarded each Gypsy house to keep it from being burned and asked: "Who is protecting the other citizens?" Noting that similar incidents had occurred in other parts of the country during the past four years, ROMANIA LIBERA warned that "the explosive situation existing between Romanians and Gypsies indicates that there will be additional incidents." The paper said that "many people have erroneously called this an interethnic conflict, but few have noted the lack of intervention by the authorities," who are "downplaying" a serious problem,

Speaking at a press conference organized by the Community of Roma in Romania and reported in the 17 January issue of the Democratic Party paper, Bucharest AZI, the president of the Community, Dumitru Ion Bidia, stated: "The conflict in Bacu between Romanians and Roma was not an interethnic or social conflict but a political game." AZI said that Bidia's statement was based on the fact that in the 1992 presidential elections, "all the Roma voted for the current head of state." This "did not please" the current opposition, which wants to demonstrate that the vote was given to the wrong person and to "convince the Roma to vote for the opposition in the next elections." The Community's leaders noted the prompt intervention of the police and gave "warm thanks" to Minister of Interior Doru Ioan Taracila. According to AZI, President Iliescu "did not take a firm stand," so he was "cut off the list of those receiving 'warm thanks,'" Prime Minister Vacaroiu received the same treatment as Iliescu. "However," AZI added, "the chief executive did get something: an open letter in which the Roma asked for a headquarters for their community, which has not received any money from the state budget during the past five years. And so, the 37th clash between Roma and Romanians since December 1989 has resulted in demands for headquarters and funds."

According to ADEVARUL of 19 January, Bidia warned that there would be an "unleashing of a Yugoslavia-type situation throughout Romania" if the "central authorities" do not take a clear stand in regard to the Bacu events and if the guilty parties are not tried and punished. The paper quoted leaders of the Community as saying that, "on all levels, there was a continuing fostering of xenophobia and of intolerance toward the representatives of the Roma" and added that "neither the presidency nor the government, through the Council for National Minorities, nor the king nor the emperor of the Roma has promoted any long-range program for

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adapting the Roma to the demands of civilized living," despite the fact that the Community's representative to the Council of Europe presented a plan for reducing crime among Gypsies.

A front-page article in the 16 January issue of the independent Bucharest daily ADEVARUL reported that Roma are responsible for more than 10 percent of the crimes in Romania in 1994 although they represent only 1.8 percent of the population. Gypsies were involved in 19 percent of violent crimes; 10.5 percent of robberies; 20.5 percent of crimes committed in forest areas, which the paper does not explain further; 20.5 percent of thefts of private property; and 23 percent of thefts of public property. The paper said that the potential for crime among the Gypsies is about 5.5 times higher than in the rest of the population and quoted the advice of Lieutenant General Ioan Pitulescu, the chief of the National Police, that representatives of this "ethnic group" stop demonstrating in the "seaports of Europe," where they circulate petitions stating that they are "marginalized," and that they be concerned not only about "personal prosperity" but also about the education and "resocialization of Roma citizens, so as to prevent the ever-increasing antisocial acts perpetrated by them."

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B-H, Croatia Joint Command Awaits Go-Ahead

AU0603202095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, a meeting was held in Zagreb between Corps General Janko Bobetko, Army General Rasim Delic, and Major General Tihomir Blaskic in the headquarters of the Croatian Army General Staff. The talks concerned the coordination and joint operations between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the Croatian Army, and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO].

It was decided at the meeting that at the moment the best way to achieve mutual goals was to form a military command that would consist of representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the Croatian Army, and the HVO. It is expected that these issues will be given a political go-ahead during a meeting this evening in Zagreb, which is to be attended—apart from the three generals—by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency member and Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation Vice President Ejup Ganic, and Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation President Kresimir Zubak.

Serbs Play Down Joint Command

AU0603205595 Paris AFP in English 2024 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Zagreb, March 6 (AFP)—Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina for the first time Monday set up a joint military unit, taking a step towards a confederation between Croatia and the Moslem-Croat Federation of Bosnia, state-run Croatian television said. [passage omitted]

The report said that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman was due to meet the president and vice-president of the Federation—Bosnian Croat representative Kresimir Zubak and Bosnian Government representative Ejup Ganic—later in the evening to officially launch the new unit.

The report cited General Bobetko as saying that his as yet unspecified forces would be used to "protect the territories, borders and populations living within the Federation and confederation and to create the conditions for a return of refugees to their homes.

"The number of refugees is not negligible, and neither is the historic duty of either of the peoples," he added.

Bosnian Army Chief General Rasim Delic and the commander of Croat forces in Bosnia, General Tihomil Blaskic, are also to be part of the new unit. [passage omitted]

The Bosnian Serbs, in a first reaction to the creation of the joint military command, played down its significance. Bosnian Serb television monitored in Sarajevo opened its evening news with the information from Zagreb.

The television said that "non-functioning of the quasi-federation (of Bosnian Moslems and Croats) and frequent incidents on the ground determine in advance the destiny of this signature."

"The authors of this alliance forgot one thing—the Serb Defence Council (that of Bosnian and Croatian Serbs) consists of the representatives of one Serb nation, while in this one there are two Croats and one Moslem," the television said.

"But the Serb Army stands ready," added the television, commenting on the announcement that the aim of the joint command is to "liberate Bosnian and Croatian territories occupied by Serbs."

Serbs Obstruct Natural Gas Supplies to Sarajevo

AU0703115595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The supply of natural gas in Sarajevo deteriorated yesterday afternoon when the enemy turned off the second valve in Doglodi. This valve supplies the city with gas, so the supply is now only possible through a valve in the southern part of the high-pressure (?ring). Under these circumstances, not all the city's consumers can receive gas.

According to the schedule for the distribution of available natural gas, consumers in Stari Grad and Centar and parts of Novi Grad and Novo Sarajevo have been supplied. [passage omitted]

Plane Hit by Gunfire; Sarajevo Airport Closed

AU0703095795 Paris AFP in English 0936 GMT 7 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 7 (AFP)—A UN plane landing at Sarajevo aiport was hit by gunfire Tuesday morning [7 March], prompting the closure of the airport, a UN spokesman said.

A UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Ilyushin-76 transport plane arriving from Zagreb was hit by at least one round of small arms fire as it made its final approach, Major Herve Gourmelon said. The plane landed safely and took off soon afterwards to return to Zagreb.

The airport was ordered closed following the incident. The air bridge into Sarajevo was suspended last week after firing incidents involving several planes.

Official: Serbs To Down Planes Carrying Arms

AU0603120195 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 1 Mar 95 p 16

[Interview with Dragan Kapetina, secretary in the Srpska repubic Defense Ministry, by Zoran Petrovic Pirocanac; place and date not given: "We Shall Mobilize the Nation

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and Readily Meet the Germans If They Come. We Have Already Been Given Orders To Shoot Down Planes Bringing Arms to Tuzla"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Pirocanac] The world media are increasingly mentioning the possibility of the Germans joining the military operations in Yugoslavia. What does your ministry think of this possibility? Is there a realistic danger of the Germans coming?

[Kapetina] As far as this is concerned, we need to note that the Germans have been actively engaged in the disintegration of Yugoslavia from the very beginning. They used the European Community, they forced the recognition of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is the Defense Ministry and the Serbian Republic's general opinion that German forces are undesirable in the area of the Srpska republic and generally in the region of the former Yugoslavia. It is worth mentioning that the Germans are one of the more important sponsors of the Muslim-Croatian coalition.

[Pirocanac] Are there any visible traces of the sponsorship in the past period? Rumor has it that 36 German officers are in Kiseljak.

[Kapetina] We have no reliable information, but there are indications that they are in Kiseljak. This was to be expected, since the Germans are losing their patience—that is, the Croatian-Muslim coalition is also expecting more significant and immediate aid from the Germans. Not only declarative, but concrete aid.

[Pirocanac] Could you compare the Germany military potential with that of the Srpska republic army, which has three years of combat experience. How would a direct comparison balance out?

[Kapetina] In any case, we do not expect a more massive German military engagement. We suppose that the German forces would most probably participate in security operations during the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] withdrawal or some kind of military engagement through NATO.

[Pirocanac] Germany's Social Democrats have agreed that 2,000 of their troops may be deployed in Yugoslavia.

[Kapetina] I am telling you, their patience is running out and they want something here. Their interests are more threatened by the Republic of Serbian Krajina than the Serbian Republic, but, generally speaking, their interests in the Balkans are threatened and they are hoping to put an end to all this as soon as possible.

[Pirocanac] Let us suppose that UNPROFOR definitely leaves. We know that NATO has asked the Croats to allow them to install a base in Croatia. That brings us back to the Germans and a new phase.

[Kapetina] I believe that if the German forces were to come here, it would be a prelude to an all-out war in the Balkans. There can be no doubt about that. And perhaps a war would break out in the wider area of Europe.

[Pirocanac] How do the troops in the Srpska republic react when the Germans are mentioned?

[Kapetina] I believe this is common knowledge. We would not trust them, even if they were part of UNPROFOR. We would probably protest through the United Nations that the Germans cannot be part of the UN forces because they are biased. They favor the Muslim-Croatian coalition.

[Pirocanac] If the Germans were to come, nevertheless, what would the Srpska republic and the Srpska republic army do?

[Kapetina] We have a unanimous stance on this. UNPROFOR forces can only be deployed on the demarcation points, not on Srpska republic territory. We would deny them hospitality on our territory.

[Pirocanac] The Tuzla airport, following the destruction of the Bihac airport, has become strategically very important.

[Kapetina] That is right. The Muslim side is now being armed via the airport in Tuzla.

[Pirocanac] They are regularly and freely bringing military hardware to the airport and you are not obstructing them in this....

[Kapetina] They do it at night and in bad weather. Transport planes from all Western ports are escorted by fighter bombers. The latest in U.S. armaments is coming in. We had an agreement with UNPROFOR to have our representative at the airport so he could monitor the situation. However, he was removed. In fact, UNPROFOR has been prevented from monitoring the airfield at Dubrave.

[Pirocanac] Why did you allow that to happen?

[Kapetina] We have lodged a protest with UNPROFOR, and our Supreme Command has passed a decision that all planes are to be downed in the future.

[Pirocanac] You are going to down planes?

[Kapetina] Of course! We are also going to shoot them down from positions on the ground.

[Pirocanac] Are you capable of discouraging them from using the airport?

[Kapetina] Yes.

[Pirocanac] How long would you say this unimpeded delivery of military hardware has been going on?

[Kapetina] On and off for about a month.

[Pirocanac] How much material could have been brought in during this time?

[Kapetina] Several thousand metric tons for certain.

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[Pirocanac] This is a significant amount.

[Kapetina] Yes, of course it is.

[Pirocanac] The issue of the Tuzla airport is extremely important for Yugoslavia because planes from Tuzla can reach the border with Yugoslavia in a minute.

[Kapetina] Precisely. I also believe that the West is leaving some of the fighter bombers at Tuzla airport for the Muslim side. I think that everything that touches down remains there for their needs.

[Pirocanac] All of this implies a new offensive. General Milovanovic in November predicted with a high degree of certainty that the Croats would launch an offensive in March. Does this mean that NATO will be involved, that everyone will be involved?

[Kapetina] Most probably. Everything will be coordinated if it happens.

[Pirocanac] When they all join forces, they are stronger than you....

[Kapetina] We were given a message that came in the form of a letter from the Srpska republic assembly session held in Samac. There is nothing else for us to do but to maximally unite and put all human and material resources into defense. Not only here, but also in Yugoslavia. Because unification makes it entirely different. We are, afterall, talking about the entire Serbian nation.

[Pirocanac] How much weaponry and what kind of forces have built up in the area since the time when the controversy regarding Tuzla airport started and when the 10 Leopard tanks arrived there? Are there any Americans there?

[Kapetina] There are American and German instructors.

[Pirocanac] Are they at the airport? You have probably been "bugging" them.

[Kapetina] Of course, of course, they are at the airport, they are instructors.

[Pirocanac] How many of them are there in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Kapetina] Several hundred to be sure. Moreover, this airport is the point from which military hardware is then distributed, even as far as the enclaves. We have information that this material is taken as far as Gorazde and Zepa.

[Pirocanac] How is that carried out?

[Kapetina] With helicopters, nighttime flights and morning flights, and so on. They are being massively armed.

[Pirocanac] You mentioned earlier that you are ready to prevent further material deliveries to Tuzla airport.

[Kapetina] We are ready mostly on the ground—that is, from several elevations east of Tuzla and further down south.

[Pirocanac] If the situation were to escalate further, would you at some point have to use the air force?

[Kapetina] We made this clear to UNPROFOR, and the Supreme Command has made the decision.

[Pirocanac] What is the concrete situation in which the Srpska republic will use its planes?

[Kapetina] Probably during massive offensive operations towards our positions. And probably in cooperation with Krajina, particularly after the establishment to the Joint Defense Council and other agreements.

[Pirocanac] Are these agreements solid?

[Kapetina] Certainly.

[Pirocanac] When it comes to Germans, for the time being they are members of AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System] and ship crews in the Adriatic. With the exception of the instructors in Tuzla, and elsewhere, in Kiseljak, are there Germans anywhere else in Bosnia?

[Kapetina] There are Germans in Mostar, around Koschnik and the European Union. A part of them make up the police force.

[Pirocanac] Were there any Germans in Bihac, like there were Americans?

[Kapetina] We have no information that there were any Germans in Bihac. The Germans have as yet not come to these war zones. However, if you were to see footage of their maneuvers in the West, it is clear that the Germans are preparing to come to the region. I believe that is quiet certain, since they started the whole business. Although, of course, this is a fiasco for Europe, particularly if you take into consideration earlier experience.

[Pirocanac] You are currently encircled. How long can the Serbs realistically hold out when faced with a massive influx of enemy forces?

[Kapetina] Our main preoccupation during this ceasefire is to carry out engineering work and maximally reinforce the achieved lines, and we are doing so. Furthermore, we believe that it is far easier to defend oneself than to carry out offensive operations. Our military hardware is ready. We may not have as much as the other side, but it is enough for active defense.

[Pirocanac] Do you believe that this could be enough to discourage even the Germans, who are strong and excellent fighters?

[Kapetina] They are strong, but they do not always live up to plans and theoretical assumptions. We do not believe that they would massively engage their air force. All in all, by the end of March we will be ready for active

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defense. We moreover know from which directions to expect attacks on all parts of the front.

[Pirocanac] Is the Mladic-Milovanovic-Tolimir trio ready?

[Kapetina] The public should be informed about this. Militarily things more or less correspond to your idea of them. Of course, pressure needs to be applied that will support our unification on the political level.

[Pirocanac] You seem to be using TELEGRAF to address some sort of appeal to the public.

[Kapetina] Our assembly has already done that, and I do not wish the Defense Ministry to that. Our ministry is a state body, and the assembly letter has said it all. We only wish to remind the public of the letter and the latest agreements wit the political and military leadership of the republic of Serbian Krajina. I believe that the public will learn that a delegation has been appointed that will conduct talks on the subject in Yugoslavia.

[Pirocanac] What has happened to the troops during this lull? Have they become slack?

[Kapetina] Things are practically boiling here. The atmosphere is tense. There can be no talk of slackening. We shall in fact mobilize the entire human resources, and, if need be, we shall create and train female units so that everyone who is able can take part in the defense.

[Pirocanac] What is the morale of the troops like?

[Kapetina] Mostly it is on an enviable level. There are perhaps some problems on the social level. This war has, after all, been going on for a long time, and priorities do not allow us to think about the living standard, the position of families, and so forth. The most important thing, after all, is to defend our cause.

Serbs Allow Netherlands Food Convoy To Pass

BR0603154595 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 6 Mar 95 p 5

[Article by Bart Rijs: "Serbs Let Convoy for Netherlands UN Soldiers Pass"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade—On Sunday [5 March] Bosnian Serbs allowed a convoy to bring 30 tonnes of food to Netherlands UN soldiers in the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica. The food supplies for the Netherlands troops were almost exhausted. The Serbs only agreed after the United Nations threatened to break the blockade with helicopters, under NATO air protection.

"We did not even have canned rations left," said Karremans, commanding officer of the more than 700 Netherlands soldiers in Srebrenica. "We only had some rice and peanut butter left. With this convoy we have supplies for another eight days. We finally had a proper meal this evening: a slice of meat, potatoes, and carrots. Spirits are high."

Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic was only willing to let the convoy pass after he received a telephone call from UN Commander Smith. "He yielded to the argument that no officer will let his troops starve and that the supplies would get there one way or another," a UN officer in Sarajevo said. Without Serbian permission the supplies would have been flown in by helicopter from Tuzla airport, which is under Bosnian Army control. [passage omitted]

Croats Firm on Mostar as Herceg-Bosna Capital

LD0603170395 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kresimir Zubak, president of the presidential council of the [Bosnian] Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna; Ivan Bender, president of the republic chamber of deputies; and Jadranko Prlic, prime minister of the republic, have left for Bonn for talks on the political status of Mostar. Before their departure Ivan Bender spoke about [Bosnian] Croat standpoints.

[Begin Bender recording] The Croat standpoints are well known, they were defined a long time ago in declarations and the program of the Croat Democratic Union and in the programs of the state institutions of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna. We are ready and we are prepared to discuss the implementation of the Muslim-Croat Federation based on the agreed principles. There can and will be no deviations from these principles. Our standpoints on Mostar are well known. We will adhere to our standpoints and I repeat that there can and will be no deviations. Mostar is the capital of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, a focal point for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats. I think that we will discuss this issue, and as you know, our idea is to organize Mostar as a single city with two or more municipalities. [end recording]

SRS Supports Dismissal of RSK's Mikelic

LD0603212495 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1615 GMT 6 Mar 95

[Item received via fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 6 Mar (SRNA)—The Serb Radical Party [SRS] of the Srpska republic today sent a letter to the president of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], expressing its full support for his initiative to dismiss Borislav Mikelic from the post of Krajina prime minister.

The letter says that SRS members, its numerous supporters, and Srpska republic patriots agree that "in a state of upheaval, it is of exceptional importance that the RSK state organs have decided to use all available means to fight crime, especially since the name of Borislav Mikelic has been linked with it."

The letter of support for Martic is signed by Nikola Poplasen, vice president of the SRS of the Serb lands, and Nikola Siric, chairman of the Serb Republic SRS Executive.

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Speculation About Holbrooke's Impact on Tudjman

AU0603171795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 6 Mar 95

[Report by Nada al-Isa from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke is to arrive in Zagreb today to try and persuade President Tudjman to allow UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] to stay. This seems to be the prevailing view on the Croatian political scene. That is why Zagreb is holding its breath in anticipation: Will the American explicitly demand—perhaps even as an ultimatum—that Tudjman let UNPROFOR stay? Will Tudjman agree? Can he, dare he reject the U.S. offer? On the other hand, if he agrees, how will he explain to his people that UNPROFOR is staying after all? There are lots questions and very few answers. The talks are expected to take place this evening.

In the meantime, Serb radio stations in the occupied Croatian territories appear to be only too keen to see more international, particularly U.S., pressure on Croatia. They claim that Croatia is preparing for war, that it has bought incredible amounts of weapons, among other things, also apparently 400 tanks. According to Milan Martic on Radio Knin, the so-called Krajina is also gearing for war. Martic says that the missiles are already trained on Zagreb.

In one television program, Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak seemed to have been replying to Knin when he said: Croatia can mobilize 500,000 people within 24 hours, if war turns out to be the only solution.

All this, of course, is provided UNPROFOR leaves. However, whether UNPROFOR is to leave or not is still a question mark. A high-ranking UN officer in Zagreb says that UNPROFOR is not going anywhere, that it will remain in Croatia. The definitive answer to this will be known this evening, after the talks between Tudjman and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke.

A Croatian Government official says: Holbrooke is not coming to the presidential palace for coffee. He is coming with definite demands that Tudjman will find hard to reject. Some people have interpreted this as a sign that UNPROFOR will stay put.

Tudjman, Holbrooke Talk

LD0603194695 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received a statement issued by the office of the president of the republic in connection with his meeting with Richard Holbrooke, U.S. assistant secretary of state, this evening.

According to the statement, the meeting was attended by Hrvoje Sarinic, head of the office; Ivo Sanader, deputy foreign minister; Miomir Zuzul, the president's special envoy and ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva; Zaljko Matic, the president's foreign policy adviser; and Goran Radin, the spokesman of the president's office.

They held constructive talks on the future of the peace process once the UN Protection Force mandate in Croatia expires, the statement says.

Tudjman, Bosnian Military Delegations Meet

LD0603220795 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received a statement from the president's office:

A meeting was held in the presidential palace in Zagreb between a delegation of the Federation of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia President Dr. Franjo Tudjman, and a delegation of Croatia. Present were Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Dr. Ejup Ganic, member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation; Dr. Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs; Gojko Susak, minister of defense; Corps General Janko Bobetko, chief of general staff of the Croatian Army; General Rasim Delic, chief of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army general staff; General Tihomir Blaskic, chief of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] general staff; Dr. Miroslav Tudjman, head of the Croatian information service; Colonel General Zvonimir Cervenko, head of the president's military office; Miomir Zuzul, the president's special envoy and ambassador to the UN mission in Geneva; and Dr. Kasim Trnka, ambassador of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Zagreb.

Under discussion at the meeting were issues relating to the implementation of the Washington Agreements on the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its confederation with Croatia. In accordance with the Washington Agreements on setting up the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its confederal relationship with Croatia and in line with the 1992 agreement on friendship and cooperation between the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, an agreement was reached today on cooperation and coordination between the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the HVO, and the Croatian Army. To this end the military commands will consistently pursue efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis.

Tudjman, Ganic, Zubak Comment

LD0603230895 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2200 GMT 6 Mar 95

[Interview with President Franjo Tudjman, Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and Dr. Ejup Ganic, a member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and vice president of the

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Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation by an unidentified correspondent on 6 March; place not given; from the "Picture vs. Picture" program—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] A meeting was held in the presidential palace this evening between a delegation of the Federation of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Dr. Franjo Tudjman, the president of the Republic of Croatia with his accompanying delegation. After the meeting the following statements were made:

[Tudjman] Good evening. As you can see the Croatian state leaders have just had a meeting with the leaders of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation led by Zubak, the president of the Federation, and Vice President Ganic who is also a member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency. We talked about the meeting that the generals held today on cooperation between our military experts in line with the agreement on friendship and cooperation between Croatia and Bosnia reached as early as the summer of 1992. The main topic of our discussion was the ways of implementing the Washington accords and we are in full agreement on this.

[Correspondent] What is the meaning of the joint command?

[Tudjman] Precisely what I have just told you. Cooperation in line with the general agreement on federation and confederation and the 1992 agreement.

[Ganic] You see, we are searching for a peaceful solution. Croatia and Bosnia favor a peaceful solution. At the same time we must unite our military and peace-oriented efforts to establish balance in the region, to deter the aggressor from further attacks. These meetings are useful. In 1992 we reached an agreement that laid foundations for our cooperation and meetings between our generals, etc., to take part on the basis of that agreement and also the Washington agreement that helped to speed up the pace at which problems are being overcome and solutions found. As you know, the Bosnian equation has now been simplified since the Croats and Bosniaks are acting together in building their Federation. On the other hand, the situation surrounding UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] has also changed. We have been exchanging views, coordinating actions in the search for a peaceful solution. At the same time we must strengthen our potentials, exchange information, coordinate action to deter the aggressor from further actions.

[Correspondent] Can we say that this agreement is not directed against a third party?

[Tudjman] Of course. I think that it is clear that Croatia's entire policy and its efforts—and to this end we have been cooperating with the Federation's leaders—are designed—and especially in the light of the cancellation of the UNPROFOR mandate—to reach a peaceful solution as soon as possible to both the occupied areas of Croatia and as a contribution to the efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Zubak] As Mr. Tudjman and Mr. Ganic already said—based on agreements reached in 1992 and the Washington Agreements—following the latest developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia we thought it was necessary to jointly analyze the situation on the territory of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly in connection with the latest decision by Croatia to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate. We did this in order to coordinate our activities in all areas—both political and military—under the given circumstances. We reached an agreement, which is very important in my opinion. This agreement deals with our joint activities in the period ahead. We are seeking a peaceful solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia but we should also be prepared to coordinate our defense and to defend ourselves jointly against the common aggressor.

[Tudjman] Our policy is in line with the efforts of the international community, both the European Union and the United States.

[Ganic] Our generals just like to spend time together, they are pals.

[Tudjman] Good night.

Article Views Effects of Joint Serb Forces

AU0303205995 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Feb 95 p 8

[Article by Mladen Jurasek: "Attacks Without Punishment Are History"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 20 February, the leaders of the "Krajina" and Bosnian Serbs announced the founding of the "Supreme Defense Council," which in fact is the political decision on joining the armed formations of the "Krajina" and the "Srpska republic." The fact is that they have practically acted together all along under the command of General Ratko Mladic. The intention of this political decision was to reconfirm the power of the decision that all the Serbs on this side of the Drina River fight together after UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] leaves.

It is now necessary to assess what this decision means for the balance of powers in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have estimated the Serb forces, so certain inaccuracies should be taken into account. It is thought that the Bosnians have approximately 80,000 armed soldiers. The Serbs in the "Krajina" can arm 50,000 soldiers at the most, so the joint Serb army would consist of about 130,000 armed men. At the same time, the Croatian Army, the HVO [Croat Defense Council], and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army can arm 250,000 soldiers.

Following the public unification of the Serb armies, it is logical to expect that the Croat, as well as the Bosnian,

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armed forces will coordinate their war activities to a greater extent, even more so if UNPROFOR leaves Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina at the same time. The fact that the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia have been fighting without any major interruptions and that their mental and physical exhaustion is clearly visible should also be taken into account.

Thanks to the former "JNA" [Yugoslav National Army] and Serbia, the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs have had no shortages of heavy weapons. The joint forces have almost 600 tanks (240 in Croatia and over 330 in Bosnia) and over 300 pieces of heavy artillery. Serb tanks could become active in the Zadar hinterland, in western and eastern Slavonia, Banija, and Bosanska Posavina. The Croatian Army can efficiently oppose them, since it has a large number of modern guided antiarmor missiles. Moreover, Croatia has managed to produce a state-of-the-art tank; Croatian armored forces have therefore been able to refresh the quantity of modern tanks each month. With the combined use of guided missiles and modern tanks, the mass Serb tank charges will be efficiently warded off. This tactic has been tested during the fighting in the Zadar hinterland and several conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At critical points, the MI-24 helicopters, the flying guns, will come in, armed with powerful guided missiles. After several large-scale conflicts and great losses, Serb tank corpsmen will begin to avoid direct conflicts.

Since 1991, Croatia has, apart from the production of tanks, been mass producing artillery weapons (mortars, guns, howitzers, multiple rocket launchers). According to the indicators (several major battles that took place recently), the force of the Croatian artillery is greater than that of the former "JNA" in 1991. This is why the situation from 1991—in which Serbs fired at civilian targets and went unpunished, knowing that the Croatian Army had nothing to return fire with—cannot happen again.

If the no-fly zone remains in force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbs will not be able to use their jet-propelled fighter planes efficiently. The "Krajina" has a military airport at Udbina, but it has been useless since the very beginning of the conflict. Namely, this airport is within range of Croatian long-range guns and multiple rocket launchers. The use of an airport that is under constant artillery fire is extremely risky and most often ends with the loss of a large number of planes. With considerable damage to the runway, all the jet-propelled planes will have to remain at the airport. At the Posejdon 94 exercise, the Croatian air force displayed the efficiency of the BETAB-500 piercing bomb, the purpose of which is destroying runways and armored-concrete facilities. Moreover, the slow and relatively immobile Galebs, Supergalebs, Jastrebs, and Oraos would become easy targets for Croatian MiGs, which are armed with the super modern air-to-air missiles.

The Serbs will therefore use the SA-341 Gazela fighter helicopters, armed with guided antiarmor Maljutka missiles. Each Gazela carries up to four such missiles. The helicopter is small and highly mobile, but has no armored protection, which is why it is exceptionally sensitive to antiaircraft artillery, even of the smallest calibers (20 mm and higher), and even heavy machine guns. Each shot of a guided antiaircraft missile, including those of the smallest ones, such as the Stinger or the Needle is sure to down this helicopter. The Croatian response is the MI-24 Hind, a large fighter helicopter armed with a great fire-density heavy machine gun, which is placed in the nose, and with four powerful AT-16 Sturm antiarmored missiles.

The Gun Helicopter Rules the Sky

Moreover, the MI-24 also often carries four multiple rocket launchers, each with 32 57-mm missiles. These missiles act efficiently against infantry and light armored vehicles (trucks and similar vehicles). With its great speed (over 300 kilometers an hour) and good armored protection, this helicopter can also be used for classic bombing with gravity bombs. It can carry four bombs, each weighing up to 250 kilograms. It can lift up to 1,500 kilograms of cargo. If necessary, the MI-24 can also perform helicopter assaults with up to eight fully equipped soldiers.

Comparing the balance of powers on paper, the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are still quite powerful. Their newly created army is not short of weapons for land forces, particularly tanks and artillery. However, the example of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army best confirms that it is not the same power as the one in 1991 and 1992. The 5th Corps has been completely surrounded since the very beginning of the war in Bosnia. Moreover, inter-Muslim fighting in western Bosnia has made the position of the 5th Corps even weaker. Since Croatia declared that it would not extend the UNPROFOR mandate, which implies that UNPROFOR will withdraw, the Serbs have been attacking intensively the 5th Corps. If they managed to neutralize it, they would significantly improve their positions in the present UNPA [UN Protected Area] Sectors North and South, which include Banija, Kordun, Lika, and the Knin surroundings. For the Krajina Serbs, the possible joining of the Croatian Army forces and the 5th Corps would mean the same as a complete military defeat. This is why the joint forces of the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs have for three months, with Abdic's rebels and with a lot of help from "volunteers" from Serbia, been attacking Bihac and Velika Kladusa, but with little success. This is why it is not difficult to foresee the result of the conflict between the Serbs and the presently very well equipped Croatian Army. The Serbs must also not neglect the power of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, which has, slowly but surely, been improving its organization and equipment.

This is why Karadzic's latest verbal threats to the Muslims and Croats are aimed primarily at "raising the

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seriously questionable combat morale of the Serbs across the Drina River, who are more and more tired of the war."

RSK Will Not Accept Changed Mandate

LD0603210995 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2010 GMT 6 Mar 95

[Item received via fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 6 Mar (SRNA)—The republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] will not accept a changed mandate of the UN troops in the UN Protected Areas after 31 March, SRNA learned today from a representative of the RSK president's office.

The RSK president's standpoint is that "the RSK is absolutely for a peaceful resolution of the crisis," but the Krajina leadership "cannot agree" to changes in the UNPROFOR mandate because, as it has been pointed out, that would amount to "a violation of the status quo, which has been assessed as positive regarding the resumption of negotiations."

"The RSK asks UNPROFOR to stay in Croatia with an unchanged mandate until an acceptable solution to the crisis is found. If UNPROFOR stays this should not prejudge the political solution," and the Krajina leadership will firmly abide by this standpoint.

The RSK believes that UNPROFOR is "a necessary guarantee, the only one which can secure the resumption of the negotiating process, and the only guarantee of the implementation of possible agreements and of those already reached."

Owen Views UN's Future Role in Bosnia, Croatia

MS0703133095 London BBC Television Network in English 0700 GMT 7 Mar 95

[Inteview with Lord Owen, EU commissioner, by presenter Justin Webb; Owen in Belgrade, Webb in London; from the "Breakfast News" program—live]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [Webb] Good Morning

[Owen] Do you think that President Tudjman of Croatia is bluffing, do you think he is willing to carry out his threat and make sure that UN does leave at the end of the month?

[Owen] I don't think he is bluffing, I think he has a serious purpose in effectively saying that the UN will have to be out by the 31st of March. What he is afraid of is what we call (Cyprusization) the idea that the UN comes in to solve a problem, becomes part of the problem sits on the status quo, he is not happy to have that, in fact he is determined not to allow it.

[Webb] And do you believe if the UN is forced to go then that will lead to a renewed war between Croatia and Serbia, a war which eventually will involve Bosnia as well?

[Owen] I think it is very rare in politics to be certain about war arriving, but I would be absolutly certain that if the UN leaves Croatia there will be fighting between the Croatian Serbs and the Croats and I think you can be absolutely guaranteed that there are Serb's sitting on parts of Croatia who are determined that they will stay there and they have always lived there, they are fighting people from the Krijina and in my view without the UN on the zone of separation there will be war.

[Webb] Do you also believe, Lord Owen, that if the UN has to leave Croatia that they will actually have to leave Bosnia as well because their operation there will be undermined?

[Owen] No I don't think it is absolutly inevitable. But, I do think there is a momentum about those things and I think it would be likely that we would be leaving Bosnia. But my own belief is that there will not be a UN withdrawal from Croatia, but we are in for a few difficult weeks. But, I was in Zagreb, I was talking to Mr. Akashi on Sunday, I saw President Milosevic yesterday in Belgrade, I am going back to Zagreb with Mr. Stoltenberg from the UN to talk the the Croatian Government. My own belief is that we will reach an accommodation, the UN will stay slightly changed in its functions, make some changes in military objectives, some changes in names. I think we can satisfy the Croatian Government that some of their fears will not be fulfilled, and I think the UN will stay.

[Webb] Do you believe also that President Milosevic can be brought on board in any sense for the Contact Group peace plan for Bosnia itself, is there any sign of movement in the meetings you have had with him?

[Owen] Well President Milosevic supports the Contact Group plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina and I think that he has demonstrated that over the last few few months. What we are now trying to do is to get President Milosevic, President Tudjman, and President Izetbegovic to Paris sometime in the next month or to try and get progress on recognition of each others country, and also some framework for a peace settlement. It is proving difficult to achieve but I think that too may be possible, I cannot be so categorical or certain about that. I am pretty confident that the UN will stay in some form in Croatia, but there is no doubt these people have to get negotiating on the table and that UN personnel, who said you know at the end of the day these people have to live together, there are limits and we are coming closer to how much longer the UN can act as the separator. They have got to come together and live together and there is going to have to be negotiations around the table I think before the end of the summer, because I don't see us going through another winter, at least I personally can't.

[Webb] Lord Owen, thanks for joining us this morning.

Knin Socialists Demand Ousting of Mikelic

LD0603205395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1537 GMT 6 Mar 95

[Item received by fax]

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[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 6 Mar (SRNA)—The executive of the Knin-based Serb Party of Socialists [Srpska Partija Socijalista, SPS] today voiced its support for an initiative by Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], to dismiss Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic.

In a statement sent to SRNA, Serb socialists from Knin say that the initiative to replace the RSK prime minister should have come earlier since "the time has now come to take serious steps to activate the main functions of the state. Mikelic's cabinet has done nothing to this end."

"An economic paralysis, a policy of economic development based on regional affiliations, mistakes in organizing the defense, trading state-owned assets in an impermissible way—these are only some of the reasons why Mikelic should be dismissed," Knin socialists stress.

The SPS executive insists that at its next session the RSK assembly should raise the issue not just of Mikelic's dismissal but also of his reaponsibility for the current situation in the state.

Istrian Leaders Insist on Self-Government

95BA0167A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 6 Feb 95 p 7

[Article by R. Arsenic: "Istrian Representatives Dissatisfied With Decision by Constitutional Court of Croatia: Estrangement From Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The decision by the Constitutional Court of Croatia declaring unconstitutional the part of the statute of Istrian Zupanija according to which it can conclude international treaties is considered by Istrian representatives to be an estrangement from Europe and a blow to local self-rule.*

Zagreb, February—A decision by the Constitutional Court of Croatia declaring unconstitutional the part of the statute of Istria Zupanija that stipulated that the zupanija can conclude international treaties (as well as certain other provisions, such as the one that "recognizes and protects Istrianhood as an expression of the Istrian plural ethnos") has inspired a great deal of anger among Istrian representatives and its deputies in the Assembly of the RH [Republic of Croatia].

The chairman of the IDS [Istrian Democratic Assembly], Ivan Jakovic, feels that this decision by the Constitutional Court "contains far-reaching consequences for local self-rule." This, he says, is because "now it is explicitly clear that the zupanija is not a unit of local self-rule, as the IDS was attempting to establish." IDS parliamentary deputy Dino Debeljuh believes that with this sort of decision the Constitutional Court "has placed the Croatian state in an unpleasant situation, because now it is definitively clear that there is no desire to respect the international agreement that Croatia signed in connection with the memorandum with Italy." He therefore believes that "this decision estranges Croatia from Europe."

The representative of the Italian community in the Assembly, Furio Radin, emphasizes that "the Italian ethnic community clearly cannot be satisfied with this decision, because the majority of essential articles relating to protection of the Italian ethnic community are nullified, especially those that concern equality in language use and the status of the Italian union." Radin also emphasizes that "we clearly did not expect abolition of the right to consensus and to use of the veto by zupanija councilmen who are members of the Italian community."

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Editorial Says Berisha Accepts 'War Option'

AU0603200595 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 5 Mar 95 p 2

[Editorial by Nevenka Mitrevska: "Berisha's Dilemmas"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Albanian President Sali Berisha has finally revealed his cards and stopped bluffing. His evolution from a "good intentional friend" to Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] and a "peacemaker" in the Balkans into a militant proponent of Great Albanian ambitions and into (an additional) negator of the Macedonian state and nation culminated at the joint news conference in Tirana two days ago at the conclusion of the official visit of German President Roman Herzog. For the first time since he took office, he [Berisha] denied what even the preceding, Enver Hoxha regime, did not dare deny—the existence of the Macedonian national minority in Albania. "In Albania," he told the correspondents, "there is a Slavic group, but it is not clear whether it is of Macedonian or Bulgarian origin."

For the head of a state that pretends to be (newly) democratic and oriented toward Europe, such a statement may at first sight seem naive, let us not use any stronger word. First, because it is unnatural for him to have any doubts that Albania borders Macedonia, not Bulgaria. Secondly, such "dilemmas," if there are any, are easily resolved in truly democratic countries—with a referendum for the "contentious" population. The only trouble is that the outcome of such a referendum cannot be guaranteed by anybody—as was the case with the referendum on the new Albanian Constitution that was organized in November on the insistance of Berisha himself. The results on what he refers to a "group" can easily become useless for daily policy. However, the essence of the denial of the "origin" of the Macedonians in Albania is very poisonous. It hints that Tirana is on the road to adopting two well-known Balkan denial theses about the Republic of Macedonia as a state and as a Macedonian nation: The Greek thesis says that the Republic of Macedonia is an artificial state creation of the Comintern and Tito, and the Bulgarian thesis says that the Macedonians are Bulgarians although they are not aware of this fact.

Not very long ago, Berisha was singing another song. Pressed by the consequences of the long self-isolation of his country that not even "democratization" could overcome overnight, faced with hermetically closed and hostile regimes to the north and the south, and blocked by the Italian Army that was rescuing the Western world from an uncontrolled flood of Albanian refugees from the sea, Berisha turned his face to Macedonia and found goodwill and readiness for cooperation and friendship. "By being in the company" of the now internationally appreciated President Kiro Gligorov, he even succeeded in crowning himself as a modern, peace-loving, realistic, and democratic politician; and such are found very rarely in the Balkans. "Let us forget about the problems from the past because we cannot solve them overnight," he said in December 1992 at a meeting with President Gligorov in Ohrid. Speaking about the need for building mutual confidence, Berisha was modest in his requests: "If a faculty in the Albanian language is opened in Skopje, it will be of great importance not only for the education of the Albanians, but also for their integration in the social life of Macedonia." When he was then asked about the unaccomplished recognition of Macedonia, Berisha was almost scandalized: "How can you possibly say that a neighbor will not recognize a neighbor!" These verbal expressions of friendship were backed by Berisha last February with a concrete gesture: After the Greek closure of the northern border, he offered the modest Albanian road connections and port facilities for the transport of at least a part of the oil for Macedonia.

"Inconsistency" is not the adequate term in marking the 180-degree turn in Berisha's behavior towards Macedonia since then. Allegedly, his endeavor for the promotion of the rights of the Albanian minority in the Republic of Macedonia and the interruption of the studies of the illegal "university" in Mala Recica [near Tetovo] was the real reason. Nevertheless, all his activities before the "initiative" [for a university in Albanian] indicate that the welfare of the Albanian minority here is his last concern. It is enough to recall the division that occurred within the so-called Albanian political subject in Macedonia between "traitors" and "patriots" under the instructions and direct interference of Tirana—with frequent consultations and moral and other support for the "patriots," that is to say the extremists, and with public rejection of the "traitors," that is to say those Macedonian Albanians who believe that rights must be won through the institutions of the system and through participation in the political and social life in Macedonia. A confirmation of the validity of the division of the Albanians in Macedonia today is the stubborn refusal of the Albanian ambassador in Skopje to give an interview for the "state" newspaper FLAKA ET VLAZEREMIT, which is the only paper in the Albanian language in the country.

We can, therefore, see that the real reason for the latest cooling of Macedonia-Albanian relations is neither the position of the Albanian minority in Macedonia nor the dissatisfaction of Tirana because of the dynamics with which the Macedonian state is meeting its requests. Let us go back to the recent official visit of German President Roman Herzog to Tirana. President Herzog was very explicit when he spoke to the Albanian Parliament on 28 February and he certainly did not refer only to the Serbs when he said: "The concept of changing borders according to ethnic lines with the aim of creating a homogeneous state is not acceptable at the beginning of 21st Century." As for the "Albanian question," the head of the German state did not leave any doubts: "Germany shares the Albanian concern for the constant denial of the rights of the Albanian minority in Kosovo."

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Not only Germany, but all the other Western countries have been explicit in expressing how far their understanding for the "Albanian question" can go—it is respect for the human rights of the Albanian minority in Kosovo, but as an integral part of the Serbian state. Regarding Macedonia, in spite of the ugly picture that was created by the provoked police intervention related to the "university," the international reactions were unambiguous: Support—and an appeal to the neighbors in this context—for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Macedonia and noninterference in its internal affairs.

It was certainly not by accident that Berisha chose to radicalize the relations with Macedonia at this moment when the possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] from Croatia, and probably from Bosnia, threatens to spread the war to other parts of the Balkans. Actually, it seems that he desires this withdrawal and the consequences of destabilization in the whole region. Knowing that, given the way the matters are in Kosovo at present, he cannot (and dares not) expect any positive development there, he hopes that he can at least profit from a weak Macedonia in these "troubled waters." That is why he "predicted" in his interview for DIE WELT last week that Macedonia will be faced with a civil war (because of the unaccomplished "university"). Athens supported him immediately in its mass media, referring to an alleged "confidential report of the CIA" (how did such a "confidential" report fall into the hands of the Greek journalists first?), anticipating that Albania will cause disorder in Macedonia in the spring, using its minority for this purpose.

The reason that is guiding Berisha is obviously threatening and selfish. He wants to believe that if the war spreads to the south, it will not affect Albania, at least not in the beginning. It will be waged around it, while the Albanian minorities in Macedonia and Kosovo will serve as a shield, as a buffer zone, which means that they will be consciously used as living targets. The acceptance of this war option is of value to him in two ways. On the one hand, Berisha is courting the "militant" antagonistic forces in his party, as well as the domestic voting body. On the other hand, he hopes that, as a leader of a warring country (but outside any danger), he will have enough time to reestablish his long faded image with the international public. If war has kept Milosevic in power, if it has nearly made his wish for gathering "all Serbs into one state" come true, and if it has also made him the unavoidable "factor of peace" in the Balkans, why should Berisha not try the same thing? As the last recourse?

Serbs Complain of Status, Lack of Rights

LD0603171595 Belgrade BETA News Agency in Serbo-Croatian 1530 GMT 5 Mar 95 (tentative)

[FBIS Translated Text] Kragujevac, 5 Mar (BETA)—Borivoje Ristic, president of the Democratic Union of Serbs in Macedonia [Demokratski Savez Srba u Makedoniji, DSSM] [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], said today that the status of the Serbs in this former Yugoslav republic "has not been defined" and that "in fact, they have no rights at all."

Taking part in the "Hallmarks of Time" program on Radio Kragujevac, Ristic said that 18 months ago the Macedonian Government committed itself to "resolving the constitutional status of the Serbs" and that the deadline for this expired on 27 February. The government has failed to fulfill a single major obligation from a special document signed by the Macedonian and Serb sides in the presence of representatives of the international conference on former Yugoslavia and what was at that time the CSCE, he said.

Such conduct by the Macedonian authorities can have serious consequences, Ristic warned, and hinted at the possibility of the the Serbs in Macedonia rallying together and setting up their own parliament and government. Under the document, Article 78 of the Macedonian constitution, "which lists all the nationalities living in Macedonian except the Serbs," was to be changed.

The Macedonian authorities also took on the obligation to protect Serb cultural monuments, to open a secondary school where teaching will be done in Serbian, and to help finance our cultural institutions, the DSSM leader said. The DSSM will tell relevant international institutions that the Macedonian Government has failed to meet its obligations to the Serbs, Ristic said, and went on to stress that in the light of the current situation the Serbs have the right of "civil disobidience."

Opposition Against UNPROFOR, Observers

95BA0167B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 6 Feb 95 p 7

[Article by M. Krstic: "Strong Reaction by Opposition in FYROM After Announcement That UNPROFOR Command Will Move from Zagreb: Abhorrence of Blue Helmets in Skopje"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Following Tudjman's decision to revoke the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mandate in Croatia, opposition leaders and their mouthpieces react to any presence of "observer troops" on Macedonian soil.*

Skopje, 5 Feb—After the recent firm decision by Croatian President Tudjman to revoke the UNPROFOR mandate at the end of March, the Skopje monthly MAKEDONSKO VREME wrote that the headquarters of the UN peacekeeping forces will probably be moved from Zagreb to Skopje. The possible "dislocation" of the UNPROFOR command has been discussed during the numerous recent visits to FYROM [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] by U.S. military officials. Citing its reliable "sources" in the government, MAKEDONSKO VREME has even gone so far as to allege that

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official Macedonian approval has been gained for moving the command of the "Blue Helmets" and other UN military units.

They do not fail to add here that "the territory of the new Macedonian state is very suitable for the stationing of UNPROFOR military forces." After all, UN troops have been on this soil for some time now, consisting of Nordic and U.S. units on a so-called preventative mission to prevent fighting in this part of the Balkans.

FYROM Most Favorable Soil for UNPROFOR

Following Tudjman's revised firm and unwavering decision on Croatia's cancellation of the UNPROFOR command's mandate, Skopje is mentioned most often—after the Italian ports of Brindisi and Trieste—as the new command headquarters of the UN "Blue Helmets." According to some foreign experts, the territory of FYROM is the "most favorable soil" for the successful performance of UNPROFOR's mission in this part of Europe.

The fact that the allegations by the well-informed Skopje monthly are certainly not random is indicated by the recent visit to Skopje by the deputy commander of the UNPROFOR forces responsible for the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Canadian General Grab, who said on that occasion that the command and units of "Blue Helmets" will certainly move to FYROM.

If MAKEDONSKO VREME does not hide its satisfaction at the announced UNPROFOR "detachment" to FYROM, the opposition Skopje weekly DELO is reacting strongly to all of this, raising the following question: On what basis did the official Macedonian Government give its approval to the move to Skopje from Zagreb by the UNPROFOR command, and why was this not done by the parliament, which is, after all, the only body authorized to make such important decisions that are "directly linked to the sovereignty of the new Macedonian state"?

The weekly goes on to note that more than two years ago the then-government of Branko Crvenkovski tried to explain the arrival of "Blue Helmets" on Macedonian soil through a statement that expressed the "present fear of possible Serb aggression" against FYROM, even though the republic's Assembly had no knowledge of any of that. But in this latest "case," the old-new Crvenkovski government has not even tried to explain itself by issuing a statement on the announced presence of the UNPROFOR command in Skopje, thereby refusing to respond to some basic questions. For example, if such an agreement has even been reached, is it possible to know under what conditions UN military forces will remain on Macedonian soil, whether or not they will have an unlim[illegible]mandate, under what conditions the military command in question will be stationed in Skopje, together with the number of units, soldiers, and their technical ordnance?

Of course, there is still no official answer to these questions. As usual, the Macedonian public has not been informed about all this. But no one denies that there exist certain "combinations" in the Macedonian state and political leadership. Expanding on this subject, DELO recalls that the Republic of Macedonia's admission to the United Nations was also made conditional on the explicit presence of "Blue Helmets" in Macedonia. As "favorable soil" in the Balkans.

Cynicism of General Arsovski

In its strongly worded commentary, the opposition Skopje publication goes on to say that even the presence of the current UN peacekeeping forces does not provide any protection for the new Macedonian state against possible aggression by its neighbors or, most of all, from within, because the mandate of the "Blue Helmets" is primarily one of observers. "If there is any sort of military conflict, the UNPROFOR forces—in accordance with the orders that they have received in advance—will be the first to flee...." The weekly also does not fail to point to the—to put it mildly—"nonfunctional" role of the UNPROFOR peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, where civil war is still raging, since those forces have not in any way contributed to putting an end to the tragedy in that region. "All of this justifiably relativizes the role and activity of the UNPROFOR peacekeeping forces in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, whose role has been reduced to a so-called humanitarian mission."

Raising the "open question" of why the independent, autonomous, and sovereign Macedonian state is not solving on its own these questions that are "burning" and "critical" to its further survival, the weekly DELO, in the issue published yesterday, carried a lengthy article by the former chief of staff of the ARM [Army of the Republic of Macedonia], Lieutenant General Mitret Arsovski, under the unusual title "Is It Possible To Sober Up?"

In his article, this former Yugoslav general says that peace is being preserved in Macedonia, that the new Macedonian state has not been attacked by any of its neighbors, "despite the fact that the citizens of Macedonia are kept by the current authorities in a constant state of fear that they will soon be attacked by their northern neighbor." On the other hand, despite various promises by international institutions, "the Republic of Macedonia has not yet been accepted even into certain important European and world political and military alliances, its economy is sinking more and more, and discord among Macedonians themselves is at 'the highest level.'"

Raising the question of where all this is leading, Gen. Arsovski says, among other things: "Who really needs the 'Blue Helmets' any more?", adding, rather cynically, "do we need them as a preventative against some sort of aggression from the outside, or instead to protect Macedonia from ourselves?"

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EU Approves Mandate for Associate Membership

AU0603153995 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] As our Brussels correspondent Edo Zitnik has just reported, the EU foreign ministers, approved the mandate for the commencement of the negotiations on Slovenia's associate membership in the European Union during a working lunch without any problems. The decision must now be confirmed at the plenary session this afternoon, which will be a mere formality, and we can, thus, already report that Slovenia has won the mandate.

Commission Debates Lifting of Italian EU Veto

AU0603171895 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 6 Mar 95

[Report by Nadja Pengov on session of the State Chamber Commission for International Relations in Ljubljana on 6 March—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Pengov] If the decision in Brussels today will be a positive one, then this will be an important event for Slovenia that will take us further away from the former Yugoslavia, bring us closer to Europe, and will also create possibilities for further talks with Italy.

Although the latest talks Italy only demonstrated a pronounced interest in the issue of the former property by the option-takers [optanti], while the Slovene side only emphasized the question of the Slovene minority in Italy, our country, as Minister Thaler said, sees a wider problem, ranging from cooperation in economy to security. A debate about the real estate is only possible within this framework, however, in the same manner that applies to other EU members. Slovenia also proposed an interstate agreement on minorities. Unfortunately, the Italian assurances in this direction were vague.

As opposed to Aquileia, Thaler said, the 1983 Rome Treaty is now the basis for further talks. A possibility of gestures of goodwill is envisaged, however, gestures that will come from both sides. The deputies did not learn today how many buildings would be involved in such a case. A figure launched by some Italian sources, which speaks of more than 7,000 buildings, is not realistic, Thaler said.

He also answered some unpleasant questions and objections today. Former foreign minister Lojze Peterle was convinced that now, five months after Aquileia, we have accomplished less than then. Peterle also wanted to know whether Slovenia must now do something else that would give us the green light in Brussels and that the public does not know about. He was interested in the status of the statement for the public that will supposedly be released in Rome and Ljubljana today.

[Peterle] Regarding the registration of an unspecified amount of real estate—I believe that this was the term used, and the statement for the public speaks of something similar—I would really like to hear a clear answer. What have the negotiators accomplished? What was it that satisfied Italy and what does this mean in the next stage?

[Pengov] The foreign minister assured that no talks between Rome and Ljubljana are taking place today and that there are no secrets either. He is convinced that the Aquileia Agreement was far too high a price. Currently, there is no longer any first refusal right or the returning of property.

[Thaler] With full responsibility, I state that, in comparison with the autumn events, we have made a step back in terms of Slovene obligations. In this phase, we have avoided any sort of obligations and explicit pledges as to how we will resolve these matters.

[Pengov] The objective of the talks with Italy was a dialogue and not negotiations about binding documents. Our goial was clear. Once a decision to commence the negotiations about EU associate membership is made, we will continue the dialogue with Italy.

Regarding the statement that is to be released by Ljubljana and Rome today, he said that the statement is exclusively a political statement of good intentions. When asked whether a sort of declaration is truly being prepared in Brussels today, Thaler replied that if this will happen, it will have nothing to do with our country.

Kacin Begins U.S. Visit, Talks at UN

AU0703115095 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2100 GMT 6 Mar 95

[Report by Uros Lipuscek]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Slovene Defense Minister Jelko Kacin began his visit to the United States with talks at UN Headquarters. He met with (Cofien Annan), head of the department for peace operations, and with Argentine Ambassador Cardenas, president of the UN Security Council sanctions' committees.

The two senior UN representatives emphasized that the UN management was hoping a solution to avert the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] pullout from Croatia would nevertheless be found. At the same time, they demonstrated considerable understanding for Slovene views.

The Slovene Defense Minister said that our government expects the UN management will inform it of the possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia in due time. In such case Slovenia would be willing to assist in UNPROFOR's withdrawal, which, as planned by the UN, would partially take place via Slovene territory. He emphasized, however, that deployment of peacekeepers in Slovenia is out of the question.

Regarding the UN Security Council embargo on arms deliveries to Slovenia, Defense Minister Kacin stressed

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first that Slovenia is the only member of the Partnership for Peace Plan from the territory of the former Yugoslavia; second, that as a democratic country it is willing to honor international obligations; and third, that we wish to be an equal member of the international community, which must recognize our right to self-defense.

Both senior officials admitted that Slovenia was a victim of circumstances on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and that the balance of power in the UN Security Council was such that the annulment of this measure was currently not possible. The president of the Sanctions' Committee stressed that in the event UNPROFOR withdraws from Croatia the UN Security Council will have to reexamine the reasons for the arms embargo. In other words, it would not be impossible in such case for the UN Security Council nevertheless to exclude Slovenia from this measure. [passage omitted]

Poll: Public Not Overtly Enthusiastic About EU

AU0603214695 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Faculty of Social Sciences in Ljubljana carried out a public opinion poll that lasted more than a month, that is, until the second half of January and in which 1,500 pollees took part. The results of the poll were presented today. The presentation was attended by Foreign Minister Thaler and Borut Pahor, vice president of the Parliamentary Commission for International Relations. Igor Juric reports:

[Begin recording] At today's news conference, the authors of the poll only presented the main conclusions, which are the following: Generally speaking, the Slovenes have a relatively poor knowledge of the issues discussed, however, the majority of the pollees have formed a opinion about the foreign policy issues.

Today is an important day for further Slovene integration into the European Union, however, the poll showed that the Slovenes are not overtly enthusiastic about integration with the European Union. Only 27 percent of those polled were of the opinion that, in the short term, our integration into the union will have a positive effect, 22 percent were of the opinion that this will have a negative influence, while 26 percent could not answer. Over the last four years, in general, we have noted a declining interest in integration with West Europe and a growing interest in neutrality. In connection with this, some symptoms of isolationism are evident, too, as the majority of pollees verge toward the opinion that Slovenia should participate in international peace operations only with logistical and humanitarian support.

It is interesting that 43 percent of the pollees could not give an answer to the question about Slovene national interests, while a covincing majority of those remaining put trade in first place. Slovenia should primarily cooperate with Germany, Austria, Italy, and the United States.

Regarding the relations with Croatia, more than a third believe that a conflict with Croatia should be resolved even at the price of yielding, however, there should be no yielding when it comes to foreigners owning Slovene land, namely, 77 percent of pollees were opposed to this.

The majority are convinced that Slovenia is threatened the most by Croatia, Italy, and Serbia. [end recording]

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Federal

Fuel Shortages, Implications for Agriculture

AU0603203495 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Mar 95 p 7

[Article by J. Putnikovic: "The State Interferes With Agriculture"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It has become normal, under the sanctions, to have quick discussions before every sowing period about how to provide the fuel necessary for the agriculture; this is the case this year too. Agricultural experts claim that 140,000 metric tons of diesel are necessary for the spring sowing and agricultural activities in the first half of the year. According to recent statement by Serbian Government Energy Minister Dragan Kostic, farmers will be provided with 33,600 metric tons of diesel from domestic sources. This will be delivered to farmers in March, April, and May by means of so-called green cards. Minister Kostic says that the allowance from the previous period of 10 liters per hectare and 40 liters per hectare of cultivated land is still valid.

Simple arithmetic shows that there is a deficit of over 100,000 metric tons. It must not be forgotten that many farmers protested last autumn that their cards remained unused because their cooperatives did not receive enough diesel. The people in charge hesitantly admitted that the distribution had "failed in places," that is that the necessary quantities had not been correctly calculated for all regions. This year's deficit, a result of the oil embargo, has to be covered by imported fuel as has been the case with all previous deficits during the sanctions. The state has failed here, and it can be claimed that in this case "it causes its own damage," since it has already been proven that fuel cannot be imported in such a short period of time. First of all, a train can carry only 700 metric tons of fuel, which means that at least 15 train compositions would be needed in order to transport 100,000 metric tons. Import experts point out that time is a significant factor. One of the importers has calculated all the financial elements and claims that, first of all, the purchasing price of fuel for Yugoslavia is considerably higher than for a "standard buyer," that the dividend paid to middlemen has to be added to that price, which is then in Yugoslavia augmented by a 5 percent customs duty, a 10 percent special tax for the equalization of the tax base, and by 0.36 dinars per kg as the excise tax. On the basis of the latest regulation of taxes, that is on the basis of the recently changed rates of the sales tax, a 10 percent tax is imposed on oil products, which amounts to a total of 20 percent calculated from the base for the payment of the customs duty. Final calculation shows that taxes, tariffs and excises, without the customs duty, add 12 percent to the price of imported goods. The person we talked to criticized the additional taxes and suggested that those in charge actually help agriculture during the forthcoming sowing season rather than just declare their support. In his opinion, both the Federal and Serbian Governments should relinquish the taxes they planned on putting in their treasuries. In order to prevent the misuse of imported fuel, the importers should, in his opinion, assume the obligation of controlling whether the imported fuel really ends up in tractor tanks. He claims that this is really necessary because the Pancevo refinery can deliver approximately 23,000 metric tons of diesel at the most. He believes the abovementioned system should also be applied to branches other than agriculture, since public transportation, railways etc. also suffer from a chronic fuel shortage.

Gas Agreement With Russia Advances Relations

95BA0167C Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by R. Nikolic: "Yesterday in the Palace of the Federation: Agreement Signed on Supplying Yugoslavia With Gas Until 2010"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Oleg Davydov, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign economic relations for the Russian Federation: We have signed an agreement on long-term deliveries of gas to Yugoslavia [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, FRY] and shared ideas in various areas, from agriculture to the petroleum industry; Nikola Sainovic, the federal deputy prime minister: Today's agreement affirms the two governments' determination to work hard on advancing economic relations.*

An agreement on supplying Yugoslavia with gas over a long term, until 2010, was formally signed yesterday in the Palace of the Federation. The agreement was signed by Oleg Davydov, the deputy prime minister and minister of foreign economic relations for the Russian Federation, and Nikola Sainovic, the Yugoslav deputy prime minister. Present at the formal signing were Mirko Marjanovic, the Serbian prime minister; Mihailo Milojevic, the president of the Economic Chamber of Yugoslavia; Vlajko Stojiljkovic, the president of the Economic Chamber of Serbia; Gennadiy Shikin, the Russian ambassador to Belgrade; members of the Russian delegation; Yugoslav, republican, and federal ministers; and other guests.

Expressing his satisfaction with the visit and his gratitude for the hospitality extended to him, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Davydov said:

"In our talks and cooperation, we have aspired to fully prepare the legal framework for what awaits us after the sanctions are lifted. The signing of this agreement is a continuation of our talks that we had during last year's visit to Russia by Messrs. Sainovic and Marjanovic. We have now signed an agreement on long-term deliveries of gas to Yugoslavia and shared ideas in various areas, from agriculture to the petroleum industry. In this we see the desires of our two countries for further cooperation."

Expressing his gratitude for the successful cooperation and joint work, Federal Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic said:

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"This step is important in terms of both scope and details, but especially in terms of the systematic way in which we approached this task. Through the cooperative agreement, our relations gain new elements of legal and normative significance. Today's agreement affirms the two governments' determination to work hard on advancing economic relations. Our delegations have worked in recent months in 10 working groups, and the meetings that have been held leave behind an abundance of cooperation and numerous initiatives for further development," Sainovic said.

Responding to a journalist's question on how cooperation between Russia and Yugoslavia will be effected with regard to the international sanctions, Oleg Davydov said that the sanctions are antihuman and that they are not in keeping with the interests of the two countries. For two years now, the Committee for Sanctions has refused to approve the delivery of 130 million cubic meters of Russian gas to Yugoslavia. That is not a satisfactory solution and that practice must be discontinued, Davydov emphasized.

Regarding a question on the recent visit to Russia by Haris Silajdzic, Davydov responded that that visit was planned earlier, that Silajdzic too asked about deliveries of Russian gas to Sarajevo, and that he was told that this problem relates to the companies that produce and supply gas.

Russian Proposal for Joint Companies, Banks

95BA0168A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Feb 95 p 11

[Unattributed TANJUG article: "Proposal for Creatian of a New Economic Union"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Russian delegation to the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce; in March or April, about 200 prominent directors from the Russian Federation will visit Yugoslavia.*

A delegation from the Russian Federation headed by Oleg Davidov, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign economic relations, spoke yesterday at the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce with the chamber's president, Prof. Mihajlo Milojevic, and a group of prominent Yugoslav businessmen.

According to the communique from that meeting, Milojevic said that the sanctions were harming the Yugoslav economy and people, and expressed his expectation that reason would consequently prevail among those who imposed the embargo and that it would soon be lifted.

At the same time, he added that the sanctions were also doing a great deal of damage to the countries of the Balkans, but to Russia as well.

The president of the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce pointed out the need and the great possibilities for developing bilateral economic cooperation. He particularly cited the area of agriculture, and proposed consideration of the possibilities for establishing joint ventures that could build small food factories in the interior of Russia.

Milojevic said that there were real chances for cooperation in the areas of energy, metallurgy, machinery, electronics, and construction.

He pointed out that cooperation was dominated by commercial transactions and that there was a lack of higher forms of economic cooperation, such as coproduction, joint investments, the establishment of joint ventures in various areas, and joint entry into third markets.

The communique states that the Russian guests accepted with satisfaction an invitation from the chambers of commerce of Yugoslavia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Belgrade to have about 200 prominent directors and managers from the Russian Federation visit our country in March or April.

The head of the Russian delegation, Oleg Davidov, said that in the past three years there had been significant changes in the Russian economy. These have to do with the liberalization of prices, foreign trade, and privatization. Today about 50 percent of Russia's social product is created in the private sector.

Davidov also added that the state monopoly over foreign trade had been abolished.

Speaking about current trends in the world and the creation of large economic associations, Davidov said that the Russian Federation had initiated the process of forming a new economic union that would encompass the countries of the former USSR that so desired, but it was also open to all other interested countries, including the Balkan countries.

Davidov supported the establishment of joint Yugoslav-Russian enterprises, and expressed confidence that first of all there should be joint banks, because they represented the circulatory system of international economic cooperation. Such institutions could also participate in world financial flows.

Davidov invited the Yugoslav businessmen to visit Russian enterprises in order to inspect technological models and other forms of mutual cooperation, the communique concluded.

Russia To Deliver Kerosene Despite Sanctions

95BA0168B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Feb 95 p 11

[Unattributed TANJUG article: "Kerosene for Our Aircraft Soon"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Oleg Davidov visits Minister Siradovic; views exchanged on creating a free trade zone in which other Balkan states could also be included.*

Djordje Siradovic, federal minister of foreign trade, spoke yesterday with Deputy Prime Minister of the

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Russian Federation Oleg Dimitrievich Davidov about creating conditions for and continuing economic cooperation after the lifting of the Security Council sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY].

As the Federal Secretariat for Information announced, both sides felt that the recently signed agreements and the formation of an intergovernmental committee would constitute an institutional framework for broad and intensive economic cooperation between the FRY and the Russian Federation.

Minister Siradovic and Deputy Prime Minister Davidov also exchanged views on the creation of a free trade zone between our two countries, which could also be extended to other Balkan countries.

It was emphasized that this issue would be particularly studied within the framework of the joint intergovernmental committee, on the beginning of whose work a protocol was signed during Deputy Prime Minister Davidov's visit to our country.

It was noted that both the FRY and the Russian Federation have a long-term interest in admission to the EU [European Union], but that this should not keep our two countries from establishing closer and very efficient economic cooperation.

During the talks, there was also a discussion of the fate of the request for the delivery of 27,000 metric tons of Russian kerosene for the JAT [Yugoslav Air Transport], Aviogeneks, and Aeroflot airlines, as well as for foreign airlines whose aircraft land and take off from the Belgrade airport.

Deputy Prime Minister Davidov said that his government was absolutely ready to meet our requirements for kerosene and that the requested amount had already been allocated.

He emphasized that so far the Security Council's sanctions committee had been blocking this type of export to the FRY, but that his government would ship the requested amount of kerosene in the event of further obstacles in the world organization, as stated in the conclusion of the communique from the Federal Secretariat for Information.

[Box, p 11]

Davidov: We Can Also Leave the Sanctions Committee

Oleg Davidov, deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation and minister of foreign economic relations, stated yesterday to TANJUG that Russia was ready to ship kerosene to Yugoslavia, with permission from the Sanctions Committee.

"But if the Sanctions Committee does not accept our decision, then we have one way out—to leave that committee, and find a way to make those deliveries," Davidov said.

Last year, on several occasions, Yugoslavia requested shipments of natural gas and several liquid fuels for humanitarian needs.

Furthermore, Federal Minister of Trade Djordje Siradovic, after the partial suspension of the sanctions, three months ago sent a written request to Deputy Prime Minister Davidov for the shipment of 27,000 tons of kerosene intended for JAT and other airlines, including Aeroflot, landing at the Belgrade airport.

After yesterday's meeting with Federal Minister of Trade Siradovic, the Russian deputy prime minister, in a brief statement, also answered a question about what would be new and most important in future bilateral economic cooperation.

"Today we talked about the fact that the main focus of our foreign trade cooperation should be on eliminating all the obstacles. That can be done by completely freeing up all mutual trade, and creating a free trade zone between Russia and Yugoslavia," Davidov said.

"If Serbia is willing, we are willing to initiate a discussion of that issue," Davidov emphasized, and concluded that the good tradition in economic cooperation should be developed further.

Steps To Realize Union of Serb Lands Viewed

95BA0163B Knin MAGAZIN KRAJINA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Dec 94 p 38

[Commentary by Dr. Veselin Djuretic, from remarks presented at the "National Conference on Unification of the Serb Lands," held in early December in Belgrade: "Settling Borders With the Croats"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Croatia has been left with the entire seacoast—a zone inhabited primarily by Catholicized Serbs.*

Are we both intellectually and politically prepared for the situation that comes after the national lands are brought together? Are we ready to fully achieve the goal of national unity?

I fear that we are not. We have yet to clearly examine either the assumptions or the manifestations of the civil war that is going on; we have not yet defined its political-historical phenomenology, even though essential changes in the feelings and desires of the people and nations, of all Yugoslav nations, demand this of the official polity.

Where do we go next, and how do we get out of this difficult situation? Is a Serb solution possible, or must a solution be sought in some new Yugoslav option?

The lessons and messages of history push the Serb solution to the foreground—a state of all Serbs—while the existing international encirclement will impose solutions that reduce the Serb destiny to the "AVNOJ" [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia] [post-World War II] borders of Serbia and Montenegro, through a blockade against the federal state and

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demands that it surrender to others everything that the Serbs lost during their supranational delirium. The ones in Bosnia-Herzegovina are asked to give up part of their territory to the heirs of the exponents of Ottoman policy.

At the same time, the Croats are left with the entire sea coast, a zone primarily of Catholicized Serbs, even the part that they gained through perfidious extortion on the eve of World War II.

A thin thread of the Catholic coast is torn loose from the Serb hinterland, contrary to hydrographic and geopolitical reason. Unprincipled world dictators are also trying to hitch the Russian polity to their anti-Serb wagon and with its help impose on the nation corridors of absolute neutralization and frameworks that they associate with the horror and terror of the last war.

The nation as a whole is driven by gloomy alternatives, and official Yugoslav policy continues to be insane, accepting solutions "piecemeal"—first in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, then in the former Croatia—solutions that are in reality intended to preserve Croatian ("AVNOJ") territorial integrity.

The Serb leaders are not adequately considering the ethnic and geopolitical situation, which demands an integral solution, i.e., that the entire territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and former Croatia be considered. Just as they do not understand that today is the critical and existential moment for the Serb nation. It is essential that ethnic entities be created in all its territories.

Thus far, no complete border settlement with the Croats, which is inevitable, has been initiated: a negotiated settlement under the assumption that the leaders of that nation have already drawn conclusions from their latest reckless incursion. A settlement is possible through an exchange of Serb lands outside the RS [republic of Srpska] and RSK [republic of Serb Krajina], and by taking into account the approximately 300,000 Serbs who live in cities with a Croat majority.

It is expected that the Croat leaders will realize that this course is beneficial for their new state as well, because it is bisected at several places by Serb ethnic regions and is well advised to seek a solution to this situation according to the "step-by-step" principle in order to achieve territorial continuity. Through a trade, it can gain certain Serb territories rich in grain crops in exchange for a wide Serb outlet on the sea.

A Serb-Croat agreement, if it happens, would also allow for a solution to the Muslim problem: either by organizing them as independent with the possibility of an outlet on the sea or by organizing them as autonomous within a Serb or Croat state.

As far as a Yugoslav solution to the difficult situation is concerned, we think that today this is possible only if it is based on a confederal reconstruction of the state, if the consequences of the federal structure of the second Yugoslavia are eliminated, and thus if the elements of the new state are ethnic units.

Thus, it is possible, even after a clear Serb-Croat border settlement.

Training of Tankmen in Pancevo Detailed

95BA0152C Belgrade VOJSKA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Oct 94 p 16

[Article by D. Glisic: "The Basic Strength of the Ground Forces"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the opening of the OMJ [Mechanized Armored Units] School Center in Pancevo, suitable ceremonies were held in the presence of numerous guests befitting the conditions and importance of this event. After moving from Banja Luka to Vrsac and then to Krusevac, the armored units finally gathered in Pancevo, a city with traditional ties to tankmen. Thus, after half a century the center for training members of this elite branch of the KoV [Ground Forces] has returned to southern Banat, but not to Bela Crkva, whence it was moved to Banja Luka way back in 1948. Former commanders of armored brigades, commanding officers of centers for training tankmen, and also present-day chiefs of school centers of the ground forces listened attentively to General Slobodan Kovacevic, who heads the OMJ Administration. Recalling the fact that in the last five decades more than 10,000 commissioned and noncommissioned officers have been trained, he emphasized that the present generation of cadets and students can meet the requirements being set for members of the VJ [Army of Yugoslavia] and the new type of officer only with knowledge, ability, and extremely positive moral characteristics.

"Being a tankman or a member of the OMJ branch is an honorable and very responsible duty. Aside from general education, technical knowledge that can be used in practice is also essential," Gen. Kovacevic emphasized.

Cadets and students in the last years of secondary school and university-level military schools will be trained in the center, which was built with the help of the opstina and the unselfish effort of members of other units in Pancevo. After gaining general knowledge in military academies, the students will spend their third and fourth years at the school center, where they will master sophisticated and powerful equipment. Display rooms, classrooms with up-to-date equipment, and also respectable exercise grounds for practicing tactical procedures at the level of the squad, platoon, or higher level provide a good foundation for achieving supreme results. Colonel Dragoslav Cosic, chief of the OMJ School Center, said that a big job awaits the center's teachers and students. They need to put in operational condition as soon as possible two firing ranges, an indoor firing range, and a miniature tank firing range that was almost ruined while the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] were in this garrison. The lack of a gymnasium will be the only problem.

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Aside from the cadets and students, those attending the one-year school for noncommissioned officers and also officers of the OMJ branch attending courses lasting more than one day will also receive training in the center. The emphasis in training is on practical exercises, and that means that indoor instruction will only be a precondition for activities on the exercise ground.

"We will try," Col. Cosic said, "to have the students go into the exercises already prepared, which will considerably improve the quality of instruction and the level of knowledge. We will also spend more time than up to now on the exercise ground at the controls of the tanks and combat vehicles."

Thus, under conditions approximating wartime, the future commissioned and noncommissioned officers of the OMJ branch, those most familiar with tank and antitank combat, will gain the knowledge necessary to work in units of the VJ. Well-trained and equipped to command tank units, the future commanders of squads and platoons, and then also of more complicated mechanized armored structures, will travel their first kilometers at the controls of tanks in Pancevo.

Aside from training future commissioned and noncommissioned officers and members of the reserves of the VJ, the OMJ School Center will also be the principal facility for experimentation related to development and modernization of armored combat vehicles. Daily improvement is an obligation of the center's faculty, just as important as the obligation they have in working with cadets and students. The development of antiarmor equipment requires that the faculty members be students themselves and do their utmost to master all the difficulties of their profession.

Pancevo Aircraft Industry Production Viewed

95BA0152D Belgrade VOJSKA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Oct 94 p 17

[Article by M. Petrovic: "The Ups and Downs of the Clipped-Winged Beauty"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Over the 57 years of its existence, the Utva Aircraft Industry in Pancevo has been the best mirror of our postwar ups and downs. From the former Glider Cooperative, established in Zemun in 1937, to the present day, the "clipped-winged beauty," because of the political recarving of the economy, has had its wings clipped twice. In the mid-1950's, as a producer of aircraft for the Yugoslav Army [VJ], it was dropped from the register of military enterprises. Overnight, it was left without equipment and personnel, which were moved to Mostar, to the new aircraft center, by order of the authorities at that time.

Escaping the Charmed Circle

Although Utva found itself in the street through no fault of its own, after eight years of survival and searching for its own identity and capabilities for alternative production, it managed to return to the ranks of successful firms. It left the charmed circle by relying above all on its own resources. It found an opportunity to reorient toward the production of civilian aircraft and to develop supplemental survival programs: trailers, prefabrications used in construction, and equipment for factories in the agricultural and food processing industry. By the 1980's it had grown to become a giant of the metal manufacturing industry, had a work force of nearly 6,000, and was selling on the world market. In the aircraft sector it was manufacturing various models of aircraft for civilian needs and had become part of the manufacturing of military aircraft (the Orao, the G-4, and the Lasta). However, it was not allowed to achieve its great ambitions and to enter the world aircraft industry by the front door.

After the successful flight of the golden-winged beauty from Pancevo, its wings were clipped once again. In early 1980, the firm was reorganized as an independent organization of associated labor with eight work organizations, 17 basic organizations of associated labor, and five work communities, which by 1990, as the administration multiplied rapidly, had turned into helpless and slow independent work organizations and communities. Nor was the aircraft factory helped by the contract with Boeing, when a sizable portion of the technology was adapted to work according to the highest world standards. All these and other large plans fell through after the sanctions were imposed, and the factory faced troubles similar to those it had four decades before.

Although it is still a part of enterprises in the special-purpose industry of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], once again, as in the past, it has been forced mainly to fight for its own survival. In spite of the advanced military and civilian technologies and programs with which it can compete with others in the world, the Utva Aircraft Industry, aside from its obligations to the Army and the production of several models of ultralight aircraft for civilian purposes (the Vila, the Utva 75a, the Utva 75 AG, the Utva 70, and the Coyote), is also compelled to produce mobile ramps, small boats, satellite antennas, manifolds, sprinklers, bicycle frames, and other products in the survival program. Unfortunately, production to meet the needs of the VJ, because of the sanctions and the difficult financing of needs to equip the Army, can no longer be a sufficient guarantee of investments in new development programs.

Modernization of the G-4 Aircraft

Utva is now the principal facility for repairing Supergaleb aircraft (the G-4) and a cooperator in repairing the structure and installations of the Orao aircraft. Aside from production in the Lasta program, it is also a facility for modernizing the G-4 and for manufacturing spare parts used in repairing aviation equipment. Contracts have also been signed with the Army of Yugoslavia for certain other jobs in repairing and manufacturing equipment, but all these programs employ only a small portion of the production capacity the factory now possesses. Production of

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piston and jet combat-training and combat planes as well as many other pieces of equipment and systems, by all appearances, will wait for some new time.

Until then, the Pancevo aircraft factory, according to its managing director Ivan Dundjerski, will be working on supplemental programs—for civilian purposes. With sales on the domestic market, it should be ready and waiting for the removal of the sanctions, when it will start up the frozen production programs and enter the world market.

Serbia

Opposition Leaders on Prospects of War in Croatia

AU0703115395 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 4-5 Mar 95 p 3

[Article by S.P., S.N.A., and V.V.: "What If UNPROFOR Leaves?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—The end of this month has been designated D day for the former Yugoslavia. By this date, the last UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] soldier—as specified by the Croatian leadership's decision—should have withdrawn from the territory of the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK]. Many people see this as the beginning of a new, even bloodier war. Opposition leaders have been telling NASA BORBA whether this will happen and what the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] should do in that case.

Vojislav Kostunica, president of the Democratic Party of Serbia, believes that the Croatian decision will be revoked. "If, however, it turns out that the Croatian decision is final," says Kostunica, "then we are on the threshold of a new, graver war. In this context, we need to keep in mind the recently signed agreement on military cooperation between the Srpska republic and the RSK, and the FRY's military and moral obligation to help the Krajina Serbs."

Zarko Korac, vice president of the Citizens Alliance of Serbia, says: "UNPROFOR should withdraw by 31 June, which means that there are still three months left to find some sort of a solution. However, if UNPROFOR does leave, it will heighten the risk of war."

"The danger of the Bosnian war escalating and a new war in Croatia is a reality over the next two months. Whether it will happen depends very little on Belgrade. In my opinion, the Americans present the greatest danger as far as the escalation of the war is concerned, while Karadzic's radicalism runs parallel to this. U.S. radicalism is reflected in Congress; Karadzic's in what is considered to be his political position," says Milan Bozic, member of the Serbian Renewal Movement's top leadership.

Vojislav Seselj, president of the Serbian Radical Party, is not convinced that UNPROFOR will withdraw. Everything implies that the Croats' resolve is wavering, says Seselj.

"If UNPROFOR withdraws, the danger of war will be greater than it is now, but according to our information, the Croats do not have the strength for a wide-scale offensive on the RSK. All operations will be of a limited nature," Seselj says.

Zoran Djindjic, president of the Democratic Party, also doubts that UNPROFOR will withdraw. The Democratic Party, claims Djindjic, has reliable information (from European diplomatic circles) that this is just haggling and putting additional pressure on the FRY.

"Tudjman will propose a redefinition of UNPROFOR's mandate and its redeployment with the possibility of UNPROFOR staying on the borders of the former Croatia. On one hand, this will be a great concession, and on the other, additional pressure on Belgrade to recognize Croatia," says Djindjic.

Zarko Jokanovic (New Democracy) hopes that the world will succeed in forcing Croatia to suspend its decision, even if it means threatening it with sanctions.

Russian Delegation Discusses Economic Relations

95BA0167D Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 7 Feb 95 p 1

[Unattributed article: "President of Republic of Serbia Receives Russian Government Delegation: Milosevic: Serbia and FRY Attach Special Significance to Economic Relations With Russian Federation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Slobodan Milosevic and Oleg Davydov, RF [Russian Federation] minister of foreign economic relations, said that the international community's hesitation in moving to lift the sanctions threatens peace and security in the broader European region; support from the Russian Government for efforts being made by our country toward a peaceful settlement of the crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.*

The president of the Republic, Slobodan Milosevic, yesterday received Oleg Davydov, the deputy prime minister and minister of foreign economic relations of the Russian Federation, who is paying an official visit to our country as the head of a Russian Government delegation.

During the cordial and amicable meeting, which was attended on our side by Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic and Federal Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic and on the Russian side by Minister of Agriculture Nazarchuk and Derezhev, the general manager of "Gaseksport," the greatest amount of attention was devoted to intensifying the development of overall bilateral relations between Serbia or the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and the Russian Federation, especially strengthening mutual economic ties and cooperation, for which a great deal of interest was demonstrated by both sides.

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Expressing his satisfaction with the official visit to our country by a high-ranking government delegation from Russia, President Milosevic emphasized that Serbia and the FRY attach special significance to economic relations with the Russian Federation. Most of the talk concerned subjects on the agenda for official talks between delegations of the two governments. The shared conviction was expressed that any agreements signed between the partners will be realized successfully and efficiently, and that the reciprocal flow of economic cooperation will continue to take place.

The high-ranking guest from Russia offered the Russian Government's support for efforts being made by our country toward a peaceful settlement of the crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and toward the establishment of stability and conditions for the economic and cultural advancement of the FRY. He also referred to the positive stance of the Russian Government regarding the lifting of the sanctions against the FRY, which are chasing away a solution to the crisis and promoting a continuation of the fighting, in which only the supporters of the war option are interested.

Thus, it was the shared opinion that the international community's hesitation in moving to lift the sanctions threatens peace and security in the broader European region. Russia, as a major power and an unquestionably significant international factor, does not want to participate in this erroneous practice.

Also emphasized in the talks was the two countries' shared determination to develop overall relations and cooperation in accordance with their interests and affirmed possibilities, to which this visit will no doubt greatly contribute.

The meeting was also attended by the Russian ambassador to Belgrade, Gennadiy Shikin.

Kosovo

Albanian Serbs Refuse To Settle in Decani

AU0603171295 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English No 566, 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Serbian press announced recently that the Serbian regime will soon began the construction of 224 new homes for Serbian and Montenegrin refugees from Albania at Ballaboq village near Degan [Decani]. In 1991, some 1,500 Serbs and Montenegrins, stimulated by the Serbian and Montenegrin regimes, left Albania voluntarily in order to settle in the territories of former Yugoslavia.

After having spent over a year in Montenegro they were forcefully settled on the territory of Kosova, in Degan district. They were never obstructed from going back to their homes in Albania and some of these families have already returned.

The remaining families refuse to settle in the Degan district alleging that they did not wish to settle in Kosova. The Serbian regime has already built a location of 119 houses in Junik village of Degan (100 per cent Albanian inhabited area). Serbian daily JEDINSTVO said that all those families who are wishing to do farming have also received farming land.

Vojvodina

Vojvodina Leader on New Focus of Autonomy Plans

LD0603182095 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1500 GMT 6 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Our Belgrade correspondent, Szilveszter Varga, reports on the new plans of one of the Hungarian organizations in Vojvodina.

[Begin Varga recording] The Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians [VMDK] is to modernize its plan on Hungarian autonomy in Vojvodina. The plan will be debated by the VMDK General Assembly on Saturday [11 March]. Before the assembly, which is to be held in Subotica, VMDK Chairman Andras Agoston told the Novi Sad paper MAGYAR SZO, that the VMDK insists on all three concepts of autonomy, however, it considers the minority autonomy based on the rights of the individual [szemelyi elvue kissebsegi oenkormanyzat] to be the dominant form, because, on the one hand, only this can be applied to all the Hungarians of Vojvodina and, on the other, in the event of its introduction, self-governments will be established only on the basis of Hungarian votes.

According to the VMDK, the model of the autonomy based on the rights of the individual could be a two-chamber house of representatives. According to plans, an executive body will also be formed and this will make it possible that deputies elected by the Hungarians will be responsible for education, culture, and information.

The VMDK's plan guarantees that the institutions of the autonomy based on the rights of the individual will be established on a multiparty basis.

At the end of his interview, Andras Agoston expressed his conviction that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic did not consider the Hungarians' autonomy plans to be dangerous for the interests of the Serb nation. Therefore, Agoston stressed the importance of foreign reactions, saying that there is a need for international support for the implementation of the autonomy plan. [end recording]

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